Cryptography and Security
An Adaptive Multi-Layered Honeynet Architecture for Threat Behavior Analysis via Deep Learning
Lukas Johannes Möller
The escalating sophistication and variety of cyber threats have rendered static honeypots inadequate, necessitating adaptive, intelligence-driven deception. In this work, ADLAH is introduced: an Adaptive Deep Learning Anomaly Detection Honeynet designed to maximize high-fidelity threat intelligence while minimizing cost through autonomous orchestration of infrastructure. The principal contribution is offered as an end-to-end architectural blueprint and
vision for an AI-driven deception platform. Feasibility is evidenced by a functional prototype of the central decision mechanism, in which a reinforcement learning (RL)
agent determines, in real time, when sessions should be escalated from low-interaction sensor nodes to dynamically provisioned, high-interaction honeypots. Because sufficient live data were unavailable, field-scale validation is not claimed; instead, design trade-offs and limitations are detailed, and a rigorous roadmap toward empirical evaluation at scale is provided. Beyond selective escalation and anomaly detection, the architecture pursues automated extraction, clustering, and versioning of bot attack chains, a core capability motivated by the empirical observation that exposed services are dominated by automated traffic. Together, these elements delineate a practical path toward cost-efficient capture of high-value adversary behavior, systematic bot versioning, and the production of actionable threat intelligence.
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Cryptography and Security · Cross-listed from cs.SE
A Causal Perspective on the Role of Training Dynamics for Interpreting Privacy Risks in Code Models
Hua Yang, Alejandro Velasco, Sen Fang et al. (+2 more)
Large
language models for code (LLM4Code) have greatly improved developer productivity but also raise
privacy concerns due to their reliance on open-source repositories containing abundant personally identifiable information (PII). Prior work shows that commercial models can reproduce sensitive PII, yet existing studies largely treat PII as a single category and overlook the heterogeneous risks among different types. We investigate whether distinct PII types vary in their likelihood of being learned and leaked by LLM4Code, and whether this relationship is causal. Our methodology includes building a
dataset with diverse PII types, fine-tuning representative models of different scales, computing training dynamics on real PII data, and formulating a structural causal model to estimate the causal effect of learnability on leakage. Results show that leakage risks differ substantially across PII types and correlate with their training dynamics: easy-to-learn instances such as IP addresses exhibit higher leakage, while harder types such as keys and passwords leak less frequently. Ambiguous types show mixed behaviors. This work provides the first causal evidence that leakage risks are type-dependent and offers guidance for developing type-aware and learnability-aware defenses for LLM4Code.
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All authors Hua Yang, Alejandro Velasco, Sen Fang, Bowen Xu, Denys Poshyvanyk
Cryptography and Security
Alisha Ukani, Hamed Haddadi, Ali Shahin Shamsabadi et al. (+1 more)
This paper presents a systematic evaluation of the
privacy behaviors and attributes of eight recent, popular browser
agents. Browser
agents are software that automate Web browsing using large
language models and ancillary tooling. However, the automated capabilities that make browser
agents powerful also make them high-risk points of failure. Both the kinds of tasks browser
agents are designed to execute, along with the kinds of information browser
agents are entrusted with to fulfill those tasks, mean that vulnerabilities in these tools can result in enormous
privacy harm. This work presents a framework of five broad factors (totaling 15 distinct measurements) to measure the
privacy risks in browser
agents. Our framework assesses i. vulnerabilities in the browser
agent's components, ii. how the browser
agent protects against website behaviors, iii. whether the browser
agent prevents cross-site tracking, iv. how the
agent responds to
privacy-affecting
prompts, and v. whether the tool leaks personal information to sites. We apply our framework to eight browser
agents and identify 30 vulnerabilities, ranging from disabled browser
privacy features to "autocompleting" sensitive personal information in form fields. We have responsibly disclosed our findings, and plan to release our
dataset and other artifacts.
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All authors Alisha Ukani, Hamed Haddadi, Ali Shahin Shamsabadi, Peter Snyder
Cryptography and Security · Cross-listed from eess.IV
Precise Liver Tumor Segmentation in CT Using a Hybrid Deep Learning-Radiomics Framework
Xuecheng Li, Weikuan Jia, Komildzhon Sharipov et al. (+4 more)
Accurate three-dimensional delineation of liver tumors on contrast-enhanced CT is a prerequisite for treatment planning,
navigation and response assessment, yet manual contouring is slow, observer-dependent and difficult to standardise across centres. Automatic
segmentation is complicated by low lesion-parenchyma contrast, blurred or incomplete boundaries, heterogeneous enhancement patterns, and confounding structures such as vessels and adjacent organs. We propose a hybrid framework that couples an
attention-enhanced cascaded U-Net with handcrafted radiomics and voxel-wise 3D CNN refinement for joint liver and liver-tumor
segmentation. First, a 2.5D two-stage network with a densely connected encoder, sub-pixel convolution decoders and multi-scale
attention gates produces initial liver and tumor probability maps from short stacks of axial slices. Inter-slice temporal consistency is then enforced by a simple three-slice refinement rule along the cranio-caudal direction, which restores thin and tiny lesions while suppressing isolated noise. Next, 728 radiomic descriptors spanning intensity, texture, shape, boundary and wavelet feature groups are extracted from candidate lesions and reduced to 20 stable, highly informative features via multi-strategy feature selection; a random forest classifier uses these features to reject false-positive regions. Finally, a compact 3D patch-based CNN derived from AlexNet operates in a narrow band around the tumor boundary to perform voxel-level relabelling and contour smoothing.
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All authors Xuecheng Li, Weikuan Jia, Komildzhon Sharipov, Alimov Ruslan, Lutfuloev Mazbutdzhon, Ismoilov Shuhratjon, Yuanjie Zheng
Cryptography and Security
VulnLLM-R: Specialized Reasoning LLM with Agent Scaffold for Vulnerability Detection
Yuzhou Nie, Hongwei Li, Chengquan Guo et al. (+5 more)
We propose VulnLLM-R, the~first specialized
reasoning LLM for vulnerability detection. Our key insight is that LLMs can reason about program states and analyze the potential vulnerabilities, rather than simple pattern matching. This can improve the model's generalizability and prevent learning shortcuts. However, SOTA
reasoning LLMs are typically ultra-large, closed-source, or have limited performance in vulnerability detection. To address this, we propose a novel training recipe with specialized data selection,
reasoning data generation,
reasoning data filtering and correction, and testing-phase optimization. Using our proposed methodology, we train a
reasoning model with seven billion parameters. Through extensive experiments on SOTA
datasets across Python, C/C++, and Java, we show that VulnLLM-R has superior effectiveness and efficiency than SOTA static analysis tools and both open-source and commercial large
reasoning models. We further conduct a detailed ablation study to validate the key designs in our training recipe. Finally, we construct an
agent scaffold around our model and show that it outperforms CodeQL and AFL++ in real-world projects. Our
agent further discovers a set of zero-day vulnerabilities in actively maintained repositories. This work represents a pioneering effort to enable real-world, project-level vulnerability detection using AI
agents powered by specialized
reasoning models. The code is available at~\href{https://github.com/ucsb-mlsec/VulnLLM-R}{github}.
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All authors Yuzhou Nie, Hongwei Li, Chengquan Guo, Ruizhe Jiang, Zhun Wang, Bo Li, Dawn Song, Wenbo Guo
Cryptography and Security · Cross-listed from cs.AR
aLEAKator: HDL Mixed-Domain Simulation for Masked Hardware & Software Formal Verification
Noé Amiot, Quentin L. Meunier, Karine Heydemann et al. (+1 more)
Verifying the security of masked hardware and software implementations, under advanced leakage models, remains a significant challenge, especially then accounting for glitches, transitions and CPU micro-architectural specifics. Existing verification approaches are either restricted to small hardware gadgets, small programs on CPUs such as Sboxes, limited leakage models, or require hardware-specific prior knowledge. In this work, we present aLEAKator, an open-source framework for the automated formal verification of masked cryptographic accelerators and software running on CPUs from their HDL descriptions. Our method introduces mixed-domain simulation, enabling precise modeling and verification under various (including robust and relaxed) 1-probing leakage models, and supports variable signal granularity without being restricted to 1-bit wires. aLEAKator also supports verification in the presence of lookup tables, and does not require prior knowledge of the target CPU architecture. Our approach is validated against existing tools and real-world measurements while providing innovative results such as the verification of a full, first-order masked AES on various CPUs
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All authors Noé Amiot, Quentin L. Meunier, Karine Heydemann, Emmanuelle Encrenaz
Cryptography and Security
Amulet: Fast TEE-Shielded Inference for On-Device Model Protection
Zikai Mao, Lingchen Zhao, Lei Xu et al. (+4 more)
On-device machine learning (ML) introduces new security concerns about model
privacy. Storing valuable trained ML models on user devices exposes them to potential extraction by adversaries. The current mainstream solution for on-device model protection is storing the weights and conducting inference within Trusted Execution Environments (TEEs). However, due to limited trusted
memory that cannot accommodate the whole model, most existing approaches employ a partitioning strategy, dividing a model into multiple slices that are loaded into the TEE sequentially. This frequent interaction between untrusted and trusted worlds dramatically increases inference latency, sometimes by orders of magnitude. In this paper, we propose Amulet, a fast TEE-shielded on-device inference framework for ML model protection. Amulet incorporates a suite of obfuscation methods specifically designed for common neural network architectures. After obfuscation by the TEE, the entire transformed model can be securely stored in untrusted
memory, allowing the inference process to execute directly in untrusted
memory with GPU acceleration. For each inference request, only two rounds of minimal-overhead interaction between untrusted and trusted
memory are required to process input samples and output results. We also provide theoretical proof from an information-theoretic perspective that the obfuscated model does not leak information about the original weights. We comprehensively evaluated Amulet using diverse model architectures ranging from ResNet-18 to GPT-2. Our approach incurs inference latency only 2.8-4.8x that of unprotected models with negligible accuracy loss, achieving an 8-9x speedup over baseline methods that execute inference entirely within TEEs, and performing approximately 2.2x faster than the state-of-the-art obfuscation-based method.
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All authors Zikai Mao, Lingchen Zhao, Lei Xu, Wentao Dong, Shenyi Zhang, Cong Wang, Qian Wang
Cryptography and Security · Cross-listed from cs.SE
Challenges in Developing Secure Software – Results of an Interview Study in the German Software Industry
Alex R. Mattukat, Timo Langstrof and Horst Lichter
The damage caused by cybercrime makes the development of secure software inevitable. Although many tools and frameworks exist to support the development of secure software, statistics on cybercrime show no improvement in recent years. To understand the challenges software companies face in developing secure software, we conducted an interview study with 19 industry experts from 12 cross-industry companies. The results of our study show that the challenges are mainly due to high complexity, a lack of security awareness, and unsuitable processes, which are further exacerbated by an immediate lack of skilled personnel. This article presents our study and the challenges we identified, and derives potential research directions from them.
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Cryptography and Security
PrivORL: Differentially Private Synthetic Dataset for Offline Reinforcement Learning
Chen Gong, Zheng Liu, Kecen Li et al. (+1 more)
Recently, offline reinforcement learning (RL) has become a popular RL paradigm. In offline RL, data providers share pre-collected
datasets – either as individual transitions or sequences of transitions forming trajectories – to enable the training of RL models (also called
agents) without direct interaction with the environments. Offline RL saves interactions with environments compared to traditional RL, and has been effective in critical areas, such as
navigation tasks. Meanwhile, concerns about
privacy leakage from offline RL
datasets have emerged. To safeguard private information in offline RL
datasets, we propose the first differential
privacy (DP) offline
dataset synthesis method, PrivORL, which leverages a
diffusion model and
diffusion transformer to synthesize transitions and trajectories, respectively, under DP. The synthetic
dataset can then be securely released for downstream analysis and research. PrivORL adopts the popular approach of pre-training a synthesizer on public
datasets, and then fine-tuning on sensitive
datasets using DP
Stochastic Gradient Descent (DP-SGD). Additionally, PrivORL introduces curiosity-driven pre-training, which uses feedback from the curiosity module to diversify the synthetic
dataset and thus can generate diverse synthetic transitions and trajectories that closely resemble the sensitive
dataset. Extensive experiments on five sensitive offline RL
datasets show that our method achieves better utility and fidelity in both DP transition and trajectory synthesis compared to baselines. The replication package is available at the GitHub repository.
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All authors Chen Gong, Zheng Liu, Kecen Li, Tianhao Wang
Cryptography and Security
Breaking ECDSA with Electromagnetic Side-Channel Attacks: Challenges and Practicality on Modern Smartphones
Felix Oberhansl, Marc Schink, Nisha Jacob Kabakci et al. (+9 more)
Smartphones handle sensitive tasks such as messaging and payment and may soon support critical electronic identification through initiatives such as the European Digital Identity (EUDI) wallet, currently under development. Yet the susceptibility of modern smartphones to physical side-channel analysis (SCA) is underexplored, with recent work limited to pre-2019 hardware. Since then, smartphone system on chip (SoC) platforms have grown more complex, with heterogeneous processor clusters, sub 10 nm nodes, and frequencies over 2 GHz, potentially complicating SCA. In this paper, we assess the feasibility of electromagnetic (EM) SCA on a Raspberry Pi 4, featuring a Broadcom BCM2711 SoC and a Fairphone 4 featuring a Snapdragon 750G 5G SoC. Using new attack methodologies tailored to modern SoCs, we recover ECDSA secrets from OpenSSL by mounting the Nonce@Once attack of Alam et al. (Euro S&P 2021) and show that the libgcrypt countermeasure does not fully mitigate it. We present case studies illustrating how hardware and software stacks impact EM SCA feasibility. Motivated by use cases such as the EUDI wallet, we survey Android cryptographic implementations and define representative threat models to assess the attack. Our findings show weaknesses in ECDSA software implementations and underscore the need for independently certified secure elements (SEs) in all smartphones.
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All authors Felix Oberhansl, Marc Schink, Nisha Jacob Kabakci, Michael Gruber, Dominik Klein, Sven Freud, Tobias Damm, Michael Hartmeier, Ivan Gavrilan, Silvan Streit, Jonas Stappenbeck, Andreas Zankl
Cryptography and Security · Cross-listed from cs.CV
AdLift: Lifting Adversarial Perturbations to Safeguard 3D Gaussian Splatting Assets Against Instruction-Driven Editing
Ziming Hong, Tianyu Huang, Runnan Chen et al. (+4 more)
Recent studies have extended
diffusion-based instruction-driven 2D image editing pipelines to 3D Gaussian Splatting (3DGS), enabling faithful manipulation of 3DGS assets and greatly advancing 3DGS content creation. However, it also exposes these assets to serious risks of unauthorized editing and malicious tampering. Although imperceptible
adversarial perturbations against
diffusion models have proven effective for protecting 2D images, applying them to 3DGS encounters two major challenges: view-generalizable protection and balancing invisibility with protection capability. In this work, we propose the first editing safeguard for 3DGS, termed AdLift, which prevents instruction-driven editing across arbitrary views and dimensions by lifting strictly bounded 2D
adversarial perturbations into 3D Gaussian-represented safeguard. To ensure both
adversarial perturbations effectiveness and invisibility, these safeguard Gaussians are progressively optimized across training views using a tailored Lifted PGD, which first conducts gradient truncation during back-propagation from the editing model at the rendered image and applies projected gradients to strictly constrain the image-level perturbation. Then, the resulting perturbation is backpropagated to the safeguard Gaussian parameters via an image-to-Gaussian fitting operation. We alternate between gradient truncation and image-to-Gaussian fitting, yielding consistent
adversarial-based protection performance across different viewpoints and generalizes to novel views. Empirically, qualitative and quantitative results demonstrate that AdLift effectively protects against state-of-the-art instruction-driven 2D image and 3DGS editing.
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All authors Ziming Hong, Tianyu Huang, Runnan Chen, Shanshan Ye, Mingming Gong, Bo Han, Tongliang Liu
Cryptography and Security · Cross-listed from cs.CV
Towards Robust Protective Perturbation against DeepFake Face Swapping
Hengyang Yao, Lin Li, Ke Sun et al. (+2 more)
DeepFake face swapping enables highly realistic identity forgeries, posing serious
privacy and security risks. A common defence embeds invisible perturbations into images, but these are fragile and often destroyed by basic transformations such as compression or resizing. In this paper, we first conduct a systematic analysis of 30 transformations across six categories and show that protection robustness is highly sensitive to the choice of training transformations, making the standard Expectation over Transformation (EOT) with uniform sampling fundamentally suboptimal. Motivated by this, we propose Expectation Over Learned distribution of Transformation (EOLT), the framework to treat transformation distribution as a learnable component rather than a fixed design choice. Specifically, EOLT employs a policy network that learns to automatically prioritize critical transformations and adaptively generate instance-specific perturbations via reinforcement learning, enabling explicit modeling of defensive bottlenecks while maintaining broad transferability. Extensive experiments demonstrate that our method achieves substantial improvements over state-of-the-art approaches, with 26% higher average robustness and up to 30% gains on challenging transformation categories.
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All authors Hengyang Yao, Lin Li, Ke Sun, Jianing Qiu, Huiping Chen
Cryptography and Security
ThinkTrap: Denial-of-Service Attacks against Black-box LLM Services via Infinite Thinking
Yunzhe Li, Jianan Wang, Hongzi Zhu et al. (+3 more)
Large
Language Models (LLMs) have become foundational components in a wide range of applications, including natural
language understanding and generation,
embodied intelligence, and scientific discovery. As their computational requirements continue to grow, these models are increasingly deployed as cloud-based services, allowing users to access powerful LLMs via the Internet. However, this deployment model introduces a new class of threat: denial-of-service (DoS) attacks via unbounded
reasoning, where adversaries craft specially designed inputs that cause the model to enter excessively long or infinite generation loops. These attacks can exhaust backend compute resources, degrading or denying service to legitimate users. To mitigate such risks, many LLM providers adopt a closed-source, black-box setting to obscure model internals. In this paper, we propose ThinkTrap, a novel input-space optimization framework for DoS attacks against LLM services even in black-box environments. The core idea of ThinkTrap is to first map discrete
tokens into a continuous
embedding space, then undertake efficient black-box optimization in a low-dimensional subspace exploiting input sparsity. The goal of this optimization is to identify
adversarial prompts that induce extended or non-terminating generation across several state-of-the-art LLMs, achieving DoS with minimal
token overhead. We evaluate the proposed attack across multiple commercial, closed-source LLM services. Our results demonstrate that, even far under the restrictive request frequency limits commonly enforced by these platforms, typically capped at ten requests per minute (10 RPM), the attack can degrade service throughput to as low as 1% of its original capacity, and in some cases, induce complete service failure.
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All authors Yunzhe Li, Jianan Wang, Hongzi Zhu, James Lin, Shan Chang, Minyi Guo