Papers

Cultural attitudes and social norms evolve over time, yet most cultural benchmarks for large language models (LLMs) treat culture as a static attribute of a country or region. We introduce ChronoCulture, a benchmark of 10,360 temporal pairs built from longitudinal survey data across 72 countries. Each pair contains the same survey question asked in the same country in an older and a newer year, with full population response distributions as ground truth. Across six LLMs, we find that models can often predict a country's attitudes at one point in time but do not reliably capture how those attitudes change. Their predictions for different years tend to stay close together, failing to capture much of the observed change. Specifying the intended year in the prompt also offers little overall improvement in alignment with survey responses. These findings suggest that models often present a largely static picture of cultural attitudes, highlighting the need to evaluate cultural awareness across time.

AI agent communities sustain lexical persistence, popular terms spread, recur, and achieve broad adoption, but whether they also develop the temporal semantic structure characteristic of human linguistic communities remains open. We compare MoltBook (AI agent community, 8 weeks), PTT (Chinese human BBS, 19 years), and Reddit (English human forum, in matched 8-week windows) using Compass-Aligned Distributional Embeddings (CADE), measuring semantic drift (B1), neighborhood stability (B2), and lag-1 autocorrelation of per-word drift trajectories. Across the platforms, lag-1 autocorrelation forms a memory-horizon continuum. AI agents' result clusters at the low end, while human platforms show longer-range temporal dependence. MoltBook exhibits approximately 2$\times$ the B1 drift and 20-30% lower B2 stability than both human platforms. As a partial control for community age, r/vibecoding (founded 2025-02-08) shows significant ACF in its first 8 weeks ($0.082$, $p<.001$) and over 15 weeks ($0.220$, $p<.001$); MoltBook's ACF remains non-significant ($p = 0.41$), consistent with the gap not reducing to developmental stage alone. We interpret this pattern as evidence that lexical diffusion alone does not guarantee diachronic semantic consolidation. The findings are consistent with a contrast between communities whose semantic trajectories accumulate long-range interaction constraints and communities whose outputs are repeatedly regenerated from largely fixed pretrained distributions.

Gossip, defined as evaluative talk about absent third parties, is widely seen as a uniquely human social practice. This study examines whether comparable discourse emerges spontaneously in a community of autonomous AI agents. We compare Moltbook, a Reddit-style platform populated by AI agents, with PTT, a large human-operated bulletin board in Taiwan. To reduce differences attributable to communicative setting, we analyze two public, asynchronous forums using the same operational definition of gossip. Gossip occurs on Moltbook, but its prevalence is 2.6 to 6 times lower than on PTT, depending on the denominator used. On both platforms, gossip frequently targets locally prominent figures, tends to elicit agreement from the first respondent, and is rarely presented as unsupported rumor. The clearest difference concerns how subsequent responses develop. Among threads containing at least one codable reply, challenges occur in 65.1% of human threads but only 21.3% of agent threads. Moreover, following an early aligning response, consensus remains unchallenged in 83.6% of agent threads, compared with 44.7% of human threads. This thread-level contrast remains after controlling for thread depth and board composition and under recalibration against two human annotators. Estimates based on individual reply turns are less robust and are therefore reported as bounds. These findings suggest that AI-agent communities reproduce the informational dimension of gossip, while the extent to which gossip performs comparable relational functions remains unresolved.

News outlets in poorer countries cover the world much as the leading outlets of rich countries do. Two explanations compete. One says they depend on Western news agencies for lack of resources. The other says they choose to copy prestigious outlets or whoever moves first. Observation cannot tell these apart. This study measured how closely 18 national outlets in Bangladesh, Kenya, South Africa, India, Malaysia and Nigeria followed four core outlets in how much attention they gave, which angle they took and when they published, on the wars in Ukraine and Gaza and two UN climate conferences in 2022-2024. It then ran a simulation in which language models acted as the outlets' editors and dependence, imitation and herding were switched on and off. Of nine tests, one held: outlets that relied more on wire copy published sooner after the core did. Tier and local stake showed no effect distinguishable from none. The herding test was supported and the imitation test was not. The simulation did not decide between the mechanisms, because the dependence rule, as fitted, reduced to publishing wire copy. Wire copy sets the clock of the periphery's foreign news. Whether it sets the agenda stays open.

Large language models are increasingly competent at leveraging scientific knowledge and existing computational tools to execute complex workflows. At present, little information exists on their ability to reconstruct tools when given limited descriptions of such tools. We introduce an evaluation titled ReproBAIT (Reproducing Biological AI Tools), which measures the ability of coding agents to design, implement, and train biological AI tools taken from published research across a range of information access conditions. The coding agent is securely sandboxed without internet access and receives training data, a fixed time and compute budget, and limited information about the tool to replicate. We then score the reproduced biological AI tool based on its performance (tool-specific metrics) on held-out data. We evaluated a set of biological AI tools of varying complexities: ProteinMPNN, an inverse protein folding tool, RFdiffusion3, an all-atom generative diffusion tool, and a closed-source molecular design tool. We institute a methodology to check for memorisation, as the open source tools are likely to be included in models' pretraining corpus. Across a range of leading closed- and open-source coding agents, we find substantial reproduction capability for some selected tools, though limited capability for a highly complex tool. We find moderate evidence consistent with memorisation, varying across coding agents. These results suggest that tool developers need to be increasingly cautious when releasing information about the tools publicly; re-creation of the tool based on such information could undermine a tool's commercial value or invalidate dual-use managed access strategies.

Simulated students let researchers test tutoring systems and teaching strategies before real learners are available, but only if the simulation reproduces where a particular learner succeeds and fails. The common approach asks a large language model to role-play a student, but a role does not model what this learner knows or will do next, so the model's own competence fills the gap. Simulated students perform at a level set by the model, differ little from one another, and seldom make the real learners' errors. We model the learner's behavior and recast student simulation as third-person prediction of the learner's next action. HACHIMI-II builds a student model from the learner's history, infers the learner's state for the current item or tutor turn, and compiles it into a behavior harness that constrains the next action. On three item-response datasets, the Wasserstein-1 distance between simulated and real student ability is 2.4–8.4$\times$ smaller than that of the strongest baseline. On two dialogue datasets, HACHIMI-II reproduces real student errors with the same knowledge type, locus, and mechanism 1.8–5.1$\times$ more often than the strongest baseline, and ablations trace the gains mainly to the explicit learner state. Predicting the learner makes capable models usable as simulated students.

Social psychology has long described how people can be persuaded to interpret a harmful act as moral. Recent research suggests that Large Language Models (LLMs) echo aspects of human psychology, from cognitive biases to social conformity. This raises a question with direct safety implications: can LLMs be moralized to bypass safety guardrails? We answer this question with a multi-agent framework grounded in Moral Foundations Theory (MFT). Given a harmful request that is initially refused, our agents diagnose which moral foundation (MF) the prompt is violating, identify a justifiable foundation under which the same request appears virtuous, rewrite the prompt accordingly, and reinforce it with generated precedents of comparable moral reframing. We evaluate our framework on harmful prompts from three well-known jailbreak datasets across five open-source and proprietary models. Our analysis reveals that models are highly susceptible to moralization, exhibiting high single-trial jailbreak rates with success increasing further under repeated attempts. We also find that safety benchmarks are imbalanced in the MFs they violate, concentrating on foundations toward which models already exhibit biases.

Existing student models in educational applications largely focus on student responses to questions. However, as tutoring becomes more accessible at large scale, it is important to analyze dialogues between tutors and students, which may reveal fine-grained evidence on student knowledge. In this work, we propose a unified framework that models both student responses to questions and tutor-posed subtasks during dialogues on a shared item response theory (IRT) scale. We first identify mathematical subtasks in tutoring dialogues, rewrite them into self-contained questions, and identify the correctness of student responses to these subtasks. We then develop an IRT framework that estimates question/subtask difficulty from text, tracks students' evolving abilities across question-answering and dialogue interactions, and a novel method to leverages tutor moves between consecutive subtasks to regularize their difficulty values. We evaluate our framework on two real-world math education datasets containing both human- and AI-tutored dialogues. Results show that our framework outperforms strong baselines on both question difficulty prediction and response correctness prediction.

Compute cost in automated essay scoring (AES) is usually treated as a technical efficiency issue rather than a measurement design concern. Yet deployment decisions require more than reporting latency, model size, or inference expense. In high-stakes settings, total burden includes validation, monitoring, adjudication, compliance, and governance; in instructional settings, pricing, licensing, and integration may dominate cost. This paper reframes AES as a cost-constrained measurement system and introduces the Cost-Aware Measurement Design (CAMD) Framework, a four-layer structure consisting of metering, allocation, unit economics, and decision, for translating computational and workflow resource records into decision-relevant cost constructs. Direct cost is specified as monetary outlay plus attributable labor and time, and two criteria, design attribution and auditability, determine what the cost boundary excludes. Burdens that satisfy neither criterion, such as institutional capability and governance posture, are represented as constraints on which designs are admissible rather than priced. The paper defines cost per defensible score (CPDS) and argues that AES systems should be compared by quality-cost sufficiency: minimizing cost among defensible scoring designs that satisfy measurement requirements. Scoring volume conditions all four layers, so cost per defensible score is treated as a function of scale rather than as a single transferable number. CAMD provides a portable basis for representing, comparing, and evaluating cost across AES studies and deployment contexts.

Benchmarks shape how model capabilities are measured and interpreted, yet their scores can obscure whose conventions, contexts, and judgments define successful performance. We introduce a user-centric audit framework that distinguishes users who contribute benchmark content from those whose needs evaluation results are intended to represent. The framework operationalizes seven dimensions across benchmark content, metadata, documentation, and scoring procedures. Across 16 resources, we find that American-centered conventions account for 62.4-94.4% of matched signals in 11 text benchmarks, while geographic visibility in five image-text resources is concentrated and strongly associated with national GDP share (mean Pearson r = 0.780; Spearman p = 0.778). Documentation reveals a systematic source-target gap: all 16 resources operationalize source-user context, but none operationalize target-user context. Paired scoring experiments further show that meaning-preserving answer variants reduce DROP exact-match accuracy from 100.0% to 33.3%, while TruthfulQA exhibits metric-dependent reductions in reference similarity. Our framework and documentation checklist make user assumptions auditable, clarifying what benchmark scores represent and where evaluation claims are supported.

Online memes are often carriers of unsafe content such as disinformation and propaganda. Their rapid evolution in response to news events and strong dependence on contextual information make it difficult for platforms and moderators to detect and moderate them effectively. Moreover, existing moderation studies typically classify memes as safe or unsafe based on individual images, lacking the ability to perform broader provenance analysis, i.e., where a meme originates, how it spreads, what cultural symbolism it represents, whether it poses potential risks to society, etc. To bridge this gap, we introduce MemeTrace, a multimodal LLM-based agent that automatically traces the provenance and potential risks of emerging memes. We evaluate MemeTrace on Meme100, a dataset of 100 real-world memes, using both human annotation and automatic metrics. The results demonstrate that MemeTrace substantially outperforms the VLM baseline. More importantly, MemeTrace achieves higher accuracy in detecting unsafe memes, especially those involving disinformation and sensitive content, and remains robust under visual perturbations.

Agentic remote sensing is evaluated on how many questions it can answer, whereas crisis response depends on whether its answers can be relied on and how much of the decision can safely be handed to the agent. This paper argues that autonomy should be earned, not assumed: An Earth-Observation (EO) agent should be granted autonomy in proportion to demonstrated reliability, epistemic honesty and verifiability. The position is supported by an evidential meta-analysis of twelve agentic RS/EO/GIS benchmark studies from peer-reviewed venues. Only one repeats runs, three contain unanswerable tasks and none measures calibration. Their own tables show that completed workflows are often not correct (task success exceeds tool-call correctness by up to 54pp on identical queries), that the gap to an expert trajectory widens overall with trajectory length (from 7 to 56pp), and that capability does not predict abstention (Spearman r from -0.25 to 0.50, all n.s.). The paper then contributes three EO-specific trust properties, an autonomy ladder for crisis EO tasks, and a readiness protocol that replays archived emergency activations before any live use. In this context, current evidence justifies assistive roles only.

Evaluation for automatic crisis reporting should measure what practitioners need, not what is convenient to compare. Through LLM-assisted, author-approved content analysis, we derive a 15-slot information schema from professional humanitarian situation reports using qualitative content analysis, then evaluate 121 human and 261 LLM-generated reports across five disasters and three hazard types. Under google/gemini-3.7-flash on Cyclone Idai, the best machine arm is nominally above the empirical human ceiling (0.827 vs. 0.821), but the difference is statistically indistinguishable from zero (95% bootstrap CI $[-.049,.059]$; permutation $p=.852$), and the ordering does not replicate under openai/gpt-5.6-luna. On a blind 100-item Idai sample, the author agrees with the Gemini judge at 0.910 accuracy and unweighted Cohen's $\kappa=.799$. All four judges clear the plan's raw-agreement criterion of .7; only Gemini reaches .7 on chance-corrected $\kappa$. Across the three primary events, machine reports reproduce 5.4-11.0% of same-day official figures. Across those same events, raw exact-number matching links 14.3-19.6% of official figures and 85.4-90.1% of machine figures to the social stream; manual audit confirms 45/50 declared absences, 4/25 official matches, and 24/25 machine matches semantically. The issuing-provenance gap is positive in all 12 observed event-judge cells: report date, organisation, series, and authority were not supplied at professional-report coverage in any cell. On the three primary events, ROUGE-L is uninformative, BERTScore is negatively associated with completeness after multiplicity correction, and a generic LLM judge changes sign.

Benchmarks report what an Artificial Intelligence (AI) agent can do on a task suite, but not whether one released version has been engineered with the controls that make it reliable, safe and observable, or how strongly that is shown. This paper proposes AgentStripes, an evidence-graded maturity model for AI agents. It defines levels (0 to 7 stripes), process areas (12 areas holding 40 capabilities), three gates (basic, safety, proof) that hold an agent at a level however high its score, and evidence grades E0 to E5. Each applicable capability receives a rating from 0 to 3 and a separate evidence level; these are combined into a credit, aggregated into a severity-weighted score and converted into stripes that the gates limit. Instruments gather evidence, language-model judges interpret it under explicit criteria, and the arithmetic is deterministic. The model is compared with standards at topic level without a claim of conformance, and an unexecuted validation protocol is specified. An empirical evaluation (exploratory, non-confirmatory) of 30 public Python agent repositories, with static evidence only, is a demonstration and not a validation: static evidence caps every final stripe at 2, 26 repositories end at one stripe and 4 at two, and this distinction is unreliable, since re-judging changed the final stripe of 4 of 22 repositories (engine, dossier and panel changed), whereas none of 8 panel-only repeats, all at stripe 1, changed. The parameters are expert conventions without outcome based calibration, and the stripes have not been shown to predict reliability or safety.

Fairness constraints in predict-then-optimize pipelines are necessarily enforced on predicted outcomes $\hat{y}$, since true outcomes $y$ are unobserved at decision time. We study whether a demographic parity constraint enforced this way continues to hold against $y$, and how the resulting violation scales with prediction error. Using a budget-constrained allocation problem solved as a linear program, we show empirically that the true-outcome fairness gap grows with prediction error $\sigma$ and saturates, well fit by $c(1 - e^{-\sigma/\tau})$ with $c = 0.1545 \pm 0.0103$ and $\tau = 3.9045 \pm 0.3745$; its mean is invariant to sample size while its variance decays at the standard $O(1/\sqrt{n})$ rate. We derive a two-part theoretical bound: a closed-form local sensitivity result showing the gap's first-order response to prediction error depends on only two individuals per group, validated against the solver to within three significant figures; and a universal, error-independent ceiling following from the boundedness of the decision variable, confirmed consistent with but looser than the empirical saturation level. On US Census income data, enforcing demographic parity on a trained predictor's output reduces an unconstrained disparity in true income to roughly one-third of its original size, leaving 34.4% $\pm$ 3.3% (California) and 35.7% $\pm$ 1.8% (Texas) of the disparity intact and undetectable from the predictions alone – consistent not only in mechanism but in approximate magnitude across two states with different demographics and income distributions, and stable across ten independent train/test splits in each. A fairness constraint that appears fully satisfied at decision time can mask a substantial, systematic violation of the outcome it was meant to protect.

Annotator disagreement is increasingly recognized as a meaningful property of subjective tasks, rather than merely noise to be removed. Predicting which items are likely to be contested could help allocate annotation effort and route difficult cases to human review. We propose predicting disagreement from interpretable semantic properties of the text. An LLM answers a set of binary questions covering harmful-content characteristics, disagreement-related cues such as borderline severity and missing context, and language-sensitive cues such as local slurs. A classifier predicts disagreement from these answers, and we analyze which questions contribute most to the predictions. Across four datasets in English, German, and Turkish and three open-weight LLMs, our structured question features outperform direct prompting by 10.5 ROC-AUC points and the strongest text-based baselines by 5.0 points. A compact subset of eight questions performs within 1.5 ROC-AUC points of the full twenty-question set. In leave-one-dataset-out evaluation, models retain roughly 90-95% of their in-domain ROC-AUC. Across models and datasets, questions about derogation, missing context, and decision boundaries serve as the strongest predictors, suggesting that what makes harmful content contested is partly observable in the text.

Large language models (LLMs) increasingly act as personal assistants; however, little is known about how they capture national-level preferences on a global scale. Given that "time" is a universal and representative concept, we examine LLMs' time preferences by varying only users' country and measuring the compensation LLMs deem appropriate for a 60-minute appointment delay. We then compare LLMs' responses with GDP per capita on Purchasing Power Parity (GDP_PPP), Mean Income, and a literature-based index (Patience Score). Our results across 193 countries and 5 LLMs demonstrate that people's time across the world is evaluated in noticeably different ways among LLMs, as well as varying levels of robustness under prompt variations. LLMs consistently recommend the highest compensation for Europe, but mostly the lowest for Africa. Based on GDP_PPP, LLMs underestimate the value of time for users living in Asia and South America. These findings indicate that geographical patterns are embedded in LLMs and may translate in different treatment in agentic settings.

People increasingly bring their health questions to ChatGPT, yet safety evaluations of LLM health advice rest almost entirely on clinician-authored vignettes, synthetic prompts, or simulated user profiles. The gap is widest for the Global South, where concerns about demographic bias and unsafe recommendations are well documented but have never been tested on real usage. We present, to our knowledge, the first demographically grounded safety evaluation of real-world health conversations with ChatGPT. From a consent-based data-donation corpus of 202,590 conversations from 1,252 users in India, Nigeria, Brazil, and Pakistan (December 2022 to February 2026), each linked to self-reported age and gender, we identify 15,555 health conversations, classify their health intent using an LLM classifier adapted from an established taxonomy, and score response safety under both a context-blind and a user-context-aware rubric. Roughly one in five health conversations receives a high-risk rating. Risk concentrates in symptom and condition queries and recurs through identifiable failure modes: unsafe medication or dosage guidance, harmful self-diagnosis, missing safety warnings, encouraging over-reliance on the model, and failure to refer users to professionals. Supplying the user's own accumulated context raises the high-risk share by 13-17 percentage points, and about one in four conversations rated safe in isolation turns out to be unsafe for the specific person asking. Safety evaluations built on synthetic cases are likely to miss these harms.

Automating AI research creates a positive feedback loop between software capability and research effort. We study a stochastic realisation of this loop in which independent, positive, multiplicative improvements arrive at a rate proportional to a power of current capability. Within this model, randomness leaves the deterministic explosion threshold unchanged but replaces the blow-up date by an explicit distribution. For equal-sized improvements the explosion time is a geometrically weighted sum of independent exponentials; its $q$-series representation gives its transforms, moments and tail behaviour, including a two-term small-time asymptotic. For Lomax-distributed improvement sizes the explosion time is exactly Gamma distributed. Self-similarity implies that, with parameters known, the relative uncertainty about the remaining time does not vanish as explosion approaches. We formulate a fixed-sample test between constant and geometrically increasing idea-arrival rates. If the baseline rate and the alternative log-rate increment $\ell$ are known, the minimum sample size at error level $\alpha$ is asymptotic to $(12z_\alpha^2)^{1/3}\ell^{-2/3}$, where $z_\alpha$ is the upper-$\alpha$ standard normal quantile. Uncertainty about the growth exponent near its critical value produces a $1/t$ tail with an explicit constant, and hence an infinite conditional mean waiting time, although explosion is certain given a positive exponent. Separate extensions show that a fixed deployment delay prevents explosion in the specified delayed-feedback models, that power-law diversion of effort shifts the growth threshold, and that in a deterministic oversight race a fixed allocation share does not change the asymptotic regime, except at a critical equality of exponents. Numerical illustrations, which are not empirical forecasts, show how timing and detectability depend on the granularity of improvements.

Data trading markets that span industries and regions are expanding, but the implicit trust that supports data use within an organization does not carry over to cross-domain exchange. This paper examines the Data Credit Guarantee Organization (DCGO), a proposal to institutionalize trust through third-party verification and certification, and asks what it means to trust data, what such certification can support, and under what conditions DCGO outperforms existing trading models. We decompose trust in data into four layers: authenticity of entity, authenticity and integrity of data, rights and conditions of use, and history and auditability. A third party can certify authenticity but not the correctness of content, and DCGO is positioned as a trust anchor spanning existing marketplaces and data spaces. We then extend the Law Merchant model with three data-specific properties, namely imperfect ex-post detection, cheap pseudonyms, and non-rivalry of harm, and compare bilateral trading with DCGO by agent-based simulation. DCGO keeps the buyer's payoff near its theoretical upper bound regardless of the market environment, whereas bilateral trading loses even when fraud is always detected. Identity verification proves to be a prerequisite for record sharing, and pre-verification is the only function that limits the spread of harm. On the seller side, honest sellers join voluntarily whenever the price premium exceeds the fee. Lock-in and a critical mass for diffusion, however, call for fee governance and support for entry.

Soil organic carbon (SOC) is an indicator of agricultural soil condition and carbon storage, but numerical outputs from large language models (LLMs) require validation before use in monitoring or management. We evaluated seven general-purpose LLM configurations on three direct-response tasks: estimating 0–10 cm SOC concentrations for 308 Australian paddocks under two information conditions, calculating SOC stock in 120 matched scenarios, and comparing 300 paddock pairs. References were measured SOC records or deterministic calculations; response validity, repeated-call dispersion and estimated API cost were assessed separately. Additional measured soil attributes reduced concentration mean absolute error by 13–62% across configurations, although high-SOC underprediction and paddock-specific errors persisted. Six configurations were highly accurate in stock calculations using equation-native units without coarse fragments, but accuracy declined with physically equivalent alternative units. Pairwise accuracy was 90.5–94.6% overall and 59.1–70.9% for 52 closely separated pairs; some configurations were sensitive to presentation order. Nearly all outputs were parseable, without necessarily being correct. The benchmark identifies three distinct requirements for AI-mediated SOC assessment: agreement with measured concentrations, unit-consistent stock calculations and reliable discrimination between sites. These findings support task-specific validation and auditable calculations, rather than unverified use of LLM outputs as ecological evidence.

Mini-publics are an increasingly popular family of democratic innovation to broaden citizen engagement. However, convening a representative sample in person is resource-intensive, and requires significant organizational efforts to coordinate travel, venue logistics, and facilitator training. This chapter outlines the design and development of the Stanford Online Deliberation Platform, initially tailored for Deliberative Polling, building upon insights from in-person moderation in that setting, but supporting a broader range of methods and approaches in the deliberative space. The platform supports structured conversations for small groups (ideally 8-15 people) with automated moderation functionality, enabling the groups to assume ownership of the deliberative conversation rather than relying on a moderator persona. We describe the platform's architecture and key design decisions, including the deliberation flow, room assignment, speaker management, speaking nudges, agenda management, outcome development, and real-time monitoring. Between its inception in 2018 and 2025, the platform has facilitated over 30,000 unique participants engaging in deliberations; we catalog 54 deliberations with at least 100 participants up to December 2025, spanning a diverse range of languages, countries, and topics. Finally, we establish a standardized vocabulary for future analyses by defining the terminology employed in the platform's data and documenting significant software revisions over time.

Coordinated online accounts can amplify messages and manipulate attention, but detecting such behavior is challenging due to confounding factors like account activity and item popularity. We propose a statistical null-model framework that assesses behavioral similarity between accounts by comparing observed coordination indicators against activity- and popularity-conditioned reference distributions. By combining evidence across multiple indicators and partners, our method can identify suspicious coordination links more accurately. Evaluations on nine labeled information-operation datasets involving over 152 thousand accounts show that aggregating p-values multiplicatively across indicators and partners yields improved detection performance. While results vary across information operations, this approach offers a generalizable and statistically principled tool for uncovering coordinated online behavior.

While it is known that quantization of large language models (LLMs) reduces memory usage via lower-bit weights, studies quantifying the resulting impact on energy usage and carbon intensity are scarce. We present the first unified evaluation of weight-only quantization strategies for LLM inference across varying input/output lengths and GPUs, highlighting differences in energy efficiency in addition to accuracy degradation and runtime. We study quantized inference on Llama 2 7B, Phi 3.5 Mini Instruct, OLMo 1B, Qwen 2.5 7B, and Qwen 2.5 14B across GLUE MNLI, MMLU, HumanEval, and GSM8K datasets, evaluating 10 post-training quantization (PTQ) strategies on NVIDIA H100, A6000, A100, and L4 GPUs. We identify a novel trend showing that quantization techniques tend to exhibit peak energy efficiency relative to full-precision baselines when inputs are sufficiently long and outputs are short. Furthermore, we show that quantization strategies become marginally more energy-efficient relative to full-precision models as batch sizes increase, though gains are modest. Notably, fused-kernel implementations such as EETQ int8 and Bitsandbytes int8 offer the highest energy savings, up to 4x compared to FP32 on short text generation, with negligible accuracy loss. Finally, we observe that energy usage closely tracks runtime on our evaluated benchmarks, indicating that, in practice, latency optimization can serve as a reliable proxy for reducing the environmental footprint of LLM services. We conclude with suggested directions for strategically selecting low-carbon quantization strategies based on specific inference requirements.

Learning management system traces are clustered to identify participation profiles, but unequal observation windows may cause profiles to reflect duration rather than participation alone. Using 16,448 complete learner–course sequences from 4,599 learners across 152 courses at a South African public university, we evaluated eight participation measures. All remained related to observation-window length even when expressed as rates or shares. Course-grouped adjustment reduced these relationships. Five retained measures were evaluated using K-means, Gaussian mixtures, Ward agglomerative clustering and K-medoids, with standardised measures and principal-component summaries. Evidence supported a broad two-profile grouping and a more detailed adjusted four-profile consensus: Gradually declining, Early-concentrated, Cyclical variable and Sustained active. Profile membership accounted for 2.87% of the variation in duration in the primary consensus, versus 38.18% using original measures. Mean assignment support was 0.739; 8.35% of assignments fell below 0.50, with greatest uncertainty in Sustained active. Two week-by-week sequence analyses agreed strongly with each other but only modestly with the four-profile consensus, indicating that the profiles combined multiple aspects of participation rather than distinct sequence patterns. Profiling should therefore assess duration effects, compare clustering methods and participation summaries, and report assignment consistency.

Artificial intelligence (AI) increasingly participates in communication, decision-making, and collective action, making the social organisation of human-machine interaction central to Hybrid Intelligence (HI). This chapter reviews the behavioural sociology of humans and machines through an HI lens, examining how interaction and feedback shape the combination of human and artificial capabilities. Drawing on sociology, social psychology, human-computer interaction, organisational studies, collective intelligence, and science and technology studies, it traces processes from individual social perception to cooperation in hybrid groups and organisational and institutional arrangements. Particular attention is given to how machine participation alters familiar mechanisms: social categorisation attaches expectations to designed identities, reciprocity may involve unequal social obligations, and algorithmic recommendations acquire authority through organisational practices. The chapter distinguishes observable machine behaviour from human interpretations of intention, understanding, and moral responsibility. It also considers how behavioural effects can extend beyond direct human-machine encounters, while separating established findings from proposed longer-term consequences. It argues that the benefits of HI depend on how roles, incentives, reliance, and accountability are organised, and identifies priorities for empirical research on these evolving sociotechnical arrangements.

AI agents now browse and buy on people's behalf, and benchmarks measure how well the agents perform. Far less is known about the other side of the transaction: whether a merchant's website lets an agent in, publishes terms precise enough to decide a purchase, and leaves evidence of what was agreed. This paper presents a merchant-side benchmark built on those three questions and reports a pilot of it. The central measurement, decision sufficiency, rates each criterion of a concrete buyer mandate (total cost, cancellation or return terms, service date, variant identity) as determinate, indeterminate, or unknown from the merchant's own published evidence. Readiness scores carry their evidence coverage and missingness bounds; access is reported separately for a declared bot, a declared headless browser, and a user-present browser; and each observed term is mapped to the RAILS admissibility class of the evidence that could support it in a dispute. Four large merchants received the full assessment: three refused the declared profiles at their offer pages, and no mandate could be confirmed as met, because each merchant left a total or a refund term undetermined. An access census of 555 sites of merchants that two payment processors publicly name as clients found the home page unreadable to both declared profiles at 105 sites (18.9%). A declared assessment of 330 merchants, scored by deterministic rules without a rater, found that evidence coverage rather than the score decides who can be ranked: 115 merchants (35%) reached the ranking threshold, rankable profiles scored a median of 89 to 90, and material terms was the one pillar well below the others, because the all-in total was decidable at 18 merchants. The pilot shows that the measurements can be taken; it does not validate them or rank merchants, and the weights and the projected clearing band await validation against outcomes.

AI-generated outputs are frequently perceived as highly creative, but also tend to be more similar to each other (homogenized) than human ideas. Does the human heterogeneity that extends beyond AI reflect valuable thinking that AI misses? Alternatively, is greater human heterogeneity driven by lower-quality ideas and less effective thinking that AI avoids? We developed Expansion of Divergent Generative Expression (EDGE) to map AI's semantic "blind spots" by assessing how strongly/weakly individual human ideas were represented in a task-matched AI semantic comparison set. Specifically, we compared human-generated vs. AI-generated ideas across three open-ended tasks: college admissions essays, alternative uses for everyday objects, and interpersonal advice. Across all three tasks, human responses extended into semantic regions sparsely covered by AI outputs. These distinctively human responses showed no meaningful deficits in creativity, quality, or effectiveness, were associated with equal-or-better academic performance, and with credibly superior ratings and achievement for some outcomes. These ideas were thus not merely poor-performing variation; they performed as well as or better than ideas that overlapped more strongly with AI ideas. More distinctive human ideas tended to receive higher creativity ratings, but this relationship was weak or reversed for AI ideas. Taken together, these results suggest that differentiation among human-generated ideas does not reflect poor thinking that AI can safely omit, and instead may afford both individual and population-level advantages.

Federated learning allows hospitals to train a shared mortality model without pooling their records, but published comparisons of aggregation strategies rarely control the evaluation protocol. This study compared seven strategies (FedAvg, FedProx, SCAFFOLD, FedAdagrad, FedAdam, FedYogi and FedCluster) on two federations built with one pipeline: 12 care units of a hospital in MIMIC-IV and 49 hospitals in eICU-CRD. Each strategy was tuned and selected on validation data by the same rule, and every comparison was repeated across 10 seeds with Friedman and Holm-corrected tests. SCAFFOLD ranked first in both federations (AUC-ROC 0.886 and 0.819) and in 17 of 18 variants, but its margin over the runner-up never exceeded 0.008, and a control sharing its local optimizer attributed most of its margin over FedAvg to drift correction. On the multi-hospital federation, federated training matched centralized training. In the care-unit federation, three protocol choices changed discrimination by more than the choice of strategy did: discharge-coded predictors (+0.038 in AUC-ROC), client-level SMOTE (up to -0.074), and evaluating the last instead of the best validation round (up to -0.084). Platt scaling on validation data repaired the risks distorted by imbalance corrections without loss of discrimination. Studies should therefore fix the protocol before ranking algorithms.

On many estimates, artificial general intelligence (AGI) is likely to emerge within the next few decades or even sooner. Once it does, it may quickly surpass human intelligence, possibly by a huge margin. Some believe that the country that develops AGI first could attain global dominance. This prospect risks setting off intense competition between the United States and China. Indeed, a narrative has already developed that the superpowers are locked in an AI race, with the Trump administration proclaiming its determination to 'dismantle unnecessary regulatory barriers' to winning it. We argue that this approach presents three profound dangers. The first two are familiar from past arms races: being overtaken by a rival or triggering a war. The third is new: losing control of human beings' future to agents far more intelligent than we are, which could endanger our very survival. Striving to get to AGI first risks a race to the bottom on safety practices and regulation concerning them. China does not yet appear bent on racing to superintelligence. The United States should prioritise both unilateral and co-operative efforts to improve AI safety and avoid provoking a race that all humanity could lose.