Papers

This work investigates the fundamental limits of implementing network oblivious transfer via noisy multiple access channels and broadcast channels between honest-but-curious parties when the parties have access to general tripartite non-signaling correlations. By modeling the shared resource as an arbitrary tripartite non-signaling box, we obtain a unified perspective on both the channel behavior and the resulting correlations. Our main result demonstrates that perfect oblivious transfer is impossible. In the asymptotic regime, we further show that even negligible leakage cannot be achieved, as repeated use of the resource amplifies the receiver(s)'s ability to distinguish messages that were not intended for him/them. In contrast, the receiver(s)'s own privacy is not subject to a universal impossibility limitation.

To ensure the responsible distribution and use of open-source deep neural networks (DNNs), DNN watermarking has become a crucial technique to trace and verify unauthorized model replication or misuse. In practice, black-box watermarks manifest as specific predictive behaviors for specially crafted samples. However, due to the generalization nature of DNNs, the keys to extracting the watermark message are not unique, which would provide attackers with more opportunities. Advanced attack techniques can reverse-engineer approximate replacements for the original watermark keys, enabling subsequent watermark removal. In this paper, we explore black-box DNN watermarking specificity, which refers to the accuracy of a watermark's response to a key. Using this concept, we introduce Specificity-Enhanced Watermarking (SEW), a new method that improves specificity by reducing the association between the watermark and approximate keys. Through extensive evaluation using three popular watermarking benchmarks, we validate that enhancing specificity significantly contributes to strengthening robustness against removal attacks. SEW effectively defends against six state-of-the-art removal attacks, while maintaining model usability and watermark verification performance.

We present GuardReasoner-Omni, a reasoning-based guardrail model designed to moderate text, image, video, and audio data. First, we construct a comprehensive training corpus comprising 181k samples spanning these four modalities. Our training pipeline follows a two-stage paradigm to incentivize the model to deliberate before making decisions: (1) conducting SFT to cold-start the model with explicit reasoning capabilities and structural adherence; and (2) performing RL with a concise correctness reward to preserve accurate reasoning while suppressing redundant generation. We release a suite of models scaled at 3B and 7B parameters. Extensive experiments demonstrate that GuardReasoner-Omni achieves superior performance compared to existing state-of-the-art baselines across various guardrail benchmarks.

Spiking neural networks (SNNs) compute with discrete spikes and exploit temporal structure, yet most adversarial attacks change intensities or event counts instead of timing. We study a timing-only adversary that retimes existing spikes while preserving spike counts and amplitudes in event-driven SNNs, thus remaining rate-preserving. We formalize a capacity-1 spike-retiming threat model with a unified trio of budgets: per-spike jitter $\mathcal{B}_{\infty}$, total delay $\mathcal{B}_{1}$, and tamper count $\mathcal{B}_{0}$. Feasible adversarial examples must satisfy timeline consistency and non-overlap, which makes the search space discrete and constrained. To optimize such retimings at scale, we use projected-in-the-loop (PIL) optimization: shift-probability logits yield a differentiable soft retiming for backpropagation, and a strict projection in the forward pass produces a feasible discrete schedule that satisfies capacity-1, non-overlap, and the chosen budget at every step. The objective maximizes task loss on the projected input and adds a capacity regularizer together with budget-aware penalties, which stabilizes gradients and aligns optimization with evaluation. Across event-driven benchmarks (CIFAR10-DVS, DVS-Gesture, N-MNIST) and diverse SNN architectures, we evaluate under binary and integer event grids and a range of retiming budgets, and also test models trained with timing-aware adversarial training designed to counter timing-only attacks. For example, on DVS-Gesture the attack attains high success (over $90\%$) while touching fewer than $2\%$ of spikes under $\mathcal{B}_{0}$. Taken together, our results show that spike retiming is a practical and stealthy attack surface that current defenses struggle to counter, providing a clear reference for temporal robustness in event-driven SNNs. Code is available at https://github.com/yuyi-sd/Spike-Retiming-Attacks.

Business logic vulnerabilities have become one of the most damaging yet least understood classes of smart contract vulnerabilities. Unlike traditional bugs such as reentrancy or arithmetic errors, these vulnerabilities arise from missing or incorrectly enforced business invariants and are tightly coupled with protocol semantics. Existing static analysis techniques struggle to capture such high-level logic, while recent large language model based approaches often suffer from unstable outputs and low accuracy due to hallucination and limited verification. In this paper, we propose LogicScan, an automated contrastive auditing framework for detecting business logic vulnerabilities in smart contracts. The key insight behind LogicScan is that mature, widely deployed on-chain protocols implicitly encode well-tested and consensus-driven business invariants. LogicScan systematically mines these invariants from large-scale on-chain contracts and reuses them as reference constraints to audit target contracts. To achieve this, LogicScan introduces a Business Specification Language (BSL) to normalize diverse implementation patterns into structured, verifiable logic representations. It further combines noise-aware logic aggregation with contrastive auditing to identify missing or weakly enforced invariants while mitigating LLM-induced false positives. We evaluate LogicScan on three real-world datasets, including DeFiHacks, Web3Bugs, and a set of top-200 audited contracts. The results show that LogicScan achieves an F1 score of 85.2%, significantly outperforming state-of-the-art tools while maintaining a low false-positive rate on production-grade contracts. Additional experiments demonstrate that LogicScan maintains consistent performance across different LLMs and is cost-effective, and that its false-positive suppression mechanisms substantially improve robustness.

Cyber insurance, which protects insured organizations against financial losses from cyberattacks and data breaches, can be difficult and expensive to obtain for many organizations. These difficulties stem from insurers difficulty in understanding and accurately assessing the risks that they are undertaking. Cybersecurity audits, which are already implemented in many organizations for compliance and other purposes, present a potential solution to this challenge. This paper provides a structured review and analysis of prior work in this area, analysis of the challenges and potential benefits that cyber audits provide and recommendations for the use of cyber audits to reduce cyber insurance costs and improve its availability.

AI agents that autonomously interact with external tools and environments have shown great promise across real-world applications. However, their reliance on external data exposes them to serious indirect prompt injection attacks, where malicious instructions embedded in third-party content hijack agent behaviors. To mitigate this threat, a growing number of defenses have been proposed and evaluated under existing agent security benchmarks. These benchmarks provide structured environments for comparing attacks and defenses, and have become a key driver for defense design and optimization. However, as agents move toward more complex and open-ended real-world deployments, there is a pressing need for benchmarks to become more adaptive and better reflect the dynamic environments faced by real-world agentic systems. In this work, we reveal three fundamental flaws in the current benchmarks and push the frontier along these dimensions: (i) lack of dynamic open-ended tasks, (ii) lack of helpful instructions, and (iii) simplistic user tasks. To bridge this gap, we introduce AgentDyn, a manually designed benchmark featuring 60 challenging open-ended tasks and 560 injection test cases across Shopping, GitHub, and Daily Life. Unlike prior static benchmarks, AgentDyn requires dynamic planning and incorporates helpful third-party instructions. Our evaluation of ten state-of-the-art defenses suggests that almost all existing defenses are either not secure enough or suffer from significant over-defense, revealing that existing defenses are still far from real-world deployment. Our benchmark is available at https://github.com/leolee99/AgentDyn.

Detecting whether a model has been poisoned is a longstanding problem in AI security. In this work, we present a practical scanner for identifying sleeper agent-style backdoors in causal language models. Our approach relies on two key findings: first, sleeper agents tend to memorize poisoning data, making it possible to leak backdoor examples using memory extraction techniques. Second, poisoned LLMs exhibit distinctive patterns in their output distributions and attention heads when backdoor triggers are present in the input. Guided by these observations, we develop a scalable backdoor scanning methodology that assumes no prior knowledge of the trigger or target behavior and requires only inference operations. Our scanner integrates naturally into broader defensive strategies and does not alter model performance. We show that our method recovers working triggers across multiple backdoor scenarios and a broad range of models and fine-tuning methods.

The widespread adoption of Vision Transformers (ViTs) elevates supply-chain risk on third-party model hubs, where an adversary can implant backdoors into released checkpoints. Existing ViT backdoor attacks largely rely on poisoned-data training, while prior data-free attempts typically require synthetic-data fine-tuning or extra model components. This paper introduces Data-Free Logic-Gated Backdoor Attacks (DF-LoGiT), a truly data-free backdoor attack on ViTs via direct weight editing. DF-LoGiT exploits ViT's native multi-head architecture to realize a logic-gated compositional trigger, enabling a stealthy and effective backdoor. We validate its effectiveness through theoretical analysis and extensive experiments, showing that DF-LoGiT achieves near-100% attack success with negligible degradation in benign accuracy and remains robust against representative classical and ViT-specific defenses.

Deep neural networks (DNNs) have achieved remarkable success in radio frequency (RF) fingerprinting for wireless device authentication. However, their practical deployment faces two major limitations: domain shift, where models trained in one environment struggle to generalize to others, and the black-box nature of DNNs, which limits interpretability. To address these issues, we propose a novel framework that integrates a group of variable-length two-dimensional (2D) shapelets with a pre-trained large language model (LLM) to achieve efficient, interpretable, and generalizable RF fingerprinting. The 2D shapelets explicitly capture diverse local temporal patterns across the in-phase and quadrature (I/Q) components, providing compact and interpretable representations. Complementarily, the pre-trained LLM captures more long-range dependencies and global contextual information, enabling strong generalization with minimal training overhead. Moreover, our framework also supports prototype generation for few-shot inference, enhancing cross-domain performance without additional retraining. To evaluate the effectiveness of our proposed method, we conduct extensive experiments on six datasets across various protocols and domains. The results show that our method achieves superior standard and few-shot performance across both source and unseen domains.

Evaluating and improving the security capabilities of code agents requires high-quality, executable vulnerability tasks. However, existing works rely on costly, unscalable manual reproduction and suffer from outdated data distributions. To address these, we present CVE-Factory, the first multi-agent framework to achieve expert-level quality in automatically transforming sparse CVE metadata into fully executable agentic tasks. Cross-validation against human expert reproductions shows that CVE-Factory achieves 95% solution correctness and 96% environment fidelity, confirming its expert-level quality. It is also evaluated on the latest realistic vulnerabilities and achieves a 66.2% verified success. This automation enables two downstream contributions. First, we construct LiveCVEBench, a continuously updated benchmark of 190 tasks spanning 14 languages and 153 repositories that captures emerging threats including AI-tooling vulnerabilities. Second, we synthesize over 1,000 executable training environments, the first large-scale scaling of agentic tasks in code security. Fine-tuned Qwen3-32B improves from 5.3% to 35.8% on LiveCVEBench, surpassing Claude 4.5 Sonnet, with gains generalizing to Terminal Bench (12.5% to 31.3%). We open-source CVE-Factory, LiveCVEBench, Abacus-cve (fine-tuned model), training dataset, and leaderboard. All resources are available at https://github.com/livecvebench/CVE-Factory .

Quantum Machine Learning (QML) promises significant computational advantages, but preserving training data privacy remains challenging. Classical approaches like differentially private stochastic gradient descent (DP-SGD) add noise to gradients but fail to exploit the unique properties of quantum gradient estimation. In this work, we introduce the Differentially Private Parameter-Shift Rule (Q-ShiftDP), the first privacy mechanism tailored to QML. By leveraging the inherent boundedness and stochasticity of quantum gradients computed via the parameter-shift rule, Q-ShiftDP enables tighter sensitivity analysis and reduces noise requirements. We combine carefully calibrated Gaussian noise with intrinsic quantum noise to provide formal privacy and utility guarantees, and show that harnessing quantum noise further improves the privacy-utility trade-off. Experiments on benchmark datasets demonstrate that Q-ShiftDP consistently outperforms classical DP methods in QML.

Advanced Persistent Threats (APTs) are sophisticated, long-term cyberattacks that are difficult to detect because they operate stealthily and often blend into normal system behavior. This paper presents a neuro-symbolic anomaly detection framework that combines a Graph Autoencoder (GAE) with rare pattern mining to identify APT-like activities in system-level provenance data. Our approach first constructs a process behavioral graph using k-Nearest Neighbors based on feature similarity, then learns normal relational structure using a Graph Autoencoder. Anomaly candidates are identified through deviations between observed and reconstructed graph structure. To further improve detection, we integrate an rare pattern mining module that discovers infrequent behavioral co-occurrences and uses them to boost anomaly scores for processes exhibiting rare signatures. We evaluate the proposed method on the DARPA Transparent Computing datasets and show that rare-pattern boosting yields substantial gains in anomaly ranking quality over the baseline GAE. Compared with existing unsupervised approaches on the same benchmark, our single unified model consistently outperforms individual context-based detectors and achieves performance competitive with ensemble aggregation methods that require multiple separate detectors. These results highlight the value of coupling graph-based representation learning with classical pattern mining to improve both effectiveness and interpretability in provenance-based security anomaly detection.

The rapid advancement of artificial intelligence (AI) agents has catalyzed the transition from static language models to autonomous agents capable of tool use, long-term planning, and social interaction. $\textbf{Moltbook}$, the first social network designed exclusively for AI agents, has experienced viral growth in early 2026. To understand the behavior of AI agents in the agent-native community, in this paper, we present a large-scale empirical analysis of Moltbook leveraging a dataset of 44,411 posts and 12,209 sub-communities ("submolts") collected prior to February 1, 2026. Leveraging a topic taxonomy with nine content categories and a five-level toxicity scale, we systematically analyze the topics and risks of agent discussions. Our analysis answers three questions: what topics do agents discuss (RQ1), how risk varies by topic (RQ2), and how topics and toxicity evolve over time (RQ3). We find that Moltbook exhibits explosive growth and rapid diversification, moving beyond early social interaction into viewpoint, incentive-driven, promotional, and political discourse. The attention of agents increasingly concentrates in centralized hubs and around polarizing, platform-native narratives. Toxicity is strongly topic-dependent: incentive- and governance-centric categories contribute a disproportionate share of risky content, including religion-like coordination rhetoric and anti-humanity ideology. Moreover, bursty automation by a small number of agents can produce flooding at sub-minute intervals, distorting discourse and stressing platform stability. Overall, our study underscores the need for topic-sensitive monitoring and platform-level safeguards in agent social networks.

Integration of AI into environmental regulation represents a significant advancement in data management. It offers promising results in both data protection plus algorithmic fairness. This research addresses the critical need for sustainable data protection in the era of ever evolving cyber threats. Traditional encryption methods face limitations in handling the dynamic nature of environmental data. This necessitates the exploration of advanced cryptographic techniques. The objective of this study is to evaluate how AI can enhance these techniques to ensure robust data protection while facilitating fair algorithmic management. The methodology involves a comprehensive review of current advancements in AI-enhanced homomorphic encryption (HE) and multi-party computation (MPC). It is coupled with an analysis of how these techniques can be applied to environmental data regulation. Key findings indicate that AI-driven dynamic key management, adaptive encryption schemes, and optimized computational efficiency in HE, alongside AI-enhanced protocol optimization and fault mitigation in MPC, significantly improve the security of environmental data processing. These findings highlight a crucial research gap in the intersection of AI, cyber laws, and environmental regulation, particularly in terms of addressing algorithmic bias, transparency, and accountability. The implications of this research underscore the need for stricter cyber laws. Also, the development of comprehensive regulations to safeguard sensitive environmental data. Future efforts should focus on refining AI systems to balance security with privacy and ensuring that regulatory frameworks can adapt to technological advancements. This study provides a foundation for future research aimed at achieving secure sustainable environmental data management through AI innovations.

LLMs are increasingly used for code generation, but their outputs often follow recurring templates that can induce predictable vulnerabilities. We study vulnerability persistence in LLM-generated software and introduce Feature–Security Table (FSTab) with two components. First, FSTab enables a black-box attack that predicts likely backend vulnerabilities from observable frontend features and knowledge of the source LLM, without access to the backend or source code. Second, FSTab provides a model-centric evaluation that quantifies how consistently a model reproduces the same vulnerabilities across programs, semantics-preserving rephrasings, and application domains. We evaluate FSTab on state-of-the-art code LLMs, including GPT-5.2, Claude-4.5 Opus, and Gemini-3 Pro, across diverse application domains. Our results show strong cross-domain transfer: even when the target domain is excluded from training, FSTab achieves up to 94% attack success and 93% vulnerability coverage on Internal Tools (Claude-4.5 Opus). These findings expose an underexplored attack surface in LLM-generated software and highlight the security risks of code generation. Our code is available at https://github.com/fstabicml2026/FSTab

3D Gaussian Splatting (3DGS) has become a mainstream representation for real-time 3D scene synthesis, enabling applications in virtual and augmented reality, robotics, and 3D content creation. Its rising commercial value and explicit parametric structure raise emerging intellectual property (IP) protection concerns, prompting a surge of research on 3DGS IP protection. However, current progress remains fragmented, lacking a unified view of the underlying mechanisms, protection paradigms, and robustness challenges. To address this gap, we present the first systematic survey on 3DGS IP protection and introduce a bottom-up framework that examines (i) underlying Gaussian-based perturbation mechanisms, (ii) passive and active protection paradigms, and (iii) robustness threats under emerging generative AI era, revealing gaps in technical foundations and robustness characterization and indicating opportunities for deeper investigation. Finally, we outline six research directions across robustness, efficiency, and protection paradigms, offering a roadmap toward reliable and trustworthy IP protection for 3DGS assets.

Detecting rare and diverse anomalies in highly imbalanced datasets-such as Advanced Persistent Threats (APTs) in cybersecurity-remains a fundamental challenge for machine learning systems. Active learning offers a promising direction by strategically querying an oracle to minimize labeling effort, yet conventional approaches often fail to exploit the intrinsic geometric structure of the feature space for model refinement. In this paper, we introduce SDA2E, a Sparse Dual Adversarial Attention-based AutoEncoder designed to learn compact and discriminative latent representations from imbalanced, high-dimensional data. We further propose a similarity-guided active learning framework that integrates three novel strategies to refine decision boundaries efficiently: mormal-like expansion, which enriches the training set with points similar to labeled normals to improve reconstruction fidelity; anomaly-like prioritization, which boosts ranking accuracy by focusing on points resembling known anomalies; and a hybrid strategy that combines both for balanced model refinement and ranking. A key component of our framework is a new similarity measure, Normalized Matching 1s (SIM_NM1), tailored for sparse binary embeddings. We evaluate SDA2E extensively across 52 imbalanced datasets, including multiple DARPA Transparent Computing scenarios, and benchmark it against 15 state-of-the-art anomaly detection methods. Results demonstrate that SDA2E consistently achieves superior ranking performance (nDCG up to 1.0 in several cases) while reducing the required labeled data by up to 80% compared to passive training. Statistical tests confirm the significance of these improvements. Our work establishes a robust, efficient, and statistically validated framework for anomaly detection that is particularly suited to cybersecurity applications such as APT detection.

Modern vehicles rely on electronic control units (ECUs) interconnected through the Controller Area Network (CAN), making in-vehicle communication a critical security concern. Machine learning (ML)-based intrusion detection systems (IDS) are increasingly deployed to protect CAN traffic, yet their robustness against adversarial manipulation remains largely unexplored. We present a systematic adversarial evaluation of CAN IDS using the ROAD dataset, comparing four shallow learning models with a deep neural network-based detector. Using protocol-compliant, payload-level perturbations generated via FGSM, BIM and PGD, we evaluate adversarial effects on both benign and malicious CAN frames. While all models achieve strong baseline performance under benign conditions, adversarial perturbations reveal substantial vulnerabilities. Although shallow and deep models are robust to false-alarm induction, with the deep neural network (DNN) performing best on benign traffic, all architectures suffer significant increases in missed attacks. Notably, under gradient-based attacks, the shallow model extra trees (ET) demonstrates improved robustness to missed-attack induction compared to the other models. Our results demonstrate that adversarial manipulation can simultaneously trigger false alarms and evade detection, underscoring the need for adversarial robustness evaluation in safety-critical automotive IDS.

Research on differentially private synthetic tabular data has largely focused on independent and identically distributed rows where each record corresponds to a unique individual. This perspective neglects the temporal complexity in longitudinal datasets, such as electronic health records, where a user contributes an entire (sub) table of sequential events. While practitioners might attempt to model such data by flattening user histories into high-dimensional vectors for use with standard marginal-based mechanisms, we demonstrate that this strategy is insufficient. Flattening fails to preserve temporal coherence even when it maintains valid marginal distributions. We introduce PATH, a novel generative framework that treats the full table as the unit of synthesis and leverages the autoregressive capabilities of privately fine-tuned large language models. Extensive evaluations show that PATH effectively captures long-range dependencies that traditional methods miss. Empirically, our method reduces the distributional distance to real trajectories by over 60% and reduces state transition errors by nearly 50% compared to leading marginal mechanisms while achieving similar marginal fidelity.

The design of protocols for local differential privacy (or LDP) has been a topic of considerable research interest in recent years. LDP protocols utilise the randomised encoding of outcomes of an experiment using a transition probability matrix (TPM). Several authors have observed that balanced incomplete block designs (BIBDs) provide nice examples of TPMs for LDP protocols. Indeed, it has been shown that such BIBD-based LDP protocols provide optimal estimators. In this primarily expository paper, we give a detailed introduction to LDP protocols and their connections with block designs. We prove that a subclass of LDP protocols known as pure LDP protocols are equivalent to $(r,\lambda)$-designs (which contain balanced incomplete block designs as a special case). An unbiased estimator for an LDP scheme is a left inverse of the transition probability matrix. We show that the optimal estimators for BIBD-based TPMs are precisely those obtained from the Moore-Penrose inverse of the corresponding TPM. We also review some existing work on optimal LDP protocols in the context of pure protocols.

When creating public data products out of confidential datasets, inferential/posterior-based privacy definitions, such as Pufferfish, provide compelling privacy semantics for data with correlations. However, such privacy definitions are rarely used in practice because they do not always compose. For example, it is possible to design algorithms for these privacy definitions that have no leakage when run once but reveal the entire dataset when run more than once. We prove necessary and sufficient conditions that must be added to ensure linear composition for Pufferfish mechanisms, hence avoiding such privacy collapse. These extra conditions turn out to be differential privacy-style inequalities, indicating that achieving both the interpretable semantics of Pufferfish for correlated data and composition benefits requires adopting differentially private mechanisms to Pufferfish. We show that such translation is possible through a concept called the $a(b)$-influence curve, and many existing differentially private algorithms can be translated with our framework into a composable Pufferfish algorithm. We illustrate the benefit of our new framework by designing composable Pufferfish algorithms for Markov chains that significantly outperform prior work.

Many Intelligent Transportation Systems (ITS) applications require strong privacy guarantees for both users and their data. Homomorphic encryption (HE) enables computation directly on encrypted messages and thus offers a compelling approach to privacy-preserving data processing in ITS. However, practical HE schemes incur substantial ciphertext expansion and communication overhead, which limits their suitability for time-critical transportation systems. Hybrid homomorphic encryption (HHE) addresses this challenge by combining a homomorphic encryption scheme with a symmetric cipher, enabling efficient encrypted computation while dramatically reducing communication cost. In this paper, we develop theoretical models of representative ITS applications that integrate HHE to protect sensitive vehicular data. We then perform a parameter-based evaluation of the HHE scheme Rubato to estimate ciphertext sizes and communication overhead under realistic ITS workloads. Our results show that HHE achieves orders-of-magnitude reductions in ciphertext size compared with conventional HE while maintaining cryptographic security, making it significantly more practical for latency-constrained ITS communication.

We propose Eidolon, a post-quantum signature scheme grounded on the NP-complete k-colorability problem. Our construction generalizes the Goldreich-Micali-Wigderson zero-knowledge protocol to arbitrary k >= 3, applies the Fiat-Shamir transform, and uses Merkle-tree commitments to compress signatures from O(tn) to O(t log n). We generate hard instances by planting a coloring while aiming to preserve the statistical profile of random graphs. We present an empirical security analysis of such a scheme against both classical solvers (ILP, DSatur) and a custom graph neural network (GNN) attacker. Experiments show that for n >= 60, neither approach is able to recover a valid coloring matching the planted solution, suggesting that well-engineered k-coloring instances can resist the considered classical and learning-based cryptanalytic approaches. These experiments indicate that the constructed instances resist the attacks considered in our evaluation.

Large language models (LLMs) are known to exhibit brittle behavior under adversarial prompts and jailbreak attacks, even after extensive alignment and fine-tuning. This fragility reflects a broader challenge of modern neural language models: small, carefully structured perturbations in high-dimensional input spaces can induce large and unpredictable changes in internal semantic representations and output. We investigate monotonicity as an architectural inductive bias for improving the robustness of Transformer-based language models. Monotonicity constrains semantic transformations so that strengthening information, evidence, or constraints cannot lead to regressions in the corresponding internal representations. Such order-preserving behavior has long been exploited in control and safety-critical systems to simplify reasoning and improve robustness, but has traditionally been viewed as incompatible with the expressivity required by neural language models. We show that this trade-off is not inherent. By enforcing monotonicity selectively in the feed-forward sublayers of sequence-to-sequence Transformers – while leaving attention mechanisms unconstrained – we obtain monotone language models that preserve the performance of their pretrained counterparts. This architectural separation allows negation, contradiction, and contextual interactions to be introduced explicitly through attention, while ensuring that subsequent semantic refinement is order-preserving. Empirically, monotonicity substantially improves robustness: adversarial attack success rates drop from approximately 69% to 19%, while standard summarization performance degrades only marginally.

The Uniform Resource Locator (URL), introduced in a connectivity-first era to define access and locate resources, remains historically limited, lacking future-proof mechanisms for security, trust, or resilience against fraud and abuse, despite the introduction of reactive protections like HTTPS during the cybersecurity era. In the current AI-first threatscape, deceptive URLs have reached unprecedented sophistication due to the widespread use of generative AI by cybercriminals and the AI-vs-AI arms race to produce context-aware phishing websites and URLs that are virtually indistinguishable to both users and traditional detection tools. Although AI-generated phishing accounted for a small fraction of filter-bypassing attacks in 2024, phishing volume has escalated over 4,000% since 2022, with nearly 50% more attacks evading detection. At the rate the threatscape is escalating, and phishing tactics are emerging faster than labeled data can be produced, zero-shot and few-shot learning with large language models (LLMs) offers a timely and adaptable solution, enabling generalization with minimal supervision. Given the critical importance of phishing URL detection in large-scale cybersecurity defense systems, we present a comprehensive benchmark of LLMs under a unified zero-shot and few-shot prompting framework and reveal operational trade-offs. Our evaluation uses a balanced dataset with consistent prompts, offering detailed analysis of performance, generalization, and model efficacy, quantified by accuracy, precision, recall, F1 score, AUROC, and AUPRC, to reflect both classification quality and practical utility in threat detection settings. We conclude few-shot prompting improves performance across multiple LLMs.

The digitization of healthcare has generated massive volumes of Electronic Health Records (EHRs), offering unprecedented opportunities for training Artificial Intelligence (AI) models. However, stringent privacy regulations such as GDPR and HIPAA have created data silos that prevent centralized training. Federated Learning (FL) has emerged as a promising solution that enables collaborative model training without sharing raw patient data. Despite its potential, FL remains vulnerable to poisoning and Sybil attacks, in which malicious participants corrupt the global model or infiltrate the network using fake identities. While recent approaches integrate Blockchain technology for auditability, they predominantly rely on probabilistic reputation systems rather than robust cryptographic identity verification. This paper proposes a Trustworthy Blockchain-based Federated Learning (TBFL) framework integrating Self-Sovereign Identity (SSI) standards. By leveraging Decentralized Identifiers (DIDs) and Verifiable Credentials (VCs), our architecture ensures only authenticated healthcare entities contribute to the global model. Through comprehensive evaluation using the MIMIC-IV dataset, we demonstrate that anchoring trust in cryptographic identity verification rather than behavioral patterns significantly mitigates security risks while maintaining clinical utility. Our results show the framework successfully neutralizes 100% of Sybil attacks, achieves robust predictive performance (AUC = 0.954, Recall = 0.890), and introduces negligible computational overhead (<0.12%). The approach provides a secure, scalable, and economically viable ecosystem for inter-institutional health data collaboration, with total operational costs of approximately $18 for 100 training rounds across multiple institutions.

Existing Byzantine robust aggregation mechanisms typically rely on fulldimensional gradi ent comparisons or pairwise distance computations, resulting in computational overhead that limits applicability in large scale and resource constrained federated systems. This paper proposes TinyGuard, a lightweight Byzantine defense that augments the standard FedAvg algorithm via statistical update f ingerprinting. Instead of operating directly on high-dimensional gradients, TinyGuard extracts compact statistical fingerprints cap turing key behavioral properties of client updates, including norm statistics, layer-wise ratios, sparsity measures, and low-order mo ments. Byzantine clients are identified by measuring robust sta tistical deviations in this low-dimensional fingerprint space with nd complexity, without modifying the underlying optimization procedure. Extensive experiments on MNIST, Fashion-MNIST, ViT-Lite, and ViT-Small with LoRA adapters demonstrate that TinyGuard pre serves FedAvg convergence in benign settings and achieves up to 95 percent accuracy under multiple Byzantine attack scenarios, including sign-flipping, scaling, noise injection, and label poisoning. Against adaptive white-box adversaries, Pareto frontier analysis across four orders of magnitude confirms that attackers cannot simultaneously evade detection and achieve effective poisoning, features we term statistical handcuffs. Ablation studies validate stable detection precision 0.8 across varying client counts (50-150), threshold parameters and extreme data heterogeneity . The proposed framework is architecture-agnostic and well-suited for federated fine-tuning of foundation models where traditional Byzantine defenses become impractical

Storage systems are fundamental to modern computing infrastructures, yet ensuring their correctness remains challenging in practice. Despite decades of research on system testing, many storage-system failures (including durability, ordering, recovery, and consistency violations) remain difficult to expose systematically. This difficulty stems not primarily from insufficient testing tooling, but from intrinsic properties of storage-system execution, including nondeterministic interleavings, long-horizon state evolution, and correctness semantics that span multiple layers and execution phases. This survey adopts a storage-centric view of system testing and organizes existing techniques according to the execution properties and failure mechanisms they target. We review a broad spectrum of approaches, ranging from concurrency testing and long-running workloads to crash-consistency analysis, hardware-level semantic validation, and distributed fault injection, and analyze their fundamental strengths and limitations. Within this framework, we examine fuzzing as an automated testing paradigm, highlighting systematic mismatches between conventional fuzzing assumptions and storage-system semantics, and discuss how recent artificial intelligence advances may complement fuzzing through state-aware and semantic guidance. Overall, this survey provides a unified perspective on storage-system correctness testing and outlines key challenges

Consent is an ethical cornerstone of clinical research and healthcare in general. Although the ethical principles of consent - providing information, ensuring comprehension, and ensuring voluntariness - are well-defined, the technological infrastructure remains outdated. Clinicians are responsible for obtaining informed consent from research subjects or patients, and for managing it before, during, and after clinical trials or care, which is a burden for them. The voluntary nature of participating in clinical research or undergoing medical treatment implies the need for a participant-centric consent management system. However, this is not reflected in most established systems. Not only do most healthcare information systems not follow a user-centric model, but they also create data silos, which significantly reduce the mobility of patient data between different healthcare institutions and impact personalized medicine. Furthermore, consent management tools are outdated. We propose ClinConNet (Clinical Consent Network), a platform that connects researchers and participants based on clinical research projects. ClinConNet is powered by a dynamic consent model based on blockchain and take advantage of dynamic consent interfaces, as well as blockchain and Self-Sovereign Identity systems. ClinConNet is user-centric and provides important privacy features for patients, such as unlinkability, confidentiality, and ownership of identity data. It is also compatible with the right to be forgotten, as defined in many personal data protection regulations, such as the GDPR. We provide a detailed privacy and security analysis in an adversarial model, as well as a Proof of Concept implementation with detailed performance measures that demonstrate the feasibility of our blockchain-based consent management system with a median end-to-end consent establishment time of under 200ms and a throughput of 250TPS.