Cryptography and Security
Cyber Threat Detection and Vulnerability Assessment System using Generative AI and Large Language Model
Keerthi Kumar. M, Swarun Kumar Joginpelly, Sunil Khemka et al. (+2 more)
Background: Cyber-attacks have evolved rapidly in recent years, many individuals and business owners have been affected by cyber-attacks in various ways. Cyber-attacks include various threats such as ransomware, malware, phishing, and Denial of Service (DoS)-related attacks. Challenges: Traditional models such as Generative Artificial Intelligence (AI) and Security Bidirectional Encoder Representations from
Transformers (BERT) were implemented to detect cyber threats. However, the existing Security BERT model has a limited contextual understanding of text data, which has less impact on detecting cyber-attacks. Proposed Methodology: To overcome the above-mentioned challenges, Robustly Optimized Bidirectional Encoder Representations from
Transformers Pretraining Approach (RoBERTa) model is proposed which consists of diverse words of vocabulary understanding. Initially, data are extracted from a Packet Capture (PCAP) file and encrypted using Fully Harmonic Encryption (FHE). Subsequently, a Byte-level and Byte Pair Encoding (BBPE) tokenizer was used to generate
tokens and help maintain the vocabulary for the encrypted values. Then, these values are applied to the RoBERTa model of the
transformer with extensive training. Finally, Softmax is used for the detection and classification of attacks. The proposed RoBERTa model achieved better results than the existing BERT model in terms of accuracy (0.99), recall (0.91), and precision (0.89) respectively.
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All authors Keerthi Kumar. M, Swarun Kumar Joginpelly, Sunil Khemka, Lakshmi. S R, Navin Chhibber
Cryptography and Security
Leveraging Membership Inference Attacks for Privacy Measurement in Federated Learning for Remote Sensing Images
Anh-Kiet Duong, Petra Gomez-Krämer, Hoàng-Ân Lê et al. (+1 more)
Federated Learning (FL) enables collaborative model training while keeping training data localized, allowing us to preserve
privacy in various domains including remote sensing. However, recent studies show that FL models may still leak sensitive information through their outputs, motivating the need for rigorous
privacy evaluation. In this paper, we leverage membership inference attacks (MIA) as a quantitative
privacy measurement framework for FL applied to remote sensing image classification. We evaluate multiple black-box MIA techniques, including
entropy-based attacks, modified
entropy attacks, and the likelihood ratio attack, across different FL
algorithms and communication strategies. Experiments conducted on two public scene classification
datasets demonstrate that MIA effectively reveals
privacy leakage not captured by accuracy alone. Our results show that communication-efficient FL strategies reduce MIA success rates while maintaining competitive performance. These findings confirm MIA as a practical metric and highlight the importance of integrating
privacy measurement into FL system design for remote sensing applications.
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All authors Anh-Kiet Duong, Petra Gomez-Krämer, Hoàng-Ân Lê, Minh-Tan Pham
Cryptography and Security · Cross-listed from cs.AI
AI Safeguards, Generative AI and the Pandora Box: AI Safety Measures to Protect Businesses and Personal Reputation
Prasanna Kumar
Generative AI has unleashed the power of content generation and it has also unwittingly opened the pandora box of realistic deepfake causing a number of social hazards and harm to businesses and personal reputation. The investigation & ramification of Generative AI technology across industries, the resolution & hybridization detection techniques using neural networks allows flagging of the content. Good detection techniques & flagging allow AI safety - this is the main focus of this paper. The research provides a significant method for efficiently detecting dark side problems by imposing a Temporal Consistency Learning (TCL) technique. Through pretrained Temporal Convolutional Networks (TCNs) model training and performance comparison, this paper showcases that TCN models outperforms the other approaches and achieves significant accuracy for five dark side problems. Findings highlight how important it is to take proactive measures in identification to reduce any potential risks associated with generative artificial intelligence.
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Cryptography and Security · Cross-listed from cs.LG
When the Server Steps In: Calibrated Updates for Fair Federated Learning
Tianrun Yu, Kaixiang Zhao, Cheng Zhang et al. (+4 more)
Federated learning (FL) has emerged as a transformative distributed learning paradigm, enabling multiple clients to collaboratively train a global model under the coordination of a central server without sharing their raw training data. While FL offers notable advantages, it faces critical challenges in ensuring
fairness across diverse demographic groups. To address these
fairness concerns, various
fairness-aware debiasing methods have been proposed. However, many of these approaches either require modifications to clients' training protocols or lack flexibility in their aggregation strategies. In this work, we address these limitations by introducing EquFL, a novel server-side debiasing method designed to mitigate bias in FL systems. EquFL operates by allowing the server to generate a single calibrated update after receiving model updates from the clients. This calibrated update is then integrated with the aggregated client updates to produce an adjusted global model that reduces bias. Theoretically, we establish that EquFL converges to the optimal global model achieved by FedAvg and effectively reduces
fairness loss over training rounds. Empirically, we demonstrate that EquFL significantly mitigates bias within the system, showcasing its practical effectiveness.
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All authors Tianrun Yu, Kaixiang Zhao, Cheng Zhang, Anjun Gao, Yueyang Quan, Zhuqing Liu, Minghong Fang
Cryptography and Security
Multi-turn Jailbreaking Attack in Multi-Modal Large Language Models
Badhan Chandra Das, Md Tasnim Jawad, Joaquin Molto et al. (+2 more)
In recent years, the security vulnerabilities of Multi-modal Large
Language Models (MLLMs) have become a serious concern in the Generative Artificial Intelligence (GenAI) research. These highly intelligent models, capable of performing multi-modal tasks with high accuracy, are also severely susceptible to carefully launched security attacks, such as jailbreaking attacks, which can manipulate model behavior and bypass safety constraints. This paper introduces MJAD-MLLMs, a holistic framework that systematically analyzes the proposed Multi-turn Jailbreaking Attacks and multi-LLM-based defense techniques for MLLMs. In this paper, we make three original contributions. First, we introduce a novel multi-turn jailbreaking attack to exploit the vulnerabilities of the MLLMs under multi-turn prompting. Second, we propose a novel fragment-optimized and multi-LLM defense mechanism, called FragGuard, to effectively mitigate jailbreaking attacks in the MLLMs. Third, we evaluate the efficacy of the proposed attacks and defenses through extensive experiments on several state-of-the-art (SOTA) open-source and closed-source MLLMs and
benchmark datasets, and compare their performance with the existing techniques.
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All authors Badhan Chandra Das, Md Tasnim Jawad, Joaquin Molto, M. Hadi Amini, Yanzhao Wu
Cryptography and Security
A Survey of Agentic AI and Cybersecurity: Challenges, Opportunities and Use-case Prototypes
Sahaya Jestus Lazer, Kshitiz Aryal, Maanak Gupta et al. (+1 more)
Agentic AI marks an important transition from single-step generative models to systems capable of
reasoning, planning, acting, and adapting over long-lasting tasks. By integrating
memory, tool use, and iterative decision cycles, these systems enable continuous, autonomous workflows in real-world environments. This survey examines the implications of agentic AI for cybersecurity. On the defensive side, agentic capabilities enable continuous monitoring, autonomous incident response, adaptive threat hunting, and fraud detection at scale. Conversely, the same properties amplify
adversarial power by accelerating reconnaissance, exploitation, coordination, and social-engineering attacks. These dual-use dynamics expose fundamental gaps in existing governance, assurance, and accountability mechanisms, which were largely designed for non-autonomous and short-lived AI systems. To address these challenges, we survey emerging threat models, security frameworks, and evaluation pipelines tailored to agentic systems, and analyze systemic risks including
agent collusion, cascading failures, oversight evasion, and
memory poisoning. Finally, we present three representative use-case implementations that illustrate how agentic AI behaves in practical cybersecurity workflows, and how design choices shape reliability, safety, and operational effectiveness.
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All authors Sahaya Jestus Lazer, Kshitiz Aryal, Maanak Gupta, Elisa Bertino
Cryptography and Security
The Adverse Effects of Omitting Records in Differential Privacy: How Sampling and Suppression Degrade the Privacy–Utility Tradeoff (Long Version)
Àlex Miranda-Pascual, Javier Parra-Arnau and Thorsten Strufe
Sampling is renowned for its
privacy amplification in differential
privacy (DP), and is often assumed to improve the utility of a DP mechanism by allowing a noise reduction. In this paper, we further show that this last assumption is flawed: When measuring utility at equal
privacy levels, sampling as preprocessing consistently yields penalties due to utility loss from omitting records over all canonical DP mechanisms – Laplace, Gaussian, exponential, and report noisy max – , as well as recent applications of sampling, such as clustering. Extending this analysis, we investigate suppression as a generalized method of choosing, or omitting, records. Developing a theoretical analysis of this technique, we derive
privacy bounds for arbitrary suppression strategies under unbounded approximate DP. We find that our tested suppression strategy also fails to improve the
privacy–utility tradeoff. Surprisingly, uniform sampling emerges as one of the best suppression methods – despite its still degrading effect. Our results call into question common preprocessing assumptions in DP practice.
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Cryptography and Security
$PC^2$: Politically Controversial Content Generation via Jailbreaking Attacks on GPT-based Text-to-Image Models
Wonwoo Choi, Minjae Seo, Minkyoo Song et al. (+3 more)
The rapid
evolution of text-to-image (T2I) models has enabled high-fidelity visual synthesis on a global scale. However, these advancements have introduced significant security risks, particularly regarding the generation of harmful content. Politically harmful content, such as fabricated depictions of public figures, poses severe threats when weaponized for fake news or propaganda. Despite its criticality, the robustness of current T2I safety filters against such politically motivated
adversarial prompting remains underexplored. In response, we propose $PC^2$, the first black-box political jailbreaking framework for T2I models. It exploits a novel vulnerability where safety filters evaluate political sensitivity based on linguistic context. $PC^2$ operates through: (1) Identity-Preserving Descriptive Mapping to obfuscate sensitive keywords into neutral descriptions, and (2) Geopolitically Distal Translation to map these descriptions into fragmented, low-sensitivity
languages. This strategy prevents filters from constructing toxic relationships between political entities within
prompts, effectively bypassing detection. We construct a
benchmark of 240 politically sensitive
prompts involving 36 public figures. Evaluation on commercial T2I models, specifically the GPT series, shows that while all original
prompts are blocked, $PC^2$ achieves attack success rates (ASRs) of up to 86% and outperforms state-of-the-art frameworks by a large margin. We further propose a ready-to-deploy multi-layered filtering mitigation against $PC^2$-style attacks, reducing ASR to approximately 10%.
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All authors Wonwoo Choi, Minjae Seo, Minkyoo Song, Hwanjo Heo, Seungwon Shin, Myoungsung You
Cryptography and Security
Supporting Secured Integration of Microarchitectural Defenses
Kartik Ramkrishnan, Stephen McCamant, Antonia Zhai et al. (+1 more)
There has been a plethora of microarchitectural-level attacks leading to many proposed countermeasures. This has created an unexpected and unaddressed security issue where naive integration of those defenses can potentially lead to security vulnerabilities. This occurs when one defense changes an aspect of a microarchitecture that is crucial for the security of another defense. We refer to this problem as a microarchitectural defense assumption violation} (MDAV). We propose a two-step methodology to screen for potential MDAVs in the early-stage of integration. The first step is to design and integrate a composed model, guided by bounded model checking of security properties. The second step is to implement the model concretely on a simulator and to evaluate with simulated attacks. As a contribution supporting the first step, we propose an event-based modeling framework, called Maestro, for testing and evaluating microarchitectural models with integrated defenses. In our evaluation, Maestro reveals MDAVs (8), supports compact expression (~15x
Alloy LoC ratio), enables semantic composability and eliminates performance degradations (>100x). As a contribution supporting the second step, we use an event-based simulator (GEM5) for investigating integrated microarchitectural defenses. We show that a covert channel attack is possible on a naively integrated implementation of some state-of-the-art defenses, and a repaired implementation using our integration methodology is resilient to the attack.
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All authors Kartik Ramkrishnan, Stephen McCamant, Antonia Zhai, Pen-Chung Yew
Cryptography and Security
Knowledge-to-Data: LLM-Driven Synthesis of Structured Network Traffic for Testbed-Free IDS Evaluation
Konstantinos E. Kampourakis, Vyron Kampourakis, Efstratios Chatzoglou et al. (+2 more)
Realistic, large-scale, and well-labeled cybersecurity
datasets are essential for training and evaluating Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS). However, they remain difficult to obtain due to
privacy constraints, data sensitivity, and the cost of building controlled collection environments such as testbeds and cyber ranges. This paper investigates whether Large
Language Models (LLMs) can operate as controlled knowledge-to-data engines for generating structured synthetic network traffic
datasets suitable for IDS research. We propose a methodology that combines protocol documentation, attack semantics, and explicit statistical rules to condition LLMs without fine-tuning or access to raw samples. Using the AWID3 IEEE~802.11
benchmark as a demanding case study, we generate labeled
datasets with four state-of-the-art LLMs and assess fidelity through a multi-level validation framework including global similarity metrics, per-feature distribution testing, structural comparison, and cross-domain classification. Results show that, under explicit constraints, LLM-generated
datasets can closely approximate the statistical and structural characteristics of real network traffic, enabling gradient-boosting classifiers to achieve F1-scores up to 0.956 when evaluated on real samples. Overall, the findings suggest that constrained LLM-driven generation can facilitate on-demand IDS experimentation, providing a testbed-free,
privacy-preserving alternative that overcomes the traditional bottlenecks of physical traffic collection and manual labeling.
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All authors Konstantinos E. Kampourakis, Vyron Kampourakis, Efstratios Chatzoglou, Georgios Kambourakis, Stefanos Gritzalis
Cryptography and Security
CurricuLLM: Designing Personalized and Workforce-Aligned Cybersecurity Curricula Using Fine-Tuned LLMs
Arthur Nijdam, Harri Kähkönen, Valtteri Niemi et al. (+2 more)
The cybersecurity landscape is constantly evolving, driven by increased digitalization and new cybersecurity threats. Cybersecurity programs often fail to equip graduates with skills demanded by the workforce, particularly concerning recent developments in cybersecurity, as curriculum design is costly and labor-intensive. To address this misalignment, we present a novel Large
Language Model (LLM)-based framework for automated design and analysis of cybersecurity curricula, called CurricuLLM. Our approach provides three key contributions: (1) automation of personalized curriculum design, (2) a data-driven pipeline aligned with industry demands, and (3) a comprehensive methodology for leveraging fine-tuned LLMs in curriculum development. CurricuLLM utilizes a two-tier approach consisting of PreprocessLM, which standardizes input data, and ClassifyLM, which assigns course content to nine Knowledge Areas in cybersecurity. We systematically evaluated multiple Natural
Language Processing (NLP) architectures and fine-tuning strategies, ultimately selecting the Bidirectional Encoder Representations from
Transformers (BERT) model as ClassifyLM, fine-tuned on foundational cybersecurity concepts and workforce competencies. We are the first to validate our method with human experts who analyzed real-world cybersecurity curricula and frameworks, motivating that CurricuLLM is an efficient solution to replace labor-intensive curriculum analysis. Moreover, once course content has been classified, it can be integrated with established cybersecurity role-based weights, enabling
alignment of the educational program with specific job roles, workforce categories, or general
market needs. This lays the foundation for personalized, workforce-aligned cybersecurity curricula that prepare students for the evolving demands in cybersecurity.
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All authors Arthur Nijdam, Harri Kähkönen, Valtteri Niemi, Paul Stankovski Wagner, Sara Ramezanian
Cryptography and Security
Decentralized Privacy-Preserving Federal Learning of Computer Vision Models on Edge Devices
Damian Harenčák, Lukáš Gajdošech and Martin Madaras
Collaborative training of a machine learning model comes with a risk of sharing sensitive or private data.
Federated learning offers a way of collectively training a single global model without the need to share client data, by sharing only the updated parameters from each client's local model. A central server is then used to aggregate parameters from all clients and redistribute the aggregated model back to the clients. Recent findings have shown that even in this scenario, private data can be reconstructed only using information about model parameters. Current efforts to mitigate this are mainly focused on reducing
privacy risks on the server side, assuming that other clients will not act maliciously. In this work, we analyzed various methods for improving the
privacy of client data concerning both the server and other clients for neural networks. Some of these methods include homomorphic encryption, gradient compression, gradient noising, and discussion on possible usage of modified
federated learning systems such as split learning, swarm learning or fully encrypted models. We have analyzed the negative effects of gradient compression and gradient noising on the accuracy of convolutional neural networks used for classification. We have shown the difficulty of data reconstruction in the case of
segmentation networks. We have also implemented a proof of concept on the NVIDIA Jetson TX2 module used in edge devices and simulated a
federated learning process.
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Cryptography and Security
Quantum Secure Biometric Authentication in Decentralised Systems
Tooba Qasim, Vasilios A. Siris, Izak Oosthuizen et al. (+2 more)
Biometric authentication has become integral to digital identity systems, particularly in smart cities where it en-ables secure access to services across governance, trans-portation, and public infrastructure. Centralised archi-tectures, though widely used, pose
privacy and scalabil-ity challenges due to the aggregation of sensitive biomet-ric data. Decentralised identity frameworks offer better data sovereignty and eliminate single points of failure but introduce new security concerns, particularly around mu-tual trust among distributed devices. In such environments, biometric sensors and verification
agents must authenticate one another before sharing sensitive biometric data. Ex-isting authentication schemes rely on classical public key infrastructure, which is increasingly susceptible to quan-tum attacks. This work addresses this gap by propos-ing a
quantum-secure communication protocol for decen-tralised biometric systems, built upon an enhanced Quan-tum Key Distribution (QKD) system. The protocol incorpo-rates
quantum-resilient authentication at both the classical and
quantum layers of QKD: post-
quantum cryptography (PQC) is used to secure the classical channel, while authen-tication
qubits verify the integrity of the
quantum channel. Once trust is established, QKD generates symmetric keys for encrypting biometric data in transit. Qiskit-based sim-ulations show a key generation rate of 15 bits/sec and 89% efficiency. This layered,
quantum-resilient approach offers scalable, robust authentication for next-generation smart city infrastructures.
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All authors Tooba Qasim, Vasilios A. Siris, Izak Oosthuizen, Muttukrishnan Rajarajan, Sujit Biswas
Cryptography and Security · Cross-listed from cs.NI
A Mathematical Theory of Payment Channel Networks
Rene Pickhardt
We introduce a
geometric theory of payment channel networks that centers the polytope $W_G$ of feasible wealth distributions; liquidity states $L_G$ project onto $W_G$ via strict circulations. A payment is feasible iff the post-transfer wealth stays in $W_G$. This yields a simple throughput law: if $\zeta$ is on-chain settlement bandwidth and $\rho$ the expected fraction of infeasible payments, the sustainable off-chain bandwidth satisfies $S = \zeta / \rho$. Feasibility admits a cut-interval view: for any node set S, the wealth of S must lie in an interval whose width equals the cut capacity $C(\delta(S))$. Using this, we show how multi-party channels (coinpools / channel factories) expand $W_G$. Modeling a k-party channel as a k-uniform hyperedge widens every cut in expectation, so $W_G$ grows monotonically with k; for single nodes the expected accessible wealth scales linearly with $k/n$. We also analyze depletion. Under linear, asymmetric fees, cost-minimizing flow within a wealth fiber pushes cycles to the boundary, generically depleting channels except for a residual spanning forest. Three mitigation levers follow: (i) symmetric fees per direction, (ii) convex/tiered fees (effective flow control but at odds with source routing without liquidity disclosure), and (iii) coordinated replenishment (choose an optimal circulation within a fiber). Together, these results explain why two-party meshes struggle to scale and why multi-party primitives are more capital-efficient, yielding higher expected payment bandwidth. They also show how fee design and coordination keep operation inside the feasible region, improving reliability.
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Cryptography and Security · Cross-listed from cs.AI
Defense Against Indirect Prompt Injection via Tool Result Parsing
Qiang Yu, Xinran Cheng and Chuanyi Liu
As LLM
agents transition from digital assistants to physical controllers in autonomous systems and robotics, they face an escalating threat from indirect
prompt injection. By
embedding adversarial instructions into the results of tool calls, attackers can hijack the
agent's decision-making process to execute unauthorized actions. This vulnerability poses a significant risk as
agents gain more direct control over physical environments. Existing defense mechanisms against Indirect
Prompt Injection (IPI) generally fall into two categories. The first involves training dedicated detection models; however, this approach entails high computational overhead for both training and inference, and requires frequent updates to keep pace with evolving attack vectors. Alternatively,
prompt-based methods leverage the inherent capabilities of LLMs to detect or ignore malicious instructions via
prompt engineering. Despite their flexibility, most current
prompt-based defenses suffer from high Attack Success Rates (ASR), demonstrating limited robustness against sophisticated injection attacks. In this paper, we propose a novel method that provides LLMs with precise data via tool result parsing while effectively filtering out injected malicious code. Our approach achieves competitive Utility under Attack (UA) while maintaining the lowest Attack Success Rate (ASR) to date, significantly outperforming existing methods. Code is available at GitHub.
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Cryptography and Security
Unified Framework for Qualifying Security Boundary of PUFs Against Machine Learning Attacks
Hongming Fei, Zilong Hu, Prosanta Gope et al. (+1 more)
Physical Unclonable Functions (PUFs) serve as lightweight, hardware-intrinsic
entropy sources widely deployed in IoT security applications. However, delay-based PUFs are vulnerable to Machine Learning Attacks (MLAs), undermining their assumed unclonability. There are no valid metrics for evaluating PUF MLA resistance, but empirical modelling experiments, which lack theoretical guarantees and are highly sensitive to advances in machine learning techniques. To address the fundamental gap between PUF designs and security qualifications, this work proposes a novel, formal, and unified framework for evaluating PUF security against modelling attacks by providing security lower bounds, independent of specific attack models or learning
algorithms. We mathematically characterise the adversary's advantage in predicting responses to unseen challenges based solely on observed challenge-response pairs (CRPs), formulating the problem as a conditional probability estimation over the space of candidate PUFs. We present our analysis on previous "broken" PUFs, e.g., Arbiter PUFs, XOR PUFs, Feed-Forward PUFs, and for the first time compare their MLA resistance in a formal way. In addition, we evaluate the currently "secure" CT PUF, and show its security boundary. We demonstrate that the proposed approach systematically quantifies PUF resilience, captures subtle security differences, and provides actionable, theoretically grounded security guarantees for the practical deployment of PUFs.
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All authors Hongming Fei, Zilong Hu, Prosanta Gope, Biplab Sikdar
Cryptography and Security · Cross-listed from cs.AI
Know Thy Enemy: Securing LLMs Against Prompt Injection via Diverse Data Synthesis and Instruction-Level Chain-of-Thought Learning
Zhiyuan Chang, Mingyang Li, Yuekai Huang et al. (+6 more)
Large
language model (LLM)-integrated applications have become increasingly prevalent, yet face critical security vulnerabilities from
prompt injection (PI) attacks. Defending against PI attacks faces two major issues: malicious instructions can be injected through diverse vectors, and injected instructions often lack clear semantic boundaries from the surrounding context, making them difficult to identify. To address these issues, we propose InstruCoT, a model enhancement method for PI defense that synthesizes diverse training data and employs instruction-level chain-of-thought fine-tuning, enabling LLMs to effectively identify and reject malicious instructions regardless of their source or position in the context. We evaluate InstruCoT across three critical dimensions: Behavior Deviation,
Privacy Leakage, and Harmful Output. Experimental results across four LLMs demonstrate that InstruCoT significantly outperforms baselines in all dimensions while maintaining utility performance without degradation
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All authors Zhiyuan Chang, Mingyang Li, Yuekai Huang, Ziyou Jiang, Xiaojun Jia, Qian Xiong, Junjie Wang, Zhaoyang Li, Qing Wang
Cryptography and Security
DP-MGTD: Privacy-Preserving Machine-Generated Text Detection via Adaptive Differentially Private Entity Sanitization
Lionel Z. Wang, Yusheng Zhao, Jiabin Luo et al. (+6 more)
The deployment of Machine-Generated Text (MGT) detection systems necessitates processing sensitive user data, creating a fundamental conflict between authorship verification and
privacy preservation. Standard anonymization techniques often disrupt linguistic fluency, while rigorous Differential
Privacy (DP) mechanisms typically degrade the statistical signals required for accurate detection. To resolve this dilemma, we propose DP-MGTD, a framework incorporating an Adaptive Differentially Private Entity Sanitization
algorithm. Our approach utilizes a two-stage mechanism that performs noisy frequency estimation and dynamically calibrates
privacy budgets, applying Laplace and Exponential mechanisms to numerical and textual entities respectively. Crucially, we identify a counter-intuitive phenomenon where the application of DP noise amplifies the distinguishability between human and machine text by exposing distinct sensitivity patterns to perturbation. Extensive experiments on the MGTBench-2.0
dataset show that our method achieves near-perfect detection accuracy, significantly outperforming non-private baselines while satisfying strict
privacy guarantees.
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All authors Lionel Z. Wang, Yusheng Zhao, Jiabin Luo, Xinfeng Li, Lixu Wang, Yinan Peng, Haoyang Li, XiaoFeng Wang, Wei Dong
Cryptography and Security
Constitutional Classifiers++: Efficient Production-Grade Defenses against Universal Jailbreaks
Hoagy Cunningham, Jerry Wei, Zihan Wang et al. (+26 more)
We introduce enhanced Constitutional Classifiers that deliver production-grade jailbreak robustness with dramatically reduced computational costs and refusal rates compared to previous-generation defenses. Our system combines several key insights. First, we develop exchange classifiers that evaluate model responses in their full conversational context, which addresses vulnerabilities in last-generation systems that examine outputs in isolation. Second, we implement a two-stage classifier cascade where lightweight classifiers screen all traffic and escalate only suspicious exchanges to more expensive classifiers. Third, we train efficient linear probe classifiers and ensemble them with external classifiers to simultaneously improve robustness and reduce computational costs. Together, these techniques yield a production-grade system achieving a 40x computational cost reduction compared to our baseline exchange classifier, while maintaining a 0.05% refusal rate on production traffic. Through extensive red-teaming comprising over 1,700 hours, we demonstrate strong protection against universal jailbreaks – no attack on this system successfully elicited responses to all eight target queries comparable in detail to an undefended model. Our work establishes Constitutional Classifiers as practical and efficient safeguards for large
language models.
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All authors Hoagy Cunningham, Jerry Wei, Zihan Wang, Andrew Persic, Alwin Peng, Jordan Abderrachid, Raj Agarwal, Bobby Chen, Austin Cohen, Andy Dau, Alek Dimitriev, Rob Gilson, Logan Howard, Yijin Hua, Jared Kaplan, Jan Leike, Mu Lin, Christopher Liu, Vladimir Mikulik, Rohit Mittapalli, Clare O'Hara, Jin Pan, Nikhil Saxena, Alex Silverstein, Yue Song, Xunjie Yu, Giulio Zhou, Ethan Perez, Mrinank Sharma
Cryptography and Security
Deep Dive into the Abuse of DL APIs To Create Malicious AI Models and How to Detect Them
Mohamed Nabeel and Oleksii Starov
According to Gartner, more than 70% of organizations will have integrated AI models into their workflows by the end of 2025. In order to reduce cost and foster innovation, it is often the case that pre-trained models are fetched from model hubs like Hugging Face or TensorFlow Hub. However, this introduces a security risk where attackers can inject malicious code into the models they upload to these hubs, leading to various kinds of attacks including remote code execution (RCE), sensitive data exfiltration, and system file modification when these models are loaded or executed (predict function). Since AI models play a critical role in digital transformation, this would drastically increase the number of software supply chain attacks. While there are several efforts at detecting malware when deserializing pickle based saved models (hiding malware in model parameters), the risk of abusing DL APIs (e.g. TensorFlow APIs) is understudied. Specifically, we show how one can abuse hidden functionalities of TensorFlow APIs such as file read/write and network send/receive along with their persistence APIs to launch attacks. It is concerning to note that existing scanners in model hubs like Hugging Face and TensorFlow Hub are unable to detect some of the stealthy abuse of such APIs. This is because scanning tools only have a syntactically identified set of suspicious functionality that is being analysed. They often do not have a semantic-level understanding of the functionality utilized. After demonstrating the possible attacks, we show how one may identify potentially abusable hidden API functionalities using LLMs and build scanners to detect such abuses.
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Cryptography and Security
Application of Hybrid Chain Storage Framework in Energy Trading and Carbon Asset Management
Yinghan Hou, Zongyou Yang and Xiaokun Yang
Distributed energy trading and carbon asset management involve high-frequency, small-value settlements with strong audit requirements. Fully on-chain designs incur excessive cost, while purely off-chain approaches lack verifiable consistency. This paper presents a hybrid on-chain and off-chain settlement framework that anchors settlement commitments and key constraints on-chain and links off-chain records through deterministic digests and replayable
auditing. Experiments under publicly constrained workloads show that the framework significantly reduces on-chain execution and storage cost while preserving audit trustworthiness.
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