Papers

We study fair division of indivisible items under eligibility constraints: each item may be assigned only to a subset of eligible agents. This model coincides with restricted assignment in scheduling, with agents as machines and items as jobs, and captures settings where work or resources must be split among parties with different capabilities. Eligibility makes the usual fairness benchmarks inadequate, as agents should not be measured against items they could never receive. We therefore use eligibility-aware versions of proportionality and envy-freeness, where an agent's proportional share splits each item equally among its eligible agents, and envy comparisons discount items the agents are not eligible for. Our main finding is a sharp chore–goods separation for proportionality. We focus on identical valuations: under arbitrary valuations, no online algorithm can guarantee even an $o(m)$-approximation for chores. For chores, Prop1 is achievable offline, whereas exact proportionality and proportionality up to any item are not. For online chores, the optimal approximation factor for Prop1 for deterministic algorithms is $\Theta(\sqrt m)$, with the lower bound holding even for unit-size jobs. For goods, Prop1 is again achievable offline, but the tight online bound drops to $\Theta(\log m)$. For envy-based fairness, the picture is different. Goods and chores are equivalent under eligibility-aware envy notions, while the choice of notion is decisive. Strong EF1 may fail to exist even offline and cannot be approximated online. In contrast, weak EF1 can be maintained online, while weak EFX separates offline from online. Together, these results give a systematic study of online proportional and envy-based fairness in restricted assignment and show which fairness guarantees remain achievable under eligibility constraints.

We study reward design for delegated representatives who acquire costly information and vote on a binary governance proposal. Effort improves both private information and delegated voting weight. We show that no payment rule can make sincere voting strictly optimal at every positive effort profile under a non-neutral prior, while fixed budgets limit accuracy in large symmetric committees. We then compare proportional sharing with a conditional rule that rewards only members of a sufficiently large winning coalition. Unlike proportional sharing, which supports sincere voting only through indifference, the conditional rule makes sincere voting strictly optimal at symmetric positive effort profiles. It supports sincere equilibria with the same effort as proportional sharing and, under suitable reward-cost conditions, with strictly higher effort and decision accuracy. Insincere equilibria may nevertheless coexist.

We show that computing an approximate mixed Bayes-Nash equilibrium in a discrete first-price auction with correlated priors is PPAD-complete. The key intermediate step in our reduction is the PPAD-completeness of computing an approximate Nash equilibrium in a new normal-form game, the hypergraph discrete first-price auction, which may be of independent interest.

How far can stochastic gradient descent ascent (SGDA) go by tuning its timescale ratio and step sizes in nonconvex min-max games? We answer this question for nonconvex-PŁ (NC-PŁ) games by establishing the first tight complexity of two-timescale SGDA with a fixed timescale ratio and non-increasing step sizes. For $\ell$-smooth games with an inner $\mu$-PŁ inequality, we prove a complexity lower bound $\Omega(\kappa^2\ell\varepsilon^{-2}+\kappa^4\ell\sigma^2\varepsilon^{-4})$, where $\kappa=\ell/\mu$ is the condition number, $\sigma^2$ is the gradient variance, and $\varepsilon$ measures the outer gradient norm. This matches existing SGDA upper bounds and establishes a complexity separation from Smoothed-AGDA (Yang et al., 22'). In addition, we show that SGDA can fail to find a stationary point when its timescale ratio is as small as $o(\kappa^2)$. Our negative results highlight the fundamental limitation of SGDA in NC-PŁ games, and justify the development of alternative methods.

Probability forecasts are calibrated when predicted probabilities match empirical outcome frequencies: among events assigned a probability $p$, we'd hope that the fraction of positive outcomes is close to $p$. We study the problem of sequential forecasting of binary outcomes. The classical $O(T^{2/3})$ bound on expected cumulative $\ell_1$-calibration error established by Foster and Vohra stood for over two decades until Dagan et al. reduced the exponent $2/3$ by an unspecified constant. We establish a new two-phase recursive labeling strategy for the sign-preservation-with-reuse game that yields the bound $O(n^{\alpha}t^\beta)$ for all choices of space and time. We then sharpen the reduction from upper bounds on sign preservation to calibration by modifying the equivalence of Dagan et al. to use only $O(\log T)$ instances of the sign-preservation-with-reuse game. This lets us establish an explicit bound of $O(T^{0.662942288})$, the first explicit exponent below $2/3$ for sequential calibration, by combining both improvements and choosing explicit feasible parameters.

When multiple agents share a cost budget, a common Lagrange multiplier can enforce the aggregate constraint but does not determine how its penalty should be allocated across agents. Uniform penalties ignore heterogeneity in the rewards agents sacrifice, while agent-specific multipliers may still rely on the same aggregate cost signal. We introduce Lagrangian Responsibility Allocation (LiRA), which learns each agent's share of a common multiplier by optimizing social welfare over a finite training horizon. The multiplier enforces the aggregate budget, while responsibility shares redistribute its influence without modifying the original rewards or constraints. For convex games under standard regularity conditions, varying these shares induces a smooth family of normalized generalized Nash equilibria in which active constraints remain at their budgets while welfare varies. To optimize responsibility before convergence, we derive a welfare gradient that accounts for both learning updates and the induced change in data distribution. Across CityLearn, MABIM, Harvest, and MetaDrive, spanning 3 to 400 agents, LiRA improves average social welfare by up to 29% over uniform and agent-specific multiplier baselines. Grid and driving costs remain within budget, inventory violations decrease, and Harvest makes more effective use of available budget.

Metric conditioning can change which equilibrium attracts learning dynamics without moving the equilibria of a differentiable game. We study how to use state-dependent symmetric positive-definite (SPD) metrics to select among known equilibria by keeping a designated equilibrium attracting while making a rival unstable. Building on classical results on matrix stability under positive-definite multiplication, we characterize when such destabilization is possible and show how restricting the metric to act independently on each player limits the stability changes that can be achieved at differential Nash equilibria. We then combine a stabilizing metric at the selected equilibrium with a destabilizing metric at the rival through smooth interpolation, yielding a single metric field that preserves every equilibrium of the game while assigning the desired local stability types. We also derive a step-size condition for implementing the method in discrete time. The approach is validated on a continuous-commitment stag hunt and an entropy-regularized iterated prisoner's dilemma, where it selects the desired equilibrium in both settings.

We study an online trading problem where a trader, given a sequence of i.i.d. prices drawn from a known distribution $F$ on $[0,1]$, must make irrevocable buy, sell, or hold decisions subject to storage constraints. We investigate achievable algorithmic performance measured in terms of regret, the difference between the expected profit of the hindsight optimal policy that knows the entire price sequence and an online algorithm. We analyze finite atomic and continuous distributions characterized by their local behavior around the median which we capture using a parameter $\beta$. The parameter $\beta$ quantifies how the mass of prices accumulates around the distribution median. We identify a new driver of algorithmic performance, demonstrating that median gaps coupled with an initial inventory level of zero can force regret scaling of $\Omega(T^{(\beta + 1)/(2\beta+4)})$ — establishing a novel spectrum of fundamental limits on algorithmic performance. We then study STARS, short for Storage Trading by Averaging Repeatedly across multiple Scenarios, which simulates possible future price scenarios to approximate the value-to-go function and make buy/sell/hold decisions. We show that STARS obtain near-optimal algorithmic performance (upto poly-logarithmic factors) across a broad range of distributions. In particular, it achieves $O(\log T)$ regret for finite atomic prices, $\widetilde{O}(T^{\beta/(2\beta+2)})$ for continuous distributions without a median gap and $\widetilde{O}(T^{(\beta+1)/(2\beta+4)})$ for continuous distributions with a median gap for $\beta \geq 0$.

We analyze a formal model of deliberation in which agents have probabilistic access to evidence and selectively disclose it to their peers in order to induce opinion change. We present theoretical and simulation results that tackle the question: does deliberation improve the collective accuracy of the group? Through a jury theorem we chart the conditions that allow wisdom of crowds to emerge after a few steps of deliberation, and, through simulations, we show how this effect is sensitive to the evidence acquisition mechanism and, implicitly, to the diversity in the initial evidence distribution.

We study the communication complexity of dominant-strategy incentive-compatible (DSIC) mechanisms for combinatorial auctions. For $\gamma \in [\log m, m]$, let $\mathsf{DSIC_{GEN}}(m, \gamma)$, $\mathsf{DSIC_{XOS}}(m, \gamma)$, and $\mathsf{DSIC_{GS}}(m, \gamma)$ denote the best approximation ratio attainable by a deterministic, individually rational, no-negative-transfers, DSIC mechanism using at most $2^\gamma$ communication over $m$ items, for general monotone, XOS, and gross substitutes (GS) valuations, respectively. We give a unified proof that shows $\mathsf{DSIC_{GEN}}(m, \gamma) = \Omega(m/\gamma)$, $\mathsf{DSIC_{XOS}}(m, \gamma) = \Omega((m/\gamma)^{1/5})$, and $\mathsf{DSIC_{GS}}(m, \gamma) = \Omega((m/\gamma)^{1/7})$. The GS lower bound answers an open question of~\cite{DobzinskiRV22}: although poly-communication welfare maximization for GS valuations admits a poly-communication deterministic truthful mechanism via VCG, no good approximation is possible in poly-communication for deterministic DSIC mechanisms. Additionally, the general lower bound establishes that $\mathsf{DSIC_{GEN}}(m, \gamma) = \Theta(m/\gamma)$ due to the deterministic DSIC $O(m/\gamma)$-approximation of~\cite{QiuW24}. We also obtain several results in the two-bidder setting. We show that attaining a $1.0001$-approximation for two weighted matroid-rank valuations (a subclass of GS) with a universally DSIC mechanism requires exponential communication. On the other hand, we give a poly-communication $(1+\sqrt{5})/2 \approx 1.618$-approximation for two submodular bidders using a universally DSIC mechanism. Prior to this work, it was not known whether even a poly-communication universally truthful mechanism could beat a $2$-approximation for two submodular valuations, nor whether a poly-communication universally DSIC mechanism could beat a $2$-approximation for two weighted matroid rank valuations.

We study the dimension defect of finitely many subspaces over an arbitrary field. We derive a symmetric, nonrecursive Grassmann-type formula for the dimension of their sum. The formula expresses the total dimension loss through intersections of a distinguished subspace with partial sums of the remaining subspaces, with coefficients determined by the number of subspaces involved. We also show that the formula admits a Shapley-value interpretation for the associated representable polymatroid. Grouping the correction terms by the number of participating subspaces yields a nonnegative dimension-defect profile. We prove that this profile is monotone and identify its successive gaps with the discrete curvatures of the average-rank profile. These gaps give exact remainders in two-sided defect bounds. Equality in either bound holds precisely when the images of the subspaces in the quotient by their common intersection form an internal direct sum. We also give an exact geometric decomposition of the Kinser slack into nonnegative quotient dimensions and characterize equality. Averaging these slacks over permutations and contractions recovers every defect curvature except the final one; additional representability constraints remain in the individual ordered slacks. Weighted and dual formulas accompany the expansion, and entropy analogues express the defect levels and curvatures as averages of mutual and conditional mutual information, respectively.

Modern online platforms commonly rank ads and organic content separately before blending them into a feed displayed to the user, overlooking externalities: an item's click-through rate depends on its surrounding content, not only on its own position. Recent learning-based feed generation mechanisms model some of these cross-type interactions to globally optimize for the whole feed's welfare. However, these approaches either fix the ordering of organic content, or lack exact strategyproofness guarantees for bidders. To combat these shortfalls, we introduce the Maximal-in-Range Transformer (MIRT) mechanism class, which uses a transformer to generate a range of candidate feeds that jointly order ads and organic content, and selects the welfare-maximizing feed in the range. However, there is a tension: strategyproofness requires the generated range to be bid-independent, even though a candidate feed's welfare depends linearly on the bids. Our key technical contribution is a reinforcement learning approach that incorporates both candidate generation and bid-aware selection into training, enabling a bid-independent transformer to learn to generate high-welfare ranges by accounting for both individual feed quality and the collective quality of the range. Additionally, we bound the pseudo-dimension of the MIRT class under hard attention, showing that near-optimal expected welfare is learnable with sample complexity polynomial in the transformer size and only logarithmic in the range size. Empirically, MIRT outperforms the previous non-strategyproof state-of-the-art feed models while remaining exactly strategyproof. Our results show that transformer-based auctions can deliver externality-aware whole-feed optimization without sacrificing exact incentive compatibility, removing a major obstacle to their practical deployment.

An important question in learning in games is whether players can learn to achieve efficient outcomes, those that maximize the sum of their utilities, without communication or coordination. Completely uncoupled learning algorithms, which use only each player's own past actions and utilities, can guarantee this in broad classes of games, but they typically require every player to follow the same algorithm. In this work, we ask whether one can design welfare-maximizing learning algorithms that are robust to a deviant player. To study this question, we take a well-studied welfare-maximizing learning algorithm as a testbed and consider what happens when every player except one follows it. First, we consider a deviant player who either (i) always plays the same action or (ii) selects their action uniformly at random. We show that such a player can significantly alter the long-run behavior of this algorithm, leading to states that are far from welfare-maximizing, and that no completely uncoupled learning algorithm is robust to such a player in every game. Next, we consider a strategic deviant player who acts in their own interest and show that this player can adopt a different learning algorithm to shift the long-run outcome in their favor. Moreover, we show that under any completely uncoupled welfare-maximizing learning algorithm, there is a game in which some player benefits from switching to a different completely uncoupled learning algorithm. These results show that completely uncoupled welfare-maximizing learning is fragile, even to a single deviant player, suggesting that robustness may require communication or coordination.

We study the worst-case efficiency of the random-offerer mechanism in bilateral trade relative to the first-best gains from trade. We construct a family of independent buyer value and seller cost distributions whose ratio converges to $0.436943488\ldots$, improving the previous upper bound of $0.460242308\ldots$. Our construction combines recursively nested seller distributions with downward transport of buyer values. The recursive structure allows contributions from different scales to accumulate, leading to stronger hard instances. We analyze this construction through a recurrence and obtain an analytic characterization of the limiting constant.

Braess paradox originates when latency at Wardrop equilibrium in traffic networks decreases because of removing edges. The graph-theoretic property of networks suffering from the Braess paradox was called vulnerability by Roughgarden in 2006; it was then characterized and algorithmically checked both for undirected and for directed nets. In this paper, we provide a decremental algorithm of linear amortized complexity to check vulnerability for dynamically evolving networks. The basic idea of our dynamic algorithm is to use a static algorithm that marks some edges as irrelevant for the vulnerability of the graph and ignore those edges for all subsequent runs of the decremental procedure. To get a linear amortized cost for every edge remotion, we also provide a new version of such a static algorithm that improves its complexity from O(n m^2) to O(m^2), that is in turn aligned with the cost of the best state-of-the-art static algorithm for vulnerability.

We study many-to-one, two-sided stable matching problems in which preferences are complementary and firms and workers may rank the same allocation differently. Here a coalition is a group of workers that can be jointly matched with a firm. With complementary preferences, a stable matching need not exist. We show that a stable matching exists for every instance when two conditions hold. The first requires each firm to have an anchor worker who is included in every feasible coalition that can be matched with that firm. The second is Transitive Alignment, which means there must be an overall ranking across different coalitions that is consistent with the workers' preferences. We propose CDAR (Combinatorial Deferred Acceptance with Reproposals), a Deferred Acceptance-style algorithm that permits reproposals, and prove its finite-time convergence and its output of a stable matching by constructing an $N$-digit potential function. Moreover, we show that, under strict preferences, the output of CDAR is Pareto optimal among stable matchings. The proposed framework naturally captures applications such as vehicle-route assignment for traffic safety and the misaligned interests of labor and management in wage negotiation.

A single auction can have both a shill-proof equilibrium and a non-shill-proof equilibrium in the model of Komo, Kominers, and Roughgarden. We give an explicit single item example with three bidder positions, publicly observed actions, positive winning prices, and a strictly regular i.i.d.\ value distribution. Real bidders have strict incentives in both equilibria. An initial public action conveys information about whether the final position is real. The resulting belief changes the middle bidder's response and reverses the first shill's strict preference between two actions. We verify both equilibria and compute their expected revenues.

This work identifies the dominance regions for discrete, simultaneous-move pursuit-evasion games on graphs. Existing geometric approaches provide efficient characterizations of winning regions, but typically provide only sufficient conditions and rely on open-loop strategies. To address these challenges, we develop a set-based dynamic programming approach to characterize the pursuer's winning and losing regions, providing necessary and sufficient winning conditions under worst-case behavior. The reachability analysis admits a set-chasing interpretation, allowing translation of dominance sets to feedback strategies that adapt to the players' positions in real time. For states where neither player can guarantee victory, we introduce an instantaneous matrix-game formulation and establish upper and lower bounds on the pursuer's winning probability. Simulation results validate the correctness of the dominance-region characterization and the proposed bounds.

We consider the problem of allocating $m$ indivisible items to $n$ agents. For $n \ge 2$, we define $\mu(n)$ as the largest $m$ for which every allocation instance with $n$ agents and $m$ items has an allocation that gives each agent at least her maximin share (MMS). We prove that for general monotone valuations, $\mu(n) = n + \Theta(\log n)$. This holds both for goods and for chores. For arbitrary valuations (not monotone), we prove that $\mu(n) = \log n + O(1)$.

Game-theoretic attribution explains a model by assigning credit to its features or training examples. The least core has attracted interest as an alternative to Shapley-style averaging because it can expose players that cause substantial harm in rare, high-value contexts. However, least-core allocations are generally nonunique, and the choice of allocation can affect the resulting explanation. In this study, we investigate how payoff selection and coalition sampling affect least-core attribution. Our experiments show that selector choice matters for distinguishing useful and harmful contributions, and that sampling can degrade harmful-player identification across the tested selectors even when useful players remain well identified. These observations motivate efficient computation with all coalition constraints and a well-defined selector. We introduce entropic least core (ELC), a smooth approximation whose unique minimizer follows a continuous path along the temperature to the nucleolus, a classical refinement of the least core. Our experiments show that ELC approximates the nucleolus faster than an LP-based nucleolus solver while retaining small payoff errors, with further GPU acceleration at larger problem sizes. In the tested full-coalition contextual-distractor games, ELC matches the minimum-norm selector in identification accuracy and more accurately ranks distractors by harm.

The Independent Chip Model (ICM) converts the chip stacks of the players remaining in a poker tournament into finishing-place probabilities and prize equities. It is the standard model in tournament solvers, but its definition considers all possible finishing orders, and exact computation has been regarded as intractable for large fields. The same mathematics appears in other fields; for instance, the ICM is a Plackett-Luce ranking model with stacks as weights. We present DE-ICM, a deterministic algorithm that computes the placement probabilities of all $n$ players for all paid places in $O(M n^{2})$ time, where the number $M$ of quadrature nodes is fixed for the admissible inputs and the target accuracy. Its numerical scheme allows the target to be set close to the accuracy of double-precision arithmetic. The algorithm evaluates a classical integral representation in which, conditional on a player's exponential clock, the number of players ahead is Poisson-binomial. A double-exponential quadrature on a single grid evaluates every integral; its truncation errors have closed-form bounds, and the step size, which controls the discretization error, follows from the field size. A numerically stable deconvolution then recovers each player's leave-one-out coefficients in $O(n)$ time from one shared product. On exactly solvable instances with up to 4,000 players, the worst observed relative error of an equity is $4.0 \times 10^{-14}$ and the worst absolute error of a placement probability $1.1 \times 10^{-14}$. The full placement matrix for 1,000 players takes 0.2 seconds on one CPU core.

Agentic buyers can cheaply fork a procurement task into many parallel negotiations, but concurrency is not free: every thread consumes resources, and simultaneous agreements create cancellation and commitment risk. We study a one-unit post-order sourcing problem with a single hard-deadline negotiation window, in which a planner jointly chooses the number of seller-facing negotiators and a common procurement price cap. The model combines a product-specific acceptance curve with fulfillment loss, per-thread cost, and excess-commitment cost. We establish three structural results. First, holding the per-thread acceptance target fixed, the marginal value of another negotiator decays geometrically, yielding a conditional concurrency threshold. Second, under a convex quantile curve, parallelism substitutes for concession: more concurrent negotiators imply a weakly lower per-thread acceptance target and price cap. Third, when prices are more dispersed, Agentic buyers benefit by searching harder for bargains, but suffer when they instead try to guarantee procurement by offering higher prices. We operationalize these results in the Concurrency-Aware Negotiation Optimizer (CANO), a deterministic optimizer that jointly determines the optimal negotiation concurrency and procurement price cap for an agentic procurement system. Across different analytic market configurations and extensive Monte Carlo, finite-data, non-Gaussian, and correlated-seller stress tests, CANO consistently outperforms common heuristic policies while validating the predicted structural properties.

We study last-iterate convergence in unknown two-player zero-sum discounted Markov games with bandit feedback. The players learn independently along a single trajectory without observing each other's actions. We develop Adaptive Regularized TD Learning (ARTD), which achieves a $\widetilde{\mathcal{O}}(t^{-1/4})$ duality gap bound for the current policies under a uniform hitting time assumption, with high probability simultaneously over all rounds and starting states. This improves the $\widetilde{\mathcal{O}}(t^{-1/(9+\nu)})$ rate of Cai et al. (2023), for any fixed $\nu>0$, under the same feedback model and hitting time assumption. Our algorithm requires no knowledge of the hitting time bound, the time horizon, or the confidence level. To stabilize policy learning as value estimates change, we separate fast temporal difference averaging from bounded value updates. We adapt log-barrier regularization to the progress of value estimation, controlling both policy and value errors throughout learning. Together, these mechanisms enable fast convergence of the policies actually played, even when the players learn independently from bandit feedback.

We study the complexity of Nash equilibrium computation in discrete Colonel Blotto games. For two-player general-sum Colonel Blotto with monotonic piecewise-constant battlefield payoffs, we show that computing an inverse-polynomial approximate Nash equilibrium is PPAD-hard, even with only two battlefields and a constant number of pieces per battlefield, thereby resolving an open question of [KPF+25]. Allowing more battlefields, the hardness persists when every battlefield payoff is $2$-piecewise constant with respect to either player's allocation. A general PPAD-membership theorem for multiplayer Blotto with arbitrary local reward functions then implies PPAD-completeness for both hardness results. Motivated by fixed-rank bimatrix games, we then identify a tractable frontier within two-player general-sum Colonel Blotto. If the social payoff has rank-$r$ structure, then, for every fixed $r$, an $\varepsilon$-Nash equilibrium can be computed in time polynomial in $B_1,B_2,k$, and $1/\varepsilon$. Thus constant-rank two-player Colonel Blotto remains tractable despite its exponentially large pure strategy spaces. Finally, we study multiplayer winner-takes-all Colonel Blotto with player-specific battlefield values and uncover a sharp tie-breaking frontier. If every highest bidder receives her full battlefield value, an exact pure Nash equilibrium can be computed in polynomial time for arbitrary binary-encoded budgets. In contrast, under ordinary equal splitting among highest bidders, we prove that computing an inverse-polynomial-accuracy Nash equilibrium is PPAD-hard even with only five players. This resolves an open question posed in concurrent work by Bichler and Ghosh [BG26], who established PPAD-hardness in the same player-specific equal-splitting setting when the number of players grows with the instance and asked whether hardness persists for a constant number of players.

Evaluating the causal effect of new features is a central goal for online platforms. While recent literature addresses limited testing traffic via centralized portfolio optimization, this perspective abstracts away a critical institutional reality: experimentation is operationally decentralized. The experimenters who develop new features also dictate which hypotheses to test, and they are typically rewarded based on empirical average treatment effects that are prone to upward bias. Left unchecked, this principal-agent conflict can severely erode platform value, a structural failure that conventional centralized levers, such as significance thresholds and traffic budgets, cannot resolve. By reframing experimentation as an incentive design problem, we demonstrate that two practical mechanisms, sample splitting and shrinkage, can effectively bridge this gap. Sample splitting aligns incentives perfectly at a bounded traffic cost, while shrinkage consumes no additional traffic and guarantees that interventions with negative expected effects are strictly unprofitable to field.

In decentralised priority coordination, agents announce priority levels and a shared resource serves them in decreasing order, as at an unsignalised intersection; the levels form the decision layer of a hierarchical controller. Such interactions are routinely replaced by a potential game, i.e.\ by a common objective, for analysis and design. This paper determines what that surrogate misses, using the Hodge decomposition of the incentives into a potential component, which a common objective can represent, and a harmonic component, which it cannot. For the linear payoff, both components are obtained in closed form on every conflict graph and for every deterministic tie-breaking protocol: in common units, the harmonic energy is the number of conflicts and the potential energy adds the number of adjacent pairs of conflicts. Consequently, for every rationality parameter, the best common-objective model of the agents' choice log-odds, weighted uniformly over unilateral moves, has a relative squared error of at least $1/(d_{\max}+1)$, where $d_{\max}$ is the largest number of conflicts of one agent; for an eight-vehicle intersection it is exactly one fifth, for any number of priority levels. Invisible to strict-improvement dynamics, the missed component is, under low-rationality log-linear learning with uniform revision and to leading order, the stationary probability current, and its energy sets the entropy-production rate. Payoff design cannot remove it: on the complete conflict graph of $N$ agents, under a total-order protocol and with at least three priority levels, every nonconstant rank-based payoff leaves a relative error of at least $1/N$, with equality exactly for affine payoffs.

When auction bidders misperceive their rivals, a seller can change not only the amount of information rent but also the states in which it is delivered. We ask when this payment-design opportunity survives a finite bidding interface, nonnegative-payment restrictions, and comparison with conventional auctions under the same beliefs. We formulate payment design as a linear program in nonnegative bidder rents. A single state can safely carry a report's rent when it is both cheapest for its intended type and least attractive to potential mimics. We characterize this alignment, bound the cost of a restricted payment architecture when alignment is imperfect, and use shadow prices when the rankings conflict. Own-type projection yields a unique optimal expected-payment rule for a fixed allocation. Contiguous bid bands implement truthful reporting at every value, but create pooling losses and within-band surplus. Under a separate smooth-belief model, feasible truthful rules and revenue upper bounds support comparisons with a first-price equilibrium under the same beliefs. A calibration using 1,000 eBay proof-set auction records illustrates a partition-dependent reversal: first price dominates all exactly truthful, no-subsidy rules on ten equal-probability bands in one scenario, while a richer contingent rule on ten equal-dollar bands outperforms it. An operator should choose interface resolution, payment dependence, and integrity tolerances jointly. Validate the probabilities that support incentives, compare formats under the same beliefs, and distinguish redesign from deployment. Any receipt advantage must cover implementation costs before it can imply a profit advantage.

Layered trust models for multi-agent LLM systems remain largely conceptual: they name which dimensions of trust matter but not how layers combine, how their importance is set at runtime, or how trust should govern agent actions. This gap matters because higher inter-agent trust raises task success while also enlarging exposure to exploitation, a tension formalized as the Trust-Vulnerability Paradox. We make a five-layer trust stack operational through three contributions. First, a cross-layer synergy operator propagates prerequisite-layer deficits into de- pendent layers, feeding a generalized-mean composite trust that recovers the weakest-link rule as a limiting case, with provable bounds. Second, per-layer importance weights are grounded in observed failures via a no-regret online estimator that tracks which layer is currently most responsible for harm. Third, Trust- Gated Capability Control issues short-lived, revocable capability grants only when composite trust and the relevant prerequisite layers clear capability-specific thresholds. We prove this mechanism breaks the paradox: a stealthy compromise that inflates behavioral trust while degrading a prerequisite layer cannot escalate privilege, and give a closed-form, provably conservative trust fixed point with a bounded-latency revocation guarantee. A numerical study with a sleeper adversary confirms the predictions: composite-trust bounds hold across 20,000 random draws, the analytic fixed point matches simulation within 0.007, and a compromised prerequisite layer triggers automatic revocation within a few interactions.

Every balanced instance of the stable marriage problem with strict complete preferences has a unique finest partition into prime blocks, and that single partition simultaneously factors three different structures: the reachable execution digraph as a Cartesian product, the proposal-prefix antimatroid as a direct sum, and the stable-matching lattice as a direct product. The converse fails, and fails at every size from two on: two explicit families share the identical Boolean-cube execution while one is maximally decomposable with a single stable matching and the other is prime with n. Uniqueness yields an exact census, a recursion counting the prime instances at every size, under which exactly 88,478,208 of the 110,075,314,176 profiles with four agents on each side are decomposable and the decomposable fraction is asymptotically n! / n^(2n). The blocks are characterised as the square components of the mutual-rank filtration, so the partition is computable in polynomial time and the factorisation is a tool rather than only a fact.

We study sender-receiver games in which players commit, before the state is drawn, to payments contingent on the subsequently verified state and the receiver's action. Payments may be transferred or burned, serving as contractual guarantees or promised tips. We analyze equilibrium guarantees, welfare, and computational complexity. For arbitrary finite action sets, we characterize pessimistic utility guarantees under unilateral commitments. Sender-only and sender-first commitments have worst-equilibrium welfare equal to the best constant-action welfare. Simultaneous commitments can instead reduce welfare below every equilibrium of the original game. Neither simultaneous nor sender-first commitments always admit an efficient equilibrium. Receiver-first commitments always admit an efficiently computable welfare-maximizing equilibrium, but can also reduce worst-equilibrium welfare. For binary actions, we characterize their entire equilibrium payoff region. With binary actions, optimal receiver commitments are computable in linear time, whereas optimizing deterministic sender commitments is NP-hard. Privately randomized sender commitments admit an exact $O(n\log n)$ algorithm, with an optimal lottery over at most two schemes differing at only one state. This yields an additive approximation by deterministic commitments. For arbitrary finite action sets, optimal privately randomized sender payoffs equal Bayesian persuasion values: ordinary persuasion with burning alone, and persuasion with nonnegative compliance payments when transfers are allowed. These equivalences yield polynomial-time algorithms with polynomial-size commitment lotteries.