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Computer Science Cryptography and Security

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Wednesday 5 August

Cryptography and Security

Hidden Ciphers and Where to Find Them: Static Discovery and Assessment of Cryptographic Assets in Software

Modern software systems rely on cryptography for data protection, authentication, and trust establishment, yet organizations often lack a structured view of the cryptography deployed across source code, configuration, dependencies, and cryptographic files. This lack of visibility complicates security governance and post-quantum migration planning. This paper presents a static approach for discovering and assessing cryptographic assets in software systems. We introduce a classification of Crypto-Material, Crypto-Artifacts, and Crypto-Invocations, derive an extensible scanner-independent rule repository from it, and implement a static scanner that applies these rules to produce CBOM-oriented output. We evaluate the approach on a synthetic benchmark with known ground truth and on a real-world infrastructure of ten deployed services. The scanner achieves an F1 score of 0.75 for asset discovery and correctly annotates 91% of expected weaknesses and vulnerabilities. In the realworld setting, it processes 57 610 files in under six minutes and discovers 370 cryptographic assets, including six CVE-linked vulnerabilities and 52 post-quantum migration candidates. Real-world coverage is assessed against a manually compiled reference list rather than an exhaustive one. These results show that classification-driven static discovery can provide practical cryptographic transparency for governance and post-quantum migration planning.
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Cryptography and Security

PURPOSE: Poisoning Conflict Resolution in RAG via Proxy-Fact-Grounded Updates

In Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG), post-retrieval conflict resolution arbitrates among noisy or contradictory retrieved passages. However, the robustness of this safeguard against knowledge poisoning has not been adequately studied. Existing black-box poisoning methods all assert the target answer in frontal contradiction with what the resolver treats as settled, the very signal these methods are built to detect. We propose PURPOSE, a strict black-box poisoning attack that reframes the injection as an update that minimizes conflict, rather than as a counter-claim. PURPOSE extracts query-related facts approximating the resolver's possible reference, then grounds a pivot event in them to keep the injection consistent with what the resolver might verify while steering the generator toward the target answer. Across three QA benchmarks, five generators, and three conflict-resolution methods, PURPOSE attains the highest attack success rate (ASR) in 35 of 45 settings and exceeds the strongest prior attack with +9.7 mean ASR points. These results show that our poisoning method is effective against conflict resolution in RAG and identify non-contradicting injection as a practical mode to enhance poisoning attack.
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All authors Zijian Wang, Yubo Zhu, Muzhi Dong, Yanjun Lou, Yisheng Li, ZiLiang Zhang, Wei Tong, Yuan Zhang, Jingyu Hua, Sheng Zhong

Cryptography and Security

"Allow" to Achieve, Over-Privileged Inadvertently: The Unintended Cost of Task-Completion-Driven Pop-up Decisions in Mobile GUI Agents

Mobile GUI agents routinely encounter system permission dialogs during task execution, yet their ability to grant only permissions that are necessary for the delegated task remains largely unexamined. We present a systematic study of this capability, which we term Permission Literacy. We construct a four-level permission framework based on task relevance and privacy risk and validate the evaluated scenarios with three independent experts in GUI-agent safety. We inject Android-style permission popups into real GUI tasks and evaluate four frontier multimodal large language models using synchronized annotated screenshots and UI-tree hierarchies, making the requester, permission, justification, and available actions accessible to the agent. Beyond the main study, we conduct controlled interventions that separately vary task context and agent-visible requester identity. Under the same Calendar task, changing only the requester from Calendar to PiMusic reduces grants from 26/32 to 0/32, revealing a strong but task-conditioned App-Trust Bias. Holding a popup fixed while changing task context also substantially changes authorization decisions, revealing a systematic Task-Prior Override. Prompt interventions can reduce unnecessary grants, but their effectiveness is inconsistent across models and may come at the cost of suppressing legitimate grants. These results suggest that separating task execution from permission authorization is a promising design direction for future work.
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All authors Dongsheng Chen, Yuxuan Li, Guanhua Chen, Jiaxin Zhang, Xiangyu Zhao, Lei Ma, Xin Yao, Xuetao Wei

Cryptography and Security

Web Cache Overflow: Exploiting Imprecise Keys for Cache Degradation and Beyond

Web caches support the scalability needs of contemporary web applications by storing frequently accessed objects closer to clients. Web caches are conceptually associative arrays, tracking stored objects using cache keys consisting of HTTP request fields. However, these cache keys are often imprecisely defined by website operators. This allows clients to craft a multitude of requests that target the same object, but map to different cache keys. In this work, we show that request elements included unnecessarily in cache keys can be abused to create redundant cache entries. In susceptible deployments, sustained generation of such redundant copies reduces cache effectiveness and increases origin load, facilitating eviction-dependent attacks. Our experiments reproduce cache degradation across five stand-alone caching proxies and characterize how these parameters affect attacker cost and cache hit rate, potentially resulting in denial-of-service attacks. We conclude that precise cache-key design is the most direct mitigation against this abuse vector and should be recognized as a security best practice.
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Cryptography and Security

LoginTrap: Uncovering Task-Agnostic Phishing-Style Indirect Prompt Injection Attacks against LLM-based Web Agents

LLM-based web agents automate user tasks by observing webpages and executing browser actions on behalf of users. As these agents operate on real web services, login becomes a sensitive authentication boundary because it involves credentials and sensitive information. Existing work shows that malicious webpage content can manipulate web agent actions, but it has not fully examined whether such content can induce login and cause end-to-end private data leakage. We study this attack surface and present LoginTrap, a task-agnostic login-inducing attack against LLM-based web agents. LoginTrap assumes a black box attacker that controls the webpage context and the induced login flow without knowing the user task or web agent internals. Under this threat model, LoginTrap uses webpage context to generate page-specific indirect injections through a fuzzing-inspired process, making login appear as a plausible prerequisite for continuing the task and guiding the agent to a controlled login page. We conduct a comprehensive analysis of LoginTrap across realistic web agent executions. The results show that LoginTrap reaches 86% average end-to-end attack success across LLM backbones and remains effective across agent architectures and defenses. These findings identify login inducement as a systematic authentication boundary risk and motivate further research on authentication-aware defenses for web agents.
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All authors Longtao Guo, Zelin Zhang, Kaifeng Huang, Yang Shi

Cryptography and Security

MOAT: Model-Agnostic Randomized Transformations for preventing Efficiency Degradation Attacks on ViTs

To adopt the Vision Transformers (ViTs) in resource-constrained environment, token pruning is widely used to reduce computational cost without impacting accuracy. However, adversaries have developed targeted attacks against said token pruning techniques to undermine such attempts to make ViTs efficient. In this paper, we propose MOAT, a model-agnostic pre-processing defense pipeline that applies a combination of input transformations to protect efficient ViT implementations against adversarial efficiency attacks. MOAT operates directly on the input without requiring modifications to the model architecture or token pruning mechanism. Experimental results demonstrate that, across all evaluated ViT models, MOAT limits GFLOPs degradation under adversarial attacks to within 3.4% of the original unattacked model.
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All authors Anadi Goyal, Nandish Chattopadhyay, Chandan Karfa, Anupam Chattopadhyay, Norrathep Rattanavipanon

Cryptography and Security

Blockchain Empowered Trustworthy Agent Networks: Foundations, Taxonomy, and Future Directions

AI agents are evolving from isolated task executors into networked autonomous entities that can communicate, delegate tasks, invoke tools, access external knowledge, and participate in cross-platform service and economic workflows. This evolution gives rise to open agent networks, where heterogeneous agents owned by different stakeholders interact without naturally shared infrastructures for identity, authorization, auditability, reputation, or settlement. This survey and tutorial article reviews the literature over the period 1980–2026 on the evolution from classical multi-agent systems to open agent networks, with a particular focus on LLM-based autonomous agents, agent interoperability protocols, Internet-of-Agents infrastructures, and blockchain-enabled trust mechanisms. We first review this evolution and show how the trust boundary expands from individual execution to cross-agent, cross-platform, and cross-organizational interaction. We then identify a network-level trust crisis that cannot be fully addressed by single-agent safety mechanisms or closed multi-agent coordination techniques, and develop a five-dimensional taxonomy covering entity and capability trust, authorization and delegation trust, information and provenance trust, coordination and group-robustness trust, and accountability and settlement trust. Based on this taxonomy, we examine how blockchain can provide shared identity, verifiable authorization, tamper-evident provenance, auditable collaboration, incentive alignment, and value settlement for trustworthy agent networks. We further synthesize the mapping between agent-network risks, trust requirements, and blockchain-enabled mechanisms, and clarify the role of blockchain as a shared trust layer rather than a replacement for agent security, semantic verification, privacy protection, or robust reasoning.
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All authors Liehuang Zhu, Yuhang Li, Tianxing Wang, Zhihao Chen, Ke Li, Hongyi Liu, Yajie Wang, Lei Xu, Peng Jiang, Zijian Zhang

Cryptography and Security

Adaptive Intrusion Detection System using Transformer-Based Neural Networks and Continual Learning Approach with Adversarial Investigation

Network intrusion detection systems (IDS) trained on fixed traffic snapshots decay silently after deployment as threat distributions shift. Fine-tuning models on new attacks triggers catastrophic forgetting, while retraining from scratch is computationally infeasible. Replay-based continual learning counters this, but existing methods unrealistically confine benign traffic to a single early task and ignore the replay buffer as a potential attack surface. To address this, we present an adaptive IDS framework coupling a tabular transformer encoder with a class balanced experience replay buffer that replays benign traffic at every update to stabilize decision boundaries. We introduce the class-instance incremental (CII) scenario where benign flows reappear alongside new attacks as a more faithful stress test, and probe the buffer with overt label flipping and stealthy backdoor poisoning attacks. On the CICIDS2017 benchmark, our framework achieved 0.9994 accuracy under the traditional class incremental setup and 0.9989 under CII, with negligible forgetting, drastically outperforming sequential fine-tuning (0.0052), EWC (0.0324), LwF (0.0699), and iCaRL (0.8770) baselines. While injecting benign traffic into every experience proves essential for preventing forgetting, the replay buffer introduces critical vulnerabilities. Label-flipping collapses the model entirely (0.0053 accuracy at a 1% budget), and the backdoor maintains 0.97 overall accuracy while driving the attack success rate on trigger flows to 95%, evading standard monitoring. Ultimately, while a modest replay budget recovers near-joint-training performance, ensuring buffer integrity emerges as a strict operational requirement.
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All authors Azizi Ariffin, Afif Haris, Faiz Zaki, Hazim Hanif, Nor Badrul Anuar

Cryptography and Security

Breadcrumbing Search Agents

LLM-based search agents are widely used for information-seeking tasks, but their reliance on external tool returns introduces a critical security risk: web content retrieved during execution is untrusted, exposing agents to prompt injection and goal hijacking. Prior work on search-agent safety primarily focuses on static web-content injection, but modern agents issue follow-up queries and cross-check competing sources, so a single injected page is often diluted or rejected. We show that the channel delivering search and page observations is a fragile security boundary: beyond exposing the agent to a single poisoned page, a mediated search interface can repeatedly steer how the agent gathers evidence and forms its final answer. Under a constrained tool-intermediary threat model, appending only one controlled result per query can substantially increase attack success when the evidence is coordinated across the agent's trajectory. We study this setting with a strategy-driven long-horizon attack system and introduce Authority-Chain Hijack (ACH), an expert-refined strategy that turns isolated search-result and page-content manipulations into a coherent evidence chain across seemingly corroborating sources. ACH achieves the highest Overall ASR among all baselines, reaching 55.9% / 83.3% ASR / MaxN ASR on the full SafeSearch test split. We further introduce Trace-Guided Strategy Evolution (TGSE), which automatically improves attacker strategies from execution traces, replacing manual redesign with trace-driven refinement; its strongest single setting reaches 71.4% / 95.0% in held-out evaluation.
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All authors Xuebin Li, Hanqing Zhao, Siyuan Liang, Kejiang Chen, Weiming Zhang, Dacheng Tao, Nenghai Yu

Cryptography and Security

Checked-In Secret Detection: Strings Are All You Need

Hardcoded secrets in source code pose critical security vulnerabilities which can be easily exploited by malicious adversaries. Existing regex-based detection approaches suffer from fundamental limitations, as secrets often lack identifiable patterns, resulting in poor precision and recall. Recent studies have explored context-aware detection methods, as surrounding code can reveal the purpose of candidate strings. However, these methods confront three key challenges: (1) obfuscation robustness where models over-rely on easily obfuscated identifiers, (2) cross-language generalization difficulties due to uneven training data distribution, and (3) lengthy and noisy context that introduces excessive irrelevant tokens and slows inference. We observe that strings serve as a critical information source for code semantics, offering superior contextual density, obfuscation robustness, and language independence. Based on this insight, we propose StringGroup, a novel context extraction algorithm that mines strings surrounding potential secrets. By introducing a relatively simple modification to existing patterns that narrows the analysis specifically to string literals, the method achieves significant gains. With only 33.2% of the original context, it preserves over 80% of semantic information and significantly improves the signal-to-noise ratio for secret detection. We further design a context-aware secret detection tool, Secretron, based on StringGroup methods and Transformer model. Evaluation on the SecretBench dataset demonstrates high accuracy with 98.74% F1-score and strong robustness under obfuscation and cross-language scenarios, outperforming state-of-the-art LLM-based baselines. We deploy our tool in real-world environments and successfully detect 48 previously unknown secret keys from 26 applications, demonstrating the practical effectiveness of our approach.
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All authors Zhengdong Huang, Kevin Li, Jinqiu Yang, Yepang Liu, Lili Wei

Cryptography and Security · Cross-listed from cs.LO

UC, Categorically: Rigorous Diagrammatic Proofs

Category theory is a mathematical theory of composition, widely used in logic, computing, and physics. Here we apply it to give a theory of secure composition. In particular, we provide a categorical treatment of Canetti's Universal Composability (UC) framework for systems with a static number of parties and sessions, often termed UC for static systems, yielding four benefits. First, we present our results graphically yet retain rigor by applying a standard categorical technique known as string diagrams. In particular, our formulation of the composition theorem can be graphically verified with a short sequence of diagrams, while remaining translatable to equations and amenable to formal verification. Second, categories let us generalize so that our results extend beyond interactive Turing machines to other forms of computation, such as quantum computation or domain-specific languages. Third, categories help us drop some unnecessary restrictions of UC (e.g., our adversary can be a computational network rather than a single Turing machine); we prove equivalence between our variant and the usual UC, showing no expressiveness is lost. Finally, the categorical perspective leads us to identify and correct some minor technical oversights in the standard formulation of simple UC.
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All authors Pooya Farshim, Martti Karvonen, Andre Knispel, Markulf Kohlweiss, Philip Wadler

Cryptography and Security

DeepInvert: Semi-Supervised Embedding Inversion Against Obfuscated Language Models

Cloud-based language model services routinely process prompts containing sensitive information. Obfuscation-based defenses—including ObfusLM, SentinelLMs, TextObfuscator, and DPNR—mitigate this risk by transforming prompt representations before transmission, offering a lightweight alternative to cryptographic solutions. We show these defenses provide far less protection than previously believed. We present DeepInvert, a semi-supervised embedding inversion attack that recovers original tokens from obfuscated representations with higher accuracy than prior methods. The key insight is that unlabeled obfuscated embeddings retain exploitable semantic structure despite perturbation. DeepInvert combines supervised training on labeled shadow data with a novel unsupervised consistency objective over unlabeled target embeddings, alternating between the two via a mixed training pipeline. Defense-aware adaptations further extend the attack to diverse obfuscation mechanisms across encoder-based and autoregressive architectures. Experiments on nine defenses, five tasks, and four model architectures show that DeepInvert outperforms prior attacks on most defenses. Against ObfusLM, DeepInvert achieves 73.5% top-1 token recovery versus 26.2% for the previous best. Our results reveal a task-dependent tension: obfuscation schemes preserving enough signal for utility also retain sufficient structure for inversion, while schemes resisting inversion collapse utility. On simpler classification tasks, some DP-based defenses can maintain both. We call for a re-evaluation of this defense class.
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Cryptography and Security · Cross-listed from cs.CV

Season: Spectrum-Aware Orthogonal Gradient Refinement for Transfer-Based Adversarial Attacks

Transfer-based adversarial attacks often transfer poorly across heterogeneous architectures because CNNs favor local textures while Vision Transformers (ViTs) rely on global shapes. We propose Season, a spectrum-aware orthogonal gradient refinement framework for L-infinity transfer attacks against black-box target models on ImageNet, using a white-box surrogate. Season decomposes each update into a low-frequency branch capturing structural cues and a high-frequency branch capturing textures. A low-saliency guidance scheme reallocates high-frequency energy to background regions, preserving foreground structures that ViTs depend on. An orthogonal projection then forces the textural update to lie in the orthogonal complement of the structural direction, mitigating feature interference. As a training-free plug-and-play wrapper, Season enhances eight gradient-stabilization and input-enhancement attacks without modifying their cores. Across eight CNN, ViT, and MLP targets, Season improves transfer success rate by 6.6 percentage points on average and up to 16.0 points over strong baselines under a unified protocol.
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Cryptography and Security

Large Language Models and Social Media Information Integrity: Opportunities, Challenges, and Research Directions

Large Language Models (LLMs) have emerged as powerful tools that impact information integrity on social media platforms. This comprehensive review examines the dual role of LLMs in both facilitating and mitigating various information integrity challenges, including misinformation, disinformation, fake news, social bots, and privacy concerns. \textcolor{black}{We conduct a comprehensive review of the literature from 2019 to 2024, screening 1048 studies and performing an in-depth analysis of 215 representative papers. This systematic approach allows us to identify key patterns in how LLMs influence the information security in social media ecosystems.} Through a systematic analysis of papers from multiple databases, our findings reveal that while LLMs can enhance detection capabilities for malicious content and enable sophisticated defense mechanisms, they simultaneously pose risks by enabling the generation of highly convincing, deceptive content. We categorize and analyze the potential and challenges across different dimensions of information integrity, examining technical capabilities, ethical implications, and privacy concerns. The study demonstrates critical gaps in current approaches, particularly in cross-lingual detection, real-time monitoring, and privacy-preserving implementations. We conclude by proposing future research directions and recommendations for stakeholders to leverage LLMs while mitigating risks in social media information integrity.
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All authors Junjie Xiong, Zhengyuan Jiang, Xiaoran Xu, Chi Zhang, Changjia Zhu, Ning Wang, Mingkui Wei, Zhuo Lu, Yao Liu, Lingyao Li

2608.04375 · 5 Aug · It has been accepted by Computing Surveys. Preview From: htong@illinois.edu Congratulations! Your manuscript, "Large Language Models and Social Media Information Integrity: Opportunities, Challenges, and Research Directions," has been accepted for publication in ACM Computing Surveys.Your paper will be returned to your Author Center. Dr. Hanghang Tong Editor-in-Chief ACM Computing Surveys

Cryptography and Security

Combating Knowledge Corruption in Agent Systems: A Byzantine-Tolerant Secure Collaborative RAG Framework

While retrieval-augmented generation systems partially address the hallucination issues in large language models, it also introduces new vulnerabilities to knowledge corruption attacks. Adversaries exploit these vulnerabilities by poisoning documents provided by RAG system to manipulate LLM outputs. To counter this threat, we propose SecureCollaRAG, a Byzantine-tolerant collaborative RAG framework leveraging Multi-source Knowledge Validation Mechanism. Our approach enables agent system to securely verify document provenance through dynamic GNN-based credibility scoring, effectively preventing stealthy knowledge corruption attacks while preserving essential domain knowledge integrity. Through extensive evaluations and formal analysis, we demonstrate that SecureCollaRAG maintains robustness against attackers under non-IID data distributions.
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All authors Zhaoqi Wang, Daqing He, Zijian Zhang, Ye Liu, Jiamou Liu, Zhirui Zeng, Zhan Qin, Zhen Li, Xin Li, Hongwei Yao, Jincheng An, Yong Liu, Yi Li, Qi Sun, Xiulei Liu, Liehuang Zhu

Cryptography and Security · Cross-listed from cs.LG

Manipulation-Proof Oblivious Audits against Deceptive Model Providers

Audits have emerged as a critical instrument for algorithmic governance, providing a mechanism for external scrutiny and governance of machine learning models. However, ensuring the integrity of such assessments remains a challenging issue. For instance in regulatory contexts, audits are typically declared or easily detected, thus enabling model providers to manipulate the process, whether intentionally or inadvertently. This vulnerability is particularly acute in the context of fairness evaluations, in which providers can often infer sensitive attributes and strategically equalize allocation rates between groups to satisfy fairness metrics. In this paper, we introduce a novel audit protocol designed to significantly increase the post-audit detectability of such manipulations by enabling the auditor to query the model in an oblivious manner. Our approach leverages a Private Information Retrieval mechanism to require the provider to label a large set of instances, while preventing it from knowing which subset will ultimately be used for the audit. The protocol is efficient, imposes minimal overhead on the auditor, and requires no modification to the audited model, its training procedure, or its inference pipeline. We provide theoretical guarantees showing that, under this protocol, a provider attempting to hide unfairness must falsify a significantly larger number of responses, thereby increasing both the difficulty and the likelihood of detection of manipulation. Experimental results across representative audit scenarios confirm the effectiveness and practicality of our approach.
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All authors Augustin Godinot, Sofiane Azogagh, Julien Ferry, Sébastien Gambs

Cryptography and Security

Trident : How to Break Deep Reinforcement Learning Cyber Defenses (Agentic)

Autonomous cyber defense systems based on Deep Reinforcement Learning (DRL) have attracted significant research attention, yet remain evaluated almost exclusively against static, heuristic red agents, leaving their robustness against adaptive threats critically understudied. Meanwhile, recent advances in Reinforcement Learning with Verifiable Rewards (RLVR) have improved LLM reasoning, but their integration into cybersecurity remains elusive due to the absence of suitable benchmark environments and interaction datasets. To bridge this gap, we introduce Trident, an agentic LLM red teaming framework comprising three components: a dynamic benchmark with isolated sandbox servers spanning CybORG CAGE 4 and CyberWheel, a dataset comprises over 13,000 high-fidelity red-blue interaction trajectories for RLVR, and a “Code-as-Policy” RLVR agentic architecture Trident Agentic). The latter reformulates red agent training as a contextual bandit via a tripartite Log Summarizer–Planner–Coder design, where a trainable Planner generates complete attack strategies from compressed execution logs, which a frozen Coder translates into executable Python policies deployed against live DRL defenders. Empirical evaluations reveal a fundamental brittleness in existing defenses: with a single trainable 7B planner, Trident reduces blue agent defensive performance by an average of 522% compared to static red agent baselines while autonomously discovering emergent behaviors such as decoy avoidance and adaptive state prioritization that static heuristics entirely fail to uncover.
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All authors Ryozo Masukawa, Ian Bryant, Armita Kazeminajafabadi, Sanggeon Yun, Hyunwoo Oh, SungHeon Jeong, Nathaniel D. Bastian, Mahdi Imani, Mohsen Imani

Cryptography and Security

Adversarial Attacks for Good: A Survey of Proactive Protection across the Visual Content Lifecycle

Once visual content enters an AI pipeline, its owner often retains little technical control over how it is used. Legal and regulatory remedies can address misuse, but many technical interventions must be applied earlier, when content is released or accessed. This survey examines the protective paradigm that has grown around this intervention point, which we call adversarial attacks for good. Perturbations and structured signals long studied as attacks on learned models are instead applied by data owners, creators, platforms, or auditors to disrupt unauthorized automation or support later accountability. Five research communities have arrived at this inversion largely independently, each addressing a different stage of a visual asset's lifecycle: privacy filters against unwanted recognition at sharing time, unlearnable examples against unauthorized training, generative safeguards against malicious editing or imitation, adversarial CAPTCHAs for access control against automated agents, and provenance mechanisms for post-circulation attribution. Although developed in separate venues with incompatible success criteria, many of these methods exploit persistent gaps between human perception, semantic interpretation, and machine inference, suggesting that the paradigm remains relevant as visual pipelines evolve toward multimodal models and autonomous agents. To make their claims comparable, we evaluate all five families along shared axes of transferability, adaptability, and deployment readiness. Across the lifecycle, we find that most protections are still validated mainly against static or weakly adaptive adversaries, while evidence beyond controlled benchmarks remains scarce. We close by consolidating cross-stage countermeasures and open problems for robust, composable, and deployable owner-side protection.
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All authors Jiaming Zhang, Boyang Chen, Zherui Li, Fuyao Zhang, Xinyu Yan, Hong Xi Tae, Wenwen He, Xuan Wang, Siqi Guo, Junhao Dong, Kun Wang, Hanxun Huang, Yige Li, Xingjun Ma, Yang Cao, Lingjuan Lyu, Wei Yang Bryan Lim

Tuesday 4 August

Cryptography and Security · Cross-listed from cs.CY

Unsnarling the Red Tape: Computational Infrastructure for Regulatory Systems

Regulatory complexity is increasingly recognized as an impediment to innovation, institutional responsiveness, and long-run economic growth, with regulatory accumulation estimated to reduce the U.S. GDP growth rate by nearly a full percentage point annually. This paper argues that computational approaches–including knowledge representation, artificial intelligence, natural-language processing, and cryptography–can help reduce forms of regulatory "red tape" by improving efficiency, transparency, and institutional responsiveness. We develop a framework for understanding the sources of regulatory friction and how they can be mitigated to support compliance, analysis, and reform. We further argue that effective modernization requires treating regulation not merely as legal text, but as a complex institutional and informational system that can be partially represented, analyzed, coordinated, and improved computationally while preserving legal legitimacy and procedural accountability.
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All authors Vinay K. Chaudhri, Henry F. Korth, Patrick A. McLaughlin, Leora Morgenstern, Jaromir Savelka, Wee Kee Toh, Helen Wright

Cryptography and Security

Beyond Classification Accuracy: Quantifying Fingerprint Complexity in Encrypted Darknet Services

Existing darknet traffic studies primarily evaluate service fingerprintability through classification performance, providing limited insight into why certain services are easier or harder to identify. This paper introduces the Fingerprint Complexity Score (FCS), a framework for quantifying the intrinsic complexity of darknet service fingerprints using behavioral overlap, uncertainty, disagreement, and persistent confusion. Experiments on 25 services across the Tor, I2P, FreeNet, and ZeroNet anonymity networks reveal substantial variation in fingerprint complexity, with behavioral overlap emerging as the dominant contributor. Validation using Random Forest, Extra Trees, and XGBoost demonstrates a strong inverse relationship between fingerprint complexity and recognition performance (Pearson r = -0.706, Spearman h̊o} = -0.765, p < 0.001). The findings show that service fingerprintability is fundamentally governed by behavioral complexity, providing a new perspective for analyzing behavioral information leakage in anonymity networks.
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Cryptography and Security

From Bilinear to Linear: Differentially Private Federated LoRA via Low-Dimensional Parameterization

Federated Low-Rank Adaptation (LoRA) provides an efficient solution for finetuning large language models across distributed and privacy-sensitive data. However, despite avoiding raw data sharing, federated LoRA remains vulnerable to privacy leakage through transmitted model updates. Differential privacy (DP) mitigates such leakage, but integrating DP into federated LoRA introduces two fundamental challenges: aggregation mismatch from independently averaging low-rank factors, and quadratic noise amplification when noise is injected into both factors. To address these challenges, we propose FedHSIP, a differentially private federated LoRA framework based on a unified low-dimensional parameterization. FedHSIP reformulates all LoRA parameters into a shared low-dimensional trainable vector, enabling clients to optimize and communicate only low-dimensional updates. This reformulation transforms federated LoRA from a bilinear factor aggregation problem into a unified linear parameter space, thereby eliminating aggregation mismatch and preventing the quadratic amplification of DP noise. To further handle non-IID data, we introduce a heterogeneity- and sensitivity-aware isometric projection, constructed from warm-up statistics, which groups coordinates with compatible cross-client update patterns while balancing sensitivity, update energy, and heterogeneity across the low-dimensional space. Extensive experiments on natural language understanding and generation benchmarks show that FedHSIP consistently outperforms existing federated LoRA methods under both private and non-private settings, achieving up to 3-4% improvements under differential privacy while reducing communication cost by over 80% and maintaining robustness under heterogeneous data distributions.
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All authors Lele Zheng, Ruijie Hu, Tao Zhang, Ke Cheng, Yulong Shen

Cryptography and Security · Cross-listed from cs.AI

Selection-Invariant Communication Compilers for Privacy-Aware Multi-Agent LLM Workflows

Structured multi-agent workflows exchange intermediate messages whose content and form can reveal private state even when the final output is safe. We identify selection-channel leakage: after authorization fixes what may be released, a private-state-aware choice among semantically valid realizations creates an additional inference channel. We introduce the selection-invariant communication compiler(SICC), which constrains this post-authorization representation kernel rather than prescribing templates. Any deterministic or independently public-randomized generator satisfying the invariant is valid; requirement-indexed canonical forms are one auditable implementation. We prove a compositional communication-layer guarantee: authorization, public-only form generation, and a dependency-safe utility gate make the emitted transcript reveal no information beyond the complete authorized view. Private-state-aware selection remains vulnerable after surface-disjoint and length-matched controls. Across 132 AgentLeak communication replays and 100 executable LangGraph tasks, deterministic SICC retains complete protocol utility without a positive excess-gain signal; independent public randomization preserves the same result in AgentLeak and 480 controlled cases.
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All authors Jinghan Xu, Longze Fan, Zeyuan Wang, Xinjin Li, Hankai Liu

Cryptography and Security

Post-Hoc Trajectory-Risk Certification for Modular LLM-Based Security Agents

Autonomous security agents operate as staged pipelines, such as classifying network traffic and then attributing attacks to a specific technique. Split conformal prediction gives each stage finite-sample coverage, but deployment requires a trajectory-level guarantee across the full chain. These guarantees do not compose automatically when stages are independently trained and calibrated. Bonferroni allocation is distribution-free but conservative under correlated errors. We show that a natural pairwise-correlation extension to three or more stages is invalid because it gives a lower rather than an upper bound, and derive a valid spanning-tree alternative. We distinguish whether stages are dependent from whether an audit sample is large enough to certify that dependence, and give matching upper and information-theoretic lower sample-complexity bounds. We also show that coarse-to-fine label selection can create near-perfect measured correlation without learned dependence. On a two-stage intrusion-detection pipeline across 6 open LLMs and 2 datasets, removing this artifact reduces measured correlation from near 1 to 0-0.78. A direct audit of trajectory failure becomes 13.7% tighter than Bonferroni once the audit reaches the required sample size, but is worse when undersized. A modular certificate using per-stage certificates and a pairwise overlap bound yields a positive average gain of 0.6%, quantifying the cost of lacking joint access. Same-model, cross-model, and permuted-pairing tests show that residual dependence reflects shared sample difficulty, not shared model representations. Average trajectory coverage across 12 configurations is 92.7% +/- 2.4% at alpha = 0.10. Under cross-dataset deployment, single-step miscoverage reaches 100% even when accuracy remains 78%, showing that distribution shift destroys calibrated confidence before raw accuracy.
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Cryptography and Security · Cross-listed from cs.IT

Dimension Rigidity and Projective Geometry of Trace-Product Switchings of the Gold Cube

We completely classify a natural scalar trace-product switching of the Gold almost perfect nonlinear function $x\mapsto x^3$ in every even dimension. Nontrivial switchings occur only for $n=4,6,8$: the admissible coefficients are, respectively, the nonzero trace-zero elements, the six elements of multiplicative order nine, and $\mathbb{F}_4^{*}$. For every even $n\geq10$, no nonzero coefficient is admissible. The infinite range is excluded by additive-character estimates on a Fermat cubic, with exact finite bridges for $n=10,12$. The raw coefficient lists for $n=6,8$ appeared earlier in Arshad's dissertation; our contribution is their intrinsic description, a proof uniform in the dimension, and the resulting dimension-rigidity theorem. We also classify normalized rank-two extensions in dimension eight by $\mathbb{P}^{1}(\mathbb{F}_4)$. A binary trace selector accepts two coefficient values at each non-base projective point, and the eight accepted marked switchings form exactly two extended-affine, hence two CCZ, classes. A centre-independent low-rank derivative criterion reduces each rank-$r$ candidate to $2^r-1$ membership tests in precomputed forbidden sets. The global APN classes reached are known; the results describe their local organization around the Gold centre and rule out this switching mechanism in all larger even dimensions.
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Cryptography and Security

PriDyG: Privacy-preserving Dynamic Graph Inference with LLM-GNN Collaboration

Graph inference over relational data can expose sensitive edge information, and this risk becomes more severe in dynamic graphs, where repeated model updates cause privacy loss to accumulate. We formulate Edge-level Differentially Private Dynamic Graph Inference (EDG) and propose PriDyG, a private inference framework that combines GNN-based structural learning with LLM-based semantic reasoning. PriDyG introduces incremental private multi-hop aggregation, which buffers newly arrived edges and processes each edge exactly once. By parallel composition, the total privacy cost equals that of a single static release, independent of the number or schedule of model updates. Compared with geometrically decaying budget allocation, incremental aggregation avoids exponentially increasing noise while preserving exact one-hop signals and at least half of two-hop information transfers. PriDyG further complements privatized GNN outputs with LLM predictions derived solely from node text, incurring no additional edge-level privacy cost. Experiments on four benchmarks for node classification and link prediction show that PriDyG consistently outperforms geometrically decaying baselines under the same privacy budget and matches the utility of naive per-update retraining while reducing cumulative privacy cost by up to three orders of magnitude.
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Cryptography and Security

Behavioral Skill Reconstruction: Reconstructing Hidden Functionality from LLM Agent Skills

Closed source agent skills may encode proprietary instructions, scripts, constants, and data. Providers may offer their capabilities as services while keeping the underlying packages hidden. Prior work focuses on prompt injection attacks that directly disclose these artifacts, and existing defenses accordingly aim to prevent such leakage. However, preventing file disclosure does not prevent users from recovering the functionality those files implement. This raises a fundamental question: can a user reconstruct a skill's functionality through ordinary use while its files remain hidden? We study behavioral skill reconstruction (BSR), in which an attacker uses valid task requests and observed responses to build a functional clone of a hidden skill. We introduce SkillClone, a black-box attack that clones a target skill by forming an interface hypothesis from its public advertisement, issuing structured benign probes, synthesizing an executable replica, and iteratively repairing it through differential validation against the victim skill. Across 30 skills spanning rules, tables, procedures, and algorithms, SkillClone achieves exact or partial recovery on held-out inputs for several targets. Iterative requerying closes gaps missed by single-round reconstruction. Because SkillClone uses only legitimate interactions, disclosure-focused defenses provide limited coverage, and less detailed skill descriptions offer limited protection. These results show that file secrecy alone does not ensure functional secrecy. Defenses must also limit cumulative information leakage from ordinary use.
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Cryptography and Security · Cross-listed from cs.LG

Understanding Fault Tolerance of Adversarially Robust Pruned Models

Deep neural networks (DNNs) deployed on resource-constrained neuromorphic hardware face three concurrent challenges: the need for model compression through pruning, vulnerability to adversarial input perturbations, and susceptibility to hardware-induced weight faults such as stuck-at-zero errors. While each of these factors has been studied in isolation, their combined effects on model reliability have received little attention. This paper presents an empirical investigation of how pruning, adversarial training, and hardware fault injection interact to affect the robustness of convolutional neural networks. Using a compact three-layer CNN trained on MNIST, we conduct three experiments: (1) comparing the fault tolerance of naturally and adversarially trained models under simultaneous hardware faults and adversarial attacks, (2) evaluating how pruning affects adversarial robustness, and (3) characterizing the joint accuracy surface across fault rates, adversarial perturbation magnitudes, and pruning levels. Our results show that adversarial training improves robustness against input perturbations but increases sensitivity to stuck-at-zero weight faults. Contrary to intuition, pruning did not significantly increase fault sensitivity, and varying the pruning level had little effect across fault rates and attack strengths. These results highlight the need to jointly consider adversarial robustness and hardware reliability.
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Cryptography and Security

Open-World Darknet Traffic Recognition Under Leave-One-Service-Out Evaluation

Darknet traffic recognition is critical for cyber threat intelligence, as anonymity networks are often used to conceal malicious activity. However, most existing studies rely on closed-world evaluation, assuming all service categories are known during training and testing, which is unrealistic in real-world environments. This paper presents an open-world darknet traffic classification framework using leave-one-service-out evaluation and uncertainty-aware classification with Random Forest and XGBoost models. Experimental results demonstrate significant performance degradation when transitioning from closed-world to open-world settings, demonstrating that closed-world evaluation substantially overestimates deployment robustness. For example, XGBoost Macro-F1 decreases from 88.8% to 46.1% in the I2P environment, while Random Forest performance drops from 87.4% to 45.7%. Although uncertainty-based rejection slightly improves robustness, strong behavioral similarity between known and unknown services leads to frequent misclassification. Semantic absorption analysis further shows that FreeNet video traffic is classified as browsing traffic with an 88.1% assignment rate, while I2P peer-to-peer traffic is absorbed into FTP-related behavior with an 83.4% assignment rate. The findings demonstrate that behavioral overlap remains a major challenge for reliable open-world darknet traffic classification.
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Cryptography and Security · Cross-listed from cs.NI

Securing Load Balancing over QUIC

In-network load balancing outperforms traditional software load balancing while costing less. For instance, programmable switch ASICs can use hashing to select the backend server for the initial packet of each flow at the line rate. However, when the pool of available servers changes, ensuring that the subsequent flow packets are mapped to the same server is challenging due to the data plane's limited memory resources and performance requirements. With the emergence of the QUIC transport protocol, several works show how Connection ID fields (CIDs) can embed the server identifier for all non-initial packets. This approach requires modifications on the server side and violates the QUIC specification, which mandates that CIDs remain unlinkable. In this work, we show that stateless QUIC load balancing can be implemented inside the data plane with no changes to CIDs. Moreover, QUIC packets, except the initial client packet, can bypass the load balancer. We also investigate and mitigate attacks on QUIC in this scenario, including full load balancer bypass and 0-RTT IP spoofing.
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All authors Garegin Grigoryan, Dagim Mindaye, Shireen Maini, Minseok Kwon

Cryptography and Security

Behavioral Information Leakage in Darknet Traffic: A Multi-Channel Analysis Across Anonymity Networks

Existing darknet traffic classification studies largely emphasize predictive accuracy while offering limited insight into the behavioral mechanisms that make encrypted services distinguishable. This paper proposes a behavioral information leakage framework that decomposes flow-level traffic into control, structural, and rhythmic descriptor groups across Tor, I2P, FreeNet, and ZeroNet. The framework combines normalized mutual information analysis with Random Forest-based predictive validation, structural-rhythmic interaction analysis, and cross-network service-variability evaluation under leakage-safe repeated stratified cross-validation. Results show that behavioral leakage varies considerably across anonymity networks. Tor achieves the highest service separability, with a Macro-F1 of 0.7165 and cumulative normalized leakage of 3.9461, whereas FreeNet exhibits the lowest combined leakage of 0.8744. Packet-size organization, directional exchange imbalance, packet tempo, and silence-burst behavior emerge as the main leakage mechanisms. The combined structural-rhythmic representation consistently provides the strongest within-network performance, while leave-one-network-out evaluation reveals limited transferability across anonymity architectures. The proposed Service Variability Index and Leakage Variability Index further show that video exhibits consistent network-specific separability, whereas chat and email demonstrate greater variability across anonymity-network pairs.
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