Papers

We study exact-cardinality, equally weighted minimum-variance portfolio selection under a one-factor covariance model supplied in factor form. In the nonnegative homoskedastic regime, selecting the K smallest loadings is optimal. Allowing strictly positive asset-specific idiosyncratic variances makes the decision problem NP-complete even with positive integer loadings and a strictly positive-definite covariance matrix; with identity residual covariance, exactly one negative loading also suffices. We give exact pseudo-polynomial dynamic programs for one factor and fixed factor dimension and prove W[1]-hardness parameterized by K, including the positive-data family. Consequently, a general exact polynomial-time algorithm for Monge's (2017) equally weighted single-factor variance-input formulation would imply P=NP. For a normalized binary factor encoding, we construct a depth-zero projection from modular k-SUM that preserves exact cardinality and positive definiteness. The projection transfers Lin's (2026) fixed-k circuit lower bound under its stated width and quantifier conditions and, independently, yields a parity-based proof that the portfolio language is not in nonuniform AC^0 even with identity residual covariance and polynomially bounded integer coefficients. These are restricted-circuit results: no unrestricted P/poly lower bound and no separation of P from NP is claimed.

Telework has expanded rapidly, and understanding the behaviors employees enact under it has become correspondingly important. This study develops an integrative conceptual framework specifying the multidimensional nature of telework behavior. A systematic literature review following PRISMA identified 114 review articles, which were analyzed using constructivist grounded theory. Six behavioral dimensions were identified, covering performance, communication, environmental, task, policy, and well-being conduct. Antecedents were grouped into individual factors, job characteristics, organizational norms, technological factors, and work environment factors. Outcomes were grouped into job satisfaction, productivity, turnover, health and well-being, work-life balance, and social isolation. Three contextual moderators were identified, namely telework modality, telework preference, and cultural and national context. Fourteen propositions link these categories and are advanced as testable claims rather than established findings, since they are derived from published review evidence and have not been empirically tested. The framework proposes telework behavior as the construct through which the conditions of remote work are translated into employee and organizational outcomes, and it specifies a content domain from which measures of the construct can be developed. It also indicates where organizations can direct policy, training, and intervention.

This paper is the first work at the intersection of game theory and property testing, giving algorithms and lower bounds for efficiently testing whether an allocation mechanism is incentive compatible (IC). We propose distinguishing whether a mechanism is $\epsilon$-far from being IC, i.e., when it observes many monotonicity "violations." Conceptually, inspired by the literature on Boolean function monotonicity testing, we construct a tester for discrete single-parameter allocation rules. Technically, our work is the first to consider monotonicity testing of vector-valued functions on the hypergrid. We give a $\tilde{O}(n/\epsilon)$-query algorithm to test whether a function (representing n-player allocation mechanisms) is coordinate-wise monotone versus $\epsilon$-far from it. We also show a matching lower bound: the class of coordinate-wise monotone vector-valued functions on a Boolean hypercube or hypergrid requires $\tilde{\Omega}(n/\epsilon)$ queries to test whether it is $\epsilon$-far from monotonicity, and this holds even if the tester is two-sided and allowed to make adaptive queries. Finally, we extend our upper bound to and give a tester of the same query complexity for pricing functions of allocation mechanisms. This requires overcoming the technical challenge that the path in function space to the closest IC mechanism may involve interdependent changes to both the price and the allocation rule.

Policy learning aims to determine who should be treated based on individual characteristics. In high-stakes settings such as medicine and public policy where safety is a central concern, improving the average outcomes alone may not be sufficient: decision makers may also seek to protect individuals from harm, in line with the Hippocratic principle of “do no harm.” In this paper, we propose conformal policy learning (CPL), a policy learning procedure with a new distribution-free safety guarantee that controls the probability of assigning treatment to an individual who would be harmed relative to control. CPL views each treatment decision as testing a hypothesis of counterfactual harm and assigns treatment by thresholding conformal p-values. These p-values use observable proxies and selective calibration to address the challenge that the potential outcomes under comparison are never simultaneously observed. For randomized experiments, under standard exchangeability conditions, CPL provides finite-sample safety guarantee at a user-specified level, without imposing any outcome modeling assumptions. Moreover, when the outcome model is consistently estimated, CPL achieves asymptotically optimal welfare subject to the safety constraint. In observational studies, CPL with learn-then-balance weights achieves doubly robust safety guarantees. We evaluate CPL through extensive simulations and apply it to an empirical study of AI-powered interventions designed to reduce conspiracy beliefs.

Green economic complexity provides a generalizable framework for examining countries' productive capabilities in a defined product set. We apply this framework to AI-enabling goods within the full product space, linking current specialization with adjacent diversification opportunities. Using BACI exports for 2007-2023 and 103 AI-enabling goods, we measure complexity-weighted specialization (AECI), product-level adjacent opportunities (AIAP), and average complexity-weighted relatedness of remaining candidates (AECP). In 2023, Japan leads AECI, while China leads AECP; portfolio breadth accounts for much of the variation in raw AECI. Initial raw potential is positively associated with subsequent changes in the AI-enabling export share, but its associations with changes in AECI and specialization counts are not statistically significant at the 5% level. Our contribution is a trade-based assessment of AI-enabling productive capabilities and related opportunities. The results and public dashboard provide a preliminary complement to publication and patent indicators, not a comprehensive measure of national AI performance or a validated forecast of diversification.

I study dynamic treatment effects in panel data under staggered adoption when treatment timing depends jointly on unobserved time-invariant heterogeneity and time-varying pretreatment covariates, including lagged outcomes. Untreated potential outcomes follow a nonparametric dynamic panel model that allows flexible interactions between time-varying covariates and latent heterogeneity. I use pretreatment outcome histories to find individuals with similar time-invariant latent factors, and the key requirement is that these histories are sufficiently informative about those latent factors. I develop an identification strategy for the dynamic average treatment effect on the treated (ATT) and propose kernel-based doubly robust estimators for the dynamic ATT. I further combine double cross-fitting with undersmoothing and show that, under suitable regularity conditions, the proposed estimators are $\sqrt{n}$-consistent, asymptotically normal, and asymptotically unbiased. The simulation study demonstrates that the proposed method provides accurate inference across a wide range of data-generating processes. I illustrate the method with an application to the U.S. family planning program studied by Bailey (2012) and reestimate its effect on fertility rates.

We investigate Empirical Bayes (EB) methods in the context of compound adaptive experiments, where the arm distribution in each experiment follows a normal distribution with an unknown mean that we seek to estimate. There are two main EB strategies: $g$-modeling, which estimates the prior by maximizing the marginal likelihood, and $f$-modeling, which derives posterior means directly from the empirical distribution of the observations. We show that $g$-modeling continues to be a valid EB procedure even when it incorrectly assumes that data are collected exogenously; its validity does not depend on the particular sampling algorithm or on whether sample sizes are endogenous. In practice, one can apply standard $g$-modeling techniques by acting as though the data were exogenously sampled. We extend regret guarantees from exogenous sampling to adaptively generated data. By contrast, naively applying the Tweedie formula based on the marginal density of the observed data, as in standard $f$-modeling, can produce biased rules under adaptive sampling. We corroborate the robustness of $g$-modeling through simulations with widely used adaptive algorithms and demonstrate its applicability using a real-world dataset consisting of multiple sequential experiments.

This paper develops Wald inference for least-squares estimation of linear regression models on dyadic data, accommodating configurations where multiple observations share the same pair of units (e.g., directed flows, multilayer networks, and dyadic panels). We establish that the dyadic-robust Wald statistic is asymptotically $\chi^2_q$ for an arbitrary nonrandom sequence of full-rank restrictions, under a single condition on the accumulation of dependence. Throughout, no convergence rate is assumed or estimated, permitting the condition number of the score's variance matrix to diverge. We further propose a delete-one-unit jackknife alternative that is positive semidefinite by construction. This jackknife statistic attains the same asymptotic limit under one additional condition on dyad multiplicity and remains asymptotically conservative when that condition fails. A supplement contains all proofs, Monte Carlo experiments featuring estimated coefficients that converge at heterogeneous rates, and an empirical gravity application to bilateral trade.

Model robustness analysis estimates an effect across a multiverse of specifications that pools control sets identifying the declared estimand with sets that condition on mediators or colliders. We propose stating rival assumptions about contested controls as a small set of candidate causal graphs, enumerating the adjustment sets each graph licenses, and reporting robustness metrics conditional on each graph. A finite-mixture identity splits the licensed multiverse's dispersion into within-graph and between-graph components; the between-graph share is a conditional descriptive summary whose reading depends on the candidate set, the weights, and a common estimand. Simulations examine misleading pooled robustness assessments and the limits of the decomposition. Applications to hurricane fatalities, job training, and union wages show fragility that survives every graph, instability produced by unlicensed specifications, and a fragility verdict concealing a significant premium in each adjustment-identified candidate world. An R package implements the workflow.

The return-on-investment (ROI) constraint is central to many auctions, particularly in online advertising, where a bidder is unwilling to pay more than a fixed fraction of the value obtained. We study truthful and revenue-maximizing auctions for ROI-constrained bidders. We first characterize truthful auctions when both valuations and ROI constraints are private, showing that the allocation rule uniquely determines the payment rule. Building on this characterization, for multiple bidders we introduce $\sigma$-increment mechanisms that resemble Myerson's optimal mechanism~\cite{journals/mor/Myerson81}; as $\sigma$ vanishes, these mechanisms become asymptotically optimal among deterministic truthful mechanisms, and their revenue approaches at least a $1/\bar r$ fraction of the optimal expected revenue over all truthful mechanisms, where $\bar r$ is the largest possible ROI constraint. In the single-bidder setting, we prove that every truthful auction can be replaced by a convex pricing function with weakly higher payments for every type, and we derive the optimal pricing functions when either the valuation or the ROI constraint is public.

Anthropogenic forcing components follow different long-run paths, while persistent temperature change can involve distributional changes beyond the mean. Scalar regressions aggregate these components and retain only mean temperature, obscuring how distinct forcing paths relate to persistent distributional change. We develop new testing, estimation, and inference methods for long-run relations between an integrated predictor vector and a density-valued response. These comprise a residual-based test of between-cointegration (whether predictor trends account for all stochastic trends in the response density), a fully modified least-squares estimator of predictor-specific functional responses, and simulation-based inference for interpretable projections. We apply the methods to densities of observed local temperature anomalies and anthropogenic effective radiative forcing divided into CO$_2$ and non-CO$_2$ portfolios. The test results are consistent with persistent movements in these portfolios statistically accounting for the persistent evolution of the anomaly distribution, with no additional stochastic trend detected in the residual. A joint test rejects the common-response restriction imposed by aggregating the two portfolios. The fitted CO$_2$ response mainly shifts mass toward warmer anomalies and increases central concentration, whereas the non-CO$_2$ response produces a smaller shift but greater dispersion and off-center reshaping. Positive fitted mean responses for both portfolios conceal these contrasts, demonstrating the information lost through scalar aggregation.

An adviser who warns that a task is difficult may become harder to evaluate when her advice is followed more thoroughly. We study a long-lived adviser and successive short-lived workers who choose between standard and intensive implementation. Standard implementation reveals whether the warning was correct and gives the next worker an opportunity to acquire cost-saving practical knowledge. Intensive implementation protects the project but produces only occasional evidence about the adviser. We construct a stationary sequential equilibrium in which the adviser initially accepts an informative implementation, withholds the next project after her reputation improves, and resumes recommendations once inherited know-how has been lost. The interruption is chosen because it changes the successor's implementation decision: preserving know-how reverses the adviser's preference at the relevant history. All realized evidence remains public. Weak subsequent evidence eventually ends the low-ability adviser's protection, but this can take a long time.

We study coordination games in which every action requires planning and preparation. Before players act, they can revise their plans based on partially revealing information about their adversary's preparations. Precise information enables agents to screen for cooperation, selecting the payoff-dominant equilibrium either via small exogenous trembles or via payoff uncertainty. Across scenarios, we emphasize that decomposing an action into (i) preparation and (ii) execution allows us to analyze simultaneous-move games where players partially observe each other's contemporaneous actions.

Consider a situation wherein a decision maker sequentially searches for the best alternative among heterogeneous options with an arbitrary search order. The agent partially learns the value of an option when inspecting it. The information structure jointly determines the ex-ante and ex-post value of investigating each option, thereby shaping the entire learning path. We characterize the set of all search behaviors compatible with some information structure, which forms a polytope. A single information structure rationalizes all these search behaviors, which minimizes the agent's welfare among all information structures. Under certain symmetry assumption over primitives, we also examine the set of all feasible pairs of search and choice behaviors, with and without option sellers' price competition, and prove the same results. Our study not only provides a simple framework for analyzing how information shapes ordered learning paths, but also offers sharp insights into information design and identification problems in such environments.

As artificial intelligence's capabilities improve, it is increasingly viewed as a general scientific method. But how true are these claims? Does AI outperform all techniques, or only some, and how is this changing? To assess the claims, we assemble a corpus of 2,507 head-to-head comparisons between AI and other scientific analysis techniques across 27 scientific disciplines from papers published between 2000 and early 2025. We find a profound dichotomy. Relative to traditional statistics, AI often outperforms, but at a significantly higher computational cost. But there are also nearly a quarter of cases where AI is both more expensive and performs worse than traditional statistical techniques and this fraction has been stable for a decade. Relative to scientific computing, AI often underperforms, but at lower computational cost. This has begun to change: since 2020, AI's performance against scientific computing has notably strengthened and it now outperforms on more than half of comparisons. These patterns suggest that AI is therefore not a universal replacement for existing methods, but rather a valuable – and improving – part of a new AI-enabled scientific frontier.

Numbers this large invite a defensive reflex: reach for the reassuring figure and move on. By the most widely cited measure, the World Bank's extreme-poverty line of \$3.00 per day (2021 PPP), approximately 847 million people, or 10.4% of the world's population, lived in poverty in 2024. That figure is accurate as measured. It is also, by design, a floor: a threshold built to mark bare survival in the poorest economies, not to describe what it takes for a family anywhere to live with basic security. The central argument of this report is that the reassurance offered by that single line is largely an artifact of how we chose to measure. Held to the \$3.00 floor, roughly 847 million people are poor; held to the standards of their own societies, the number is several times larger, and even the most cautious, honest count exceeds a billion. Measured against income standards appropriate to each country's level of development, some 3.7 billion people fall below the World Bank's \$8.30/day upper-middle-income reference line, roughly 1.1 billion are multidimensionally poor, and around 2.3 billion are food insecure. These are not competing errors but answers to different questions. This report does not dispute the official data. It takes those figures as accurate and asks what they do and do not capture. It disaggregates by geography, age, and gender and supplements the monetary count with multidimensional measures of food security, working poverty, social protection, and relative poverty. It also documents a data-quality problem that runs in one direction: survey coverage is weaker in regions with the worst poverty, so official figures are far likelier to understate deprivation than to overstate it.

The Money Pump Index (MPI) of Echenique et al. (2011) measures the severity of consumer irrationality, but computing the exact mean and median MPI over all revealed preference cycles is NP-hard (Smeulders et al., 2013). Existing solutions rely on heuristic proxies, such as evaluating only shorter cycles or bounding the MPI. By framing revealed preferences as a directed graph, this paper projects choice violations onto fundamental cycle bases, which are minimal sets of linearly independent cycles that span the graph's entire cycle space. This yields computationally tractable estimators for the mean and median MPI that are asymptotically equivalent to the original MPI. Applying this methodology to the scanner dataset analyzed by Echenique et al. (2011) and Smeulders et al., (2013), the proposed estimators compute quickly and with negligible small-sample bias.

Long-running AI agents create a control problem: each action they take changes the state, which in turn affects the trajectory of future actions. If the agent is not fully aligned, then guaranteeing safety requires approving consequential actions before allowing them to be executed. But requiring human approval at every step makes attention a bottleneck. Delegating review to other AI agents raises the same alignment problem: the reviewers may themselves be misaligned. We identify a condition on a reviewing panel that is weaker than individual alignment yet necessary and sufficient for a guarantee that the principal fares at least as well in expectation as under a designated baseline policy. Each reviewer agent reports whether an action proposal made by a proposer agent improves its own utility relative to the baseline. We show that a threshold rule tolerating $k$ disapprovals is safe exactly when, after any $k$ reviewers are removed, the principal's utility can be written as a nonnegative combination of the remaining reviewers' utilities, plus a term that is nonnegative on every feasible proposal. We call this property $k$-robust coalitional alignment. The characterization lifts to sequential control: in a discounted MDP with an arbitrary proposer agent, safety at every state is both necessary and sufficient for the induced policy to match or improve on the baseline. When reviewers vote strategically, full-panel coverage in reward-function space guarantees that every Nash equilibrium is safe under the unanimous approval rule; in contrast, more permissive thresholds can admit unsafe equilibria even when reviewers are individually aligned. Experiments with existing reviewer models show that collective review can remain sound without an aligned individual, even when some disapprovals are tolerated.

We model the economics of recursive self-improvement (RSI) and assess its plausibility and impacts. First, we build a sequence of increasingly rich models of AI progress to highlight the feedback loops behind RSI. We represent our models as directed graphs and show that net acceleration in AI capabilities depends on the product of elasticities across each feedback loop. Second, we distinguish between "narrow" and "broad" AI capabilities, capturing the possibility that AI systems improve narrowly at optimizing AI R&D benchmarks without improving at broader economically valuable tasks. Third, we document existing estimates of key parameters and provide a wish list of empirical objects that AI companies can measure and feasibly share publicly. Finally, we calibrate the model with existing data. A back-of-the-envelope calculation suggests that feedback loops are not currently strong enough to generate a self-sustaining acceleration, though they appear to be strengthening. We conclude by assessing the plausibility and implications of such an acceleration.

We provide an introduction to real-world asset (RWA) tokenization, and develop two economic models connecting this emerging market to classical financial theory. In search for a theory of RWA tokenization, we classify RWA tokenization according to the role of the underlying asset, distinguishing standard RWA tokenization, stablecoins, and Digital Asset Treasuries (DATs). Our first model connects tokenization with security design under asymmetric information. Continuous secondary-market trading generates information recovery, reducing adverse-selection costs over time and affecting both the issuance price and the optimal tokenization design. Our second model develops a dynamic corporate-finance framework for DATs, in which market valuation, capital-market financing, and crypto accumulation interact endogenously. We characterize the optimal issuance policy and illustrate the model using Strategy as a case study. A few directions for future research are discussed, providing a starting point for further theoretical and empirical study of RWA markets.

Likelihood-based network models are often fitted under links' independence and low-order constraints, while empirical networks frequently exhibit systematic higher-order structures such as triangles and wedges, characterizing the observed clustering patterns. Real-world core-periphery networks such as the interbank market or the air transportation system represent key examples, with cores displaying complex and nonlinear features. We formalize Penalized Likelihood with Structural Discrepancies (PLSD) as an inference-level correction that trades likelihood fit for agreement with targeted motifs. PLSD augments the negative log-likelihood with a penalty on standardized wedge and triangle discrepancies, yielding a controlled distortion of the likelihood surface that can be interpreted through a linear response analysis. A calibration approach for the unique tuning hyperparameter is introduced to turn off the penalization term when the model is correctly specified, thereby recovering maximum-likelihood estimation in that case. We then introduce a mixed-constraint maximum-entropy core-periphery Exponential Random Graph Model (ERGM), derive unconditional semi-closed motif formulas under Pareto-distributed core fitness, and interpret sparse-regime scaling through a big-jump mechanism for heavy-tailed distributions. We finally corroborate the PLSD inference methodology both with Monte Carlo simulations of a toy stochastic block model and by applying the novel core-periphery ERGM to weekly eMID interbank networks (2009-2015) and monthly US air traffic networks (1991-2000). We show that PLSD describes cores that are not only dense but also higher-order-rich and captures the observed heterogeneous degree distributions and the overexpression of wedges and triangles, at a link-level cost proportional to the model misspecification.

This paper studies the strategic market participation of a monopolistic energy storage aggregator (ESA) in a day-ahead electricity market. The ESA coordinates geographically distributed storage units, submits a coordinated bid for its portfolio, and may hold financial transmission rights (FTRs). The system operator clears the market through a network-constrained, multi-period economic dispatch, determining generation and load schedules, nodal prices, energy-market payments, and FTR payoffs. We formulate the ESA–system-operator interaction as a Stackelberg game and characterize its equilibrium through a constraint-binding-pattern decomposition of the market-clearing problem. Beyond enabling equilibrium computation, the framework reveals how the ESA can increase its profit by strategically inducing or avoiding particular constraint-binding patterns. It also establishes a novel welfare result: although strategic storage without FTRs is known to weakly improve social welfare relative to the no-storage case, certain FTR positions can overturn this guarantee by strengthening the ESA's incentive to induce particular patterns, causing social welfare to fall below the no-storage level. Motivated by these findings, we develop two system-operator mechanisms for limiting undesirable ESA behavior and its adverse effects on market outcomes and social welfare. Finally, a three-bus study illustrates the theoretical findings, while IEEE test systems demonstrate the scalability of the proposed method.

The random-coefficient demand model of Berry, Levinsohn, and Pakes (1995) is commonly estimated by the generalized method of moments (GMM), using an unconditional moment restriction with a fixed set of instruments. Identification of the model, however, rests on a conditional moment restriction. The two are not equivalent: the unconditional restriction may admit additional parameter values. We construct a counterexample in which the model is identified by the conditional restriction yet standard GMM is not, even with the optimal instrument. Building directly on the identifying restriction, we propose a two-step estimator, following Ai and Chen (2003), that first estimates the relevant conditional expectations nonparametrically and then selects the structural parameters by a conditional-variance-weighted minimum-distance criterion; standard GMM is recovered as the special case of a linear projection onto finitely many instruments. We establish root-T asymptotic normality for the proposed estimator, and we develop the theory for both kernel and series implementations of the first stage. The two implementations share a common limiting distribution, attaining the semiparametric efficiency bound. Simulation evidence illustrates the consequences of the identification gap and demonstrates that the proposed estimator outperforms standard GMM in finite samples.

We study revenue-maximizing attention allocation on an ad-funded social media platform governed by recommendation algorithms. Attention is costly and can be monetized through advertising or allocated to increase creators' exposure, creating a trade-off between monetization and production incentives. In a two-sided model with heterogeneous viewers and creators under private information, the optimal recommendation mix includes content that is ex post suboptimal for some viewers to leverage network externalities. These distortions are targeted: low-ability creators are excluded, while high-ability creators are subsidized through exposure or monetary payments. Two-sided complementarities reshape content variety and quality, with implications for personalization regulation and advertising markets.

Understanding how global supply chains endogenously transform in response to disruptions requires a parametric model of processing networks with non-neutral substitution elasticities. While cascaded CES production functions provide a rigorous analytical framework, dynamically calibrating their structural parameters from time-series data constitutes a highly non-convex inverse optimization problem. Since enforcing strict microeconomic concavity renders standard monolithic algorithmic approaches computationally intractable, we propose a novel data-driven, structure-exploiting algorithm to bypass this limitation. By leveraging the physical upstreamness topology of the supply chain, our hybrid heuristic effectively breaks the curse of dimensionality inherent in economywide processing networks. Applying this computational framework to United States time-series data, we successfully calibrate the fundamental heterogeneous elasticities. This provides a scalable analytics engine to fully endogenize complex supply chain transformations, thereby offering a practical tool to measure structural productivity and uncover the elastic origins of systemic tail risks in large-scale production networks.

Predict-then-optimize methods learn a mapping from features to unknown edge costs. They then solve the shortest-path problem on the predicted costs. We study a feature-free alternative for the case where the decision-maker observes many noisy cost vectors on a fixed network. The cost vectors are denoised by an eigenvalue decomposition (PCA) of their covariance matrix. Dijkstra's algorithm then runs on the result. We test this on the $5\times5$ grid of \citet{elmachtoub2022}, with $1000$ independent replications and a fresh ground truth in each. We compare against SPO+, against naive Dijkstra on noisy costs, and against two alternatives to a hand-picked rank $k$ (the Gavish-Donoho threshold and a Ledoit-Wolf filter). We also test a hybrid of SPO+ and PCA. Four findings emerge. First, the rank matters. Keeping $k=2$ components performs worse than no denoising. Second, when costs are close to linear in the features, the Gavish-Donoho threshold recovers the true rank without supervision. PCA-denoised Dijkstra outperforms SPO+ at $\deg=1$, but underperforms SPO+ at $\deg\geq 2$. The hybrid works best at $\deg=1$ and is slightly better than SPO+ at $\deg=2$. Third, when costs are strongly nonlinear ($\deg=4$), the signal is no longer low-rank, and only the Ledoit-Wolf filter clearly beats the naive baseline. Fourth, the benefit of denoising grows with network size on grids, but not on a layered non-grid network at high nonlinearity.

A principal faces a decision problem under uncertainty and can contract with a researcher to provide relevant information. The cost of acquiring information is only known to the researcher, and, moreover, by privately making an investment the researcher can reduce their expected cost. We characterize optimal contracts by reducing the problem to information design with cost constraints. The principal induces investment below a cutoff in its sunk cost. With two cost types, investment may be underprovided but is never excessive relative to the first best. With more types, the cutoff property survives but overinvestment can occur. Investment incentives also reshape information acquisition: optimal experiments may need to generate more distinct beliefs than there are possible states, and their design can be sensitive to the principal's initial beliefs.

Does authority in AI teams improve the outcome? Organizational theory asserts that authority facilitates decision making, improving quality. Meanwhile, some nascent AI research suggests that revision under authority makes LLM output worse. Multi-agent LLM frameworks default to giving a Manager agent the authority to send a worker's output back for revision. Prior comparisons test the effect of authority using verifiable tasks. We conduct an experiment on an open-ended task, business-intelligence reporting, using a sample of 43 paired laptop products and 86 runs. Each report is written once by a hierarchical team and once by a flat team. We find that flat teams produce higher-quality reports, scoring higher on Utility (d = 0.42, p = 0.009) and Writing Clarity (d = 0.34, p = 0.030). The reports are the same length, but hierarchical team reports use 53% more hedging words such as "may" and "could", and each revision is associated with a 0.14-point drop in Writing Clarity on a 1 to 5 scale. Before any revision, the hierarchical team's first draft is indistinguishable from the flat team's report. In other words, the quality gap can be traced to revision. Authority improves quality when the Manager can verify the work, else when it can only provide feedback it has a negative effect on quality.

After the arrival of transformative artificial intelligence (TAI), broad-based automation is expected to decrease the labor share and increase income and wealth inequality. Although economic growth is likely to accelerate, most of its gains may accrue to a narrow group of individuals and firms. Hence, if unmitigated by redistributive policy, income and wealth inequality may rise to levels unseen in the industrial economy. Using a unifying theoretical framework, we survey the redistributive policies proposed for the era of TAI, such as universal basic income (UBI), universal basic capital (UBC), state-issued compute and robot permits, and taxes on capital, compute, robots, tokens, land, energy, consumption, and wealth. We argue that policies that are able to broadly distribute rents from capital including compute and robots - such as UBC or UBI financed through capital taxes - are most likely to achieve lasting reductions in inequality in a world with human-aligned transformative AI.

Inferring intelligence from observable behavior is a foundational challenge in artificial intelligence. We develop a theory of Bayesian intelligence for agents such as language models. Each prompt induces a possibly imperfect internal experiment; the agent updates a full-support prior by Bayes' rule and faithfully reports its posterior over the possible answers to the question. Repetitions draw fresh, independent outcomes from the same unobserved experiment at one fixed state. We show that the agent's behavior admits this explanation if and only if its reports are not fully contradictory, i.e., some state remains possible under every report across all prompts. Report frequencies and the sizes of positive probabilities impose no further restrictions. We further propose and characterize the behavioral implications of an intelligence order that makes the behavior of two agents consistent with one agent having access to a more informative experiment: there should exist a coupling of report distributions such that the more informative agent's report excludes every answer excluded by its counterpart. Finally, we show the difficulty of aggregating coarse reports from intelligent agents: unless the agent reports a belief about the complete state of the world, the optimal aggregation can assign arbitrary weights to states that have not been excluded. These results provide a basis for understanding when agents' behavior is intelligent and highlight the difficulty of rejecting Bayesian rationality.