Papers

Referees increasingly use large language models (LLMs), while finance and accounting journals disagree about whether to allow it. We ask which part of a referee's job the models can do. GPT-4o, whose training data end before the 2024 conference season, referees the papers presented at the 2024 AFA and NBER finance meetings, and we compare its verdicts with publication in the top-three finance journals over the next two years. Papers the model scores one standard deviation higher are 44% more likely to be published, net of author reputation. The result is not driven by look-ahead bias, as the model does not recall the outcomes. The information comes from its judgements of correctness and exposition. Its judgements of originality and significance carry none, and a referee guide that stresses importance does not help. The split between correctness and contribution holds for accounting papers and for a newer model, GPT-5. LLMs can check whether research is right, but not whether it matters. The technical check can go to the model, while the judgement of contribution stays with people.

We study whether stock disclosures by recognizable investors generate abnormal market reactions beyond the reactions produced by comparable but non-recognizable managers. We define the Buffett effect as the incremental abnormal return to a disclosed new position that is attributable to the public recognition of the disclosing investor. We construct a recognition index from Wikipedia pageviews and ProQuest news mentions. Using data from 2000 to 2025 we compare market reaction to disclosures of 24 recognizable discretionary funds with disclosures of 24 matched control funds. New-position disclosures by recognizable managers generate a positive disclosure premium over the filing date and the following trading days, and the premium increases with investor recognition. We construct calendar-time portfolios that mechanically copy each group's disclosed purchases and find that copying the most recognized investors earns a significant alpha that persists for months and does not reverse. The evidence is most consistent with an entangled attention-information channel: investor recognition directs scarce investor attention toward selected disclosures, and the information revealed in those disclosures is then capitalized into prices.

I study how intermediary liquidity affects mortgage resolution using 1.9 million Ginnie Mae buyout options from 2019 to 2022. When funding markets froze in 2020, nonbank issuers repurchased far fewer delinquent loans than depositories servicing loans in the same pools and, within the same issuer and month, shifted repurchases away from large balances, the loans that require the most cash. About $19 billion of repurchases were delayed, and most were completed later. A model of rationing by value per dollar of cash explains this pattern and shows that borrower information is most valuable when funding is intermediate.

FinVector-Market-4B adapts Qwen/Qwen3.5-4B with rank-16 LoRA on a 22,000-example corpus for structured financial tasks. We evaluate the base and adapted models on the same 600-example benchmark under implicit and explicit JSON-schema contracts. Supplying the schema alone raises base-model JSON validity from 0% to 91.3%. Under matched explicit prompting, the frozen scores improve from 14.7% to 40.0% for FinQA answer exact match, from 48.0% to 82.7% for calculator-expression correctness, from 20.1% to 89.5% for scenario branch-label agreement, and from 52.4% to 87.2% for implication-direction agreement. A post-hoc policy-scoring audit shows that the reported macro-F1 decline reflects a changing label set; using the same three target classes gives 77.4% for the base and 83.1% for the adapter. Filing overlap and calculator-target inconsistencies qualify the benchmark's generalization claims. The results show that compact financial domain adaptation can produce substantial task-specific gains beyond output-format learning under matched prompting, with gains bounded by the evaluated task distribution and prompt contract.

In private wealth management, a manager delegating to artificial intelligence (AI) acts as the client's agent and the system's principal. We introduce a model-independent formulation that combines nested principal–agent delegation with constrained joint maximisation as the task assigned to the AI system. The objective represents client and manager outcomes separately over portfolio–workflow pairs. Legal duties, mandate requirements and evidence sufficiency determine admissibility, with Switzerland, Germany and Austria supplying the legal context. Weights and reference-service floors make the trade-off explicit; concession accounting separates their effects on the client. Analytical constructions and a simulation using public-market observations illustrate the approach. Across eight decision states from four constructed mandates, omitted client liabilities caused two liquidity violations, omitted manager terms caused two capacity violations, and mistranslated weights changed four otherwise admissible choices under faithful optimisation. At the declared weights, six states selected a higher service tier than the client-best alternative, with client concessions of EUR 1,178 to EUR 2,264 and manager gains of EUR 3,062 to EUR 10,381. Three instruction forms each reached all 32 specified decisions under shared numerical, evidence and simulated approval controls; professional instructions matched explicit nested delegation on accuracy and clarification count. Subsequent 2022 exchange-rate and yield paths, combined with constructed growth scenarios, produced lower client outcomes than the reference service although the selected services met the decision-time forecast benchmarks. These examples suggest that the approach could help make mandate choices and their consequences easier to examine. Professional and field studies could assess whether this improves oversight and client outcomes.

Many of the thousands of existing cryptocurrencies suffer from declining adoption, low liquidity and weak security, and merging two of them into a single ecosystem is a natural alternative to abandonment. No rigorous framework exists, however, for determining a fair exchange rate in such a merger. Unlike that of a corporation, the value of a cryptocurrency is driven by network effects, so the exchange rate itself influences the value of the merged asset. We extend the exchange-ratio framework of Mainini, Moretto and Visetti [7] by making the merged value endogenous: the exchange rate determines community migration, migration determines (up to user overlap) the post-merger network state, and an axiomatised valuation function assigns a value to that state. The resulting synergy has no predetermined sign, and the bounds of the bargaining region become self-referential in the exchange rate. We prove that no exchange rate at which the merger destroys value preserves wealth, and that the pre-merger price ratio preserves wealth exactly when the merger does not destroy value at that rate. In that case, under explicit threshold conditions, the price ratio satisfies all five of our fairness conditions – wealth, adoption, security, governance and liquidity preservation – and, under strict versions of these conditions, the admissible set contains a nondegenerate interval around it, the wealth-admissible set one of explicit width. The network-value laws proposed in the literature, from the linear law to Metcalfe's and its generalised power-law forms, share a convexity property that yields the Lipschitz control behind these estimates. Liquidity emerges as the only non-wealth condition that can disconnect the admissible set.

Equity-relevant news evolves through temporally dependent corporate events, making historical information useful only when event continuity, information availability, and transition reliability are modeled. Existing LLM-based financial agents incorporate historical evidence, yet they provide limited support for preserving issuer-specific chronology under point-in-time constraints and for identifying when historical transitions contribute information beyond the current forecast. We present RICE-Alpha (Reliability-Informed Correction with Event Graphs), a point-in-time stock-scoring framework that separates a history-aware multi-view Base Alpha from a reliability-calibrated residual correction derived from historical event continuation. A Multi-Tier Memory Layer grounds news interpretation in temporally eligible issuer-specific history, while a Typed Event Agent constructs event states whose successor relations are formed within issuers and pooled across firms only after valid local pairing. Matured transitions are calibrated by their empirical reliability, and the resulting graph signal is residualized against the Base Alpha and technical view to obtain the RICE Delta. On daily Nasdaq-100 and Hang Seng Index panels from 2024 to 2026, RICE-Alpha achieves the strongest results among the evaluated LLM-based agents and momentum across four predictive and four portfolio-level metrics. Its ICIR more than doubles that of the strongest baseline, while net Sharpe ratios reach 1.656 and 1.725 in the U.S. and Hong Kong, respectively. U.S. ablations further show significant reductions in IC and RankIC after Holm adjustment when major components are removed. These results indicate that historical event continuation adds incremental information when it is temporally grounded, reliability-calibrated, and introduced as a residual correction to a multi-view forecast.

Market microstructure studies how trading rules turn orders into prices and allocations. Those rules have been rebuilt repeatedly: for floor traders, electronic limit order books and high-frequency trading, batch auctions and dark pools, blockchains run by automated market makers and block builders, and now AI agents that discover, pay for, and compete over resources. This survey traces that evolution through one question: can a market allocate scarce goods efficiently and fairly without participants revealing everything they know and want? Each technological shift moved the binding constraint of market design from trader rationality to speed, to control over transaction ordering, to the dimensionality of what participants can report. Impossibility results persist; only their cost moves. We review evidence on high-frequency trading, trading venues, automated market makers, extractable value and algorithmic collusion, and identify allocation as the missing layer of the agent-commerce protocol stack.

Identity assurance is the cost a digital system pays for dishonesty and uncertainty: it exists to make acts attributable when not everyone can be trusted at their word. A common way to pay that cost is flat maximum verification, asking each participant to meet a single high level of identification at entry, before any capability is exercised. Paid on everyone, it over-collects, excludes participants who cannot meet a bar they never needed to clear, taxes every interaction with the cost of the rarest high-risk case, and binds the strength of identification to the activity it unlocks. Existing frameworks compound this by fixing a small number of per-credential levels inside a single legal space and binding each verification to the institution that performed it, leaving cross-border reuse and the tension between data erasure and evidentiary retention unaddressed. This paper develops, as a design-science proposal, a tiered and reusable model of identity assurance for natural, juridical, and machine entities across jurisdictions. Reading the problem through systems theory, where a system changes only when an entity acts, the model holds the assurance state apart from the capability gate that consumes it, so that identity demand follows the act and the weight of its consequences rather than mere presence: a participant may take part with minimal disclosure and supply more only as an act requires. It comprises a typed entity taxonomy, a two-axis coordinate of disclosed assertion scope and source of information, jurisdiction as a time-indexed attribute of the entity, and reliance recorded as bitemporal, liability-allocated, point-in-time snapshots. Requirements are derived from anti-money-laundering, electronic-identity, and data-protection law, and the proposal is evaluated against flat maximum verification, per-credential level-of-assurance designs, and institutional reusable-KYC reliance.

Researchers increasingly use generative large language models (LLMs) to convert corporate text into empirical variables. We examine the extent to which LLM-based textual measures are invariant to model choice using thirteen measures, including sentiment, management clarity, uncertainty, answer specificity, and climate and political risk. Seven LLMs from different providers score earnings call transcripts of S&P 500 companies on these constructs. Cross-model rank correlations average only 0.52, and transcript-level differences common across providers account for only 34% of total score variation. Cross-model disagreement does not predict subsequent analyst or market disagreement, consistent with a substantial model-specific component rather than common ambiguity in the underlying disclosure. Model choice significantly affects downstream inference, with coefficient magnitudes, signs, and statistical significance varying substantially across models. Averaging across providers makes transcript rankings more stable for most constructs, but score levels remain sensitive to the models included in the ensemble. LLM-generated variables should therefore be treated as model-contingent measurements and validated across providers.

Individually protective decisions can produce avoidable collective failures. As large language model (LLM) agents take on greater roles in financial decision-making, financial AI safety must therefore be considered not only at the level of individual agents, but also at the level of the systems they jointly create. We study this problem with FRAIL, a controlled experimental framework that places LLM agents in three dynamic financial environments—bank runs, debt rollover, and reward crowdfunding—where agents' decisions reshape the financial conditions faced by others. Across seven leading LLMs, we find widespread collective fragility even when no agent is instructed to destabilize the system: 77% of baseline bank-run episodes and 83% of debt-rollover episodes end in failure. We then compare three interaction mechanisms based on compensated commitments, centralized commitment agreements, and participant-led coalitions. All three improve aggregate outcomes, but no single mechanism performs best across all financial structures. Across mechanisms, successful stabilization shares a common temporal pattern: broad commitment forms early, before defensive behavior becomes self-reinforcing. Our findings show that individually capable agents do not automatically form safe financial systems, highlighting system-level evaluation and interaction design as central problems for financial AI safety. Code is available at https://anonymous.4open.science/r/FinFrail-CF26.

European electricity trading in the EU operates as a constrained multi-layer system in which legal design, exchange microstructure, and network physics are executed jointly across forward, day-ahead, intraday, and balancing horizons. This paper develops a functional architecture for AI-supported trading that is aligned with market-coupling mechanics, cross-zonal transfer constraints, and compliance obligations under REMIT, MiFID II, MiFIR, and EMIR. The contribution is a formal system specification composed of a decision-state vector, residual-exposure accounting, constrained optimization objective, executable-action permission gate, and fail-closed AI control logic with auditable records. The analysis maps major Nominated Electricity Market Operator (NEMO) venues and related exchange operators into an operational venue topology and identifies where cross-border coordination fails in practice: interface-level timing, permission heterogeneity, and balancing-layer coupling. The resulting framework proposes how AI can be deployed as a bounded decision component inside regulated market operation with explicit governance, rather than as an unconstrained prediction layer.

This paper proposes a formal multi-agent architecture for implementing enterprise AI in regulated insurance firms, integrating economic theory with institutional design. The framework synthesises three core theoretical perspectives: Arrow's risk pooling theory to formalise risk transformation under uncertainty, Nash equilibrium to model strategic interactions between decision agents, and Principal-Agent theory to address incentive alignment under information asymmetry. The insurer is modelled as a constrained optimisation entity operating under solvency, legal, ESG, and operational boundaries, with specific focus on the regulatory contexts of Austria and Germany. The architecture decomposes the firm into multiple specialised agents, each representing distinct functional domains such as capital management, underwriting, claims processing, compliance, fraud detection, and client interaction. Human-in-the-loop agents are integrated through a tiered access control system, ensuring differentiated data visibility and decision influence based on user roles. An orchestrator agent supervises inter-agent coordination, enforcing regulatory admissibility and institutional coherence under frameworks such as Solvency II, the AI Act, and the Insurance Distribution Directive. Protocol integration is based on asynchronous execution and dual-layer communication infrastructures, specifically the Model Context Protocol (MCP) and Agent-to-Agent (A2A) messaging. This structure enables the systematic design of compliant, auditable multi-agent systems aligned with the institutional logic of financial firms in Austria and Germany.

We present a compliance-first architecture for AI in regulated finance that treats regulation as an orientation layer rather than a deterministic ruleset. A matrix of regulatory intent and exposure provides a compact classification handle, which a governed policy compiler then maps into concrete prohibitions, obligations and runtime budgets. Prohibitions constrain feasibility and block externalisation, while obligations extend tasks with artefacts that must meet explicit admissibility criteria. Committee activation remains policy-driven and proportionate, preserving efficiency while ensuring supervisory oversight. Evidence, decisions and reason codes are bound to a permissioned DAG with deterministic timestamping, enabling replay, provenance checks and clear attribution of failure. Clause-level legal indexing with effective dates and capability-based agent routing ensure portability across DACH and the wider EU. The result is assurance by construction: compliance is embedded in execution and verifiable by auditors without sacrificing proportionality or transparency.

Standard valuation methods, including discounted cash flow, the income approach standard IDW S 1 of the Institute of Public Auditors in Germany, and market multiples, compress milestone probabilities, continuation options, and risk shifts into opaque aggregate parameters; none provides a structured protocol for decomposing AI integration into auditable option-level assumptions. We propose an industry-agnostic taxonomy separating AI Integrators from AI Providers. AI Integrators are further classified by their Integration Depth Level, ranging from no integration to AI at the core of the product or process. A milestone-gated real-options overlay decomposes milestone state value into five components, and an Analytic Hierarchy Process-based Success Readiness Index derives per-option probabilities from structured pairwise comparisons for scenario analysis. Applied to an AI-native energy software-as-a-service firm, the framework yields a coherent valuation band traceable to identifiable option-level assumptions. Risk concentrates in later-stage continuation options, matching the structural prediction for AI Providers. The protocol applies across the firm lifecycle, including mergers and acquisitions due diligence. The case is a single-firm demonstration of protocol coherence, not empirical validation; multi-case testing against realised post-exit valuations is left to future research.

The sooner we receive information, and the more accurate it is, the better planning decisions we can make. Every day, prediction markets let anyone bet on tomorrow's high temperature in cities around the world, creating a market-implied forecast built on dispersed information. We use the past five years of market data from the Kalshi exchange for seven American cities to extract, hour by hour, the market-implied forecast. We use this forecast as a measuring instrument to see how much information about the temperature the market makes public before the public forecasting system does. We race it against the leading American and European weather forecasts. In six of the seven cities we study, the market beats the most accurate single public forecast, the National Blend of Models (NBM). Aggregating every city-day, at the end of the market's first hour of trading it beats the best single public product by about 10 percent in root-mean-square error, and holds its lead through the day, overnight, and into the target day. Looking at how the forecasts move over time, we find the National Blend travels four times further toward the market between its postings than the market travels toward the NBM. The market does not react to new weather forecast updates; instead, the forecast slowly publishes information that the market had already shared publicly.

Financial time series evolve across multiple temporal resolutions, challenging forecasting systems to incorporate newly available information without repeatedly recomputing unchanged representations. We introduce HARN, a Hierarchical Associative Resonance Network for event-driven multi-timeframe forecasting. HARN maintains persistent representations across temporal levels and updates each level only when its corresponding completed bar becomes available. The architecture combines causal multi-scale temporal encoding, gated associative memory, cross-level resonance, and hierarchical evidence aggregation, with forecasting performed in basis-point space and reconstructed to the original price scale. We evaluate HARN on four assets spanning equity, foreign exchange, and commodity markets using multiple random seeds and component ablations. HARN achieves competitive reconstructed-price forecasting errors against single-timeframe PatchTST and TimeXer baselines, while ablations reveal the effects of removing individual components across assets and timeframes. A code-level audit further examines consistency between the implementation and the defined event-driven causal protocol. The results position HARN as a persistent multi-timeframe forecasting framework rather than evidence of universal predictive superiority.

We examine log-optimal portfolio allocation when the long-run price of an asset follows a power-law trajectory, $P(t)=At^\alpha$, and its instantaneous return variance decays as $\sigma^2(t)=\sigma_0^2 t^{-2\gamma}$. Under a zero risk-free-rate benchmark, the continuous-time Kelly fraction scales as $K^\ast(t)=(\alpha/\sigma_0^2)t^{2\gamma-1}$. Exact temporal invariance therefore occurs when $\gamma=1/2$, whereas deviations from this value produce systematic age dependence in the allocation. We propose a scaling hypothesis connecting growth in network participation, effective market liquidity, and declining volatility. Under a specified set of scaling assumptions, this model predicts the benchmark exponent $\gamma=1/2$. Using historical daily Bitcoin prices, we estimate the power-law price exponent and examine the sensitivity of the volatility exponent to the length of the rolling window. For windows of four to nine years, the estimated volatility exponents have an arithmetic mean of 0.53 and a cross-window standard deviation of approximately 0.03. Because these estimates are obtained from overlapping observations and the same underlying price history, this spread is interpreted as a measure of model sensitivity rather than a formal confidence interval. Finally, we show that a time-dependent multiplicative contribution to return variance generally breaks exact Kelly invariance. We illustrate this result using a scenario in which Bitcoin transaction-fee variability affects the effective variance process. The results identify the conditions under which log-optimal allocation can remain stable under non-stationary power-law asset dynamics and clarify the assumptions required when applying this result to Bitcoin.

Frontier models score well on shallow document/chart reading tasks. In a controlled data-room audit, moving evidence into buried conditions reduced accuracy, increased forced declarations, increased tool calls, and increased cost per correct answer. Confidence and benchmark calibration did not fully capture wrong answers; a documented production incident shows fabricated structural claims can be mixed with accurate numeric tables. Agentic evaluations need claim-level receipts (statement-level provenance, not answer-level scores), condition-aware scoring, and human-adversarial verification - an auditing discipline, not a leaderboard. The setting we measure is financial due diligence; the setting we are building toward next is defense staff work, where the same buried-evidence shape appears. In both, the model is not a party to the consequences; the person who signs is. In plain terms: in the documented cases we examine, agents can pair accurate numbers with confident fabricated explanations, and the burden of proof must therefore move from the model to the evidence trail.

Retail proprietary-trading firms sell a two-stage product: a paid evaluation that must reach a profit target before breaching a trailing drawdown, then a funded account that must survive a minimum window and a consistency rule before a payout. We show the geometry of this contract creates incentives that differ by stage and make passing a poor standalone signal of skill. Under end-of-day trailing the evaluation rewards a fast, lumpy cadence while the funded account punishes it, by a factor of nine in the joint gate. The evaluation is defeatable at zero skill: position sizing alone yields a pass probability near 0.40, against a measured cohort rate of 0.168. Pass probability rises with skill, but a real edge and aggressive sizing move it by nearly the same amount, so a pass rate confounds the two. Under a simplified contract model the seller's margin is bounded by the gap between perceived and actual gate probabilities, the probability analogue of shrouding a price component; the observed design, a permeable marketed evaluation and a hard payout gate, is consistent with that. Across the sector, pass rates are published far more often than payout rates. The same geometry produces negative expected value: within the measured strategy universe, no configuration at observed drifts clears break-even on any account sourced. Break-even lies between a 40.5% and 41.5% win rate at 1:1.5 net of costs, against a driftless 40.0%. The delta-neutral construction firms prohibit is approximately expected-value neutral at the observed payout ceiling. Every account-level result is reported against a zero-edge control.

The twenty-first century's transformative technology, artificial intelligence, is increasingly constrained by the twentieth century's transformative technology, the electricity grid. Rapid growth in electricity demand from data centers is leading to higher electricity prices, without a compensating supply-side response. We develop a framework linking data-center load growth, available generation capacity, and market-clearing prices to understand this phenomenon. We first analyze a deterministic model to show how differing estimates of demand and supply growth rates affect prices. We then model the expansion of new data centers and their associated electricity demand, together with build-outs of new electricity supply, as stochastic processes,resulting in probabilistic distributions of supply, demand, and prices rather than a single forecast. Finally, we formulate generation expansion as a stochastic control problem in which a revenue-maximizing investor dynamically chooses the intensity of supply-side investments. The analysis highlights a central challenge of the data-center build-out: even when rapid demand growth increases the need for new generation, the uncertainties related to load forecasts, development execution risks, and value cannibalization from overbuilding capacity may weaken incentives to invest at the pace required to keep electricity prices stable.

We introduce a probability-wave framework for modeling the collective behavior of interacting adaptive agents, deriving testable eigenmodes through a generalized behavioral intelligence (GBI) nonlocal probability-wave equation. This framework captures a broad range of human intelligence behaviors with analytical mechanisms and offers an indirect method to examine the Liu-Chen-Ao (LCA) hypothesis of nonlocal entangled nerve fibers in the brain through collective trader behaviors. Our empirical analysis of Chinese intraday stock market data demonstrates that adaptive entangled game modes explain 82-94% (89% overall) of observed decision patterns, a sharp contrast to the predictions of neoclassical finance based on independent rational agents. Moreover, 2-12% of behaviors show adaption to intraday news, events, and environments, characterized by dual equilibrium states and abrupt reference point shifts, while purely independent modes occur in less than 5% of cases. These findings empirically support the LCA hypothesis, as observable trading behaviors reflect underlying brain mechanisms and internal intelligence decision-making in behavioral psychology. Our results highlight the necessity of incorporating adaptive entangled game modules into artificial general intelligence (AGI) architectures, addressing the limitations of conventional artificial neural network (ANN)-based AI, which relies on trillions of opaque parameters. By integrating ANN-based AI with probability-wave-based entangled-brain simulations, machine learning can enrich AGI foundation models (FMs) and facilitate the development of human-like processing units (HPUs) that leverage brain-inspired mechanisms. Such HPUs may ultimately create more compact, efficient, and robust AGI systems, particularly for embodied intelligence and robotics.

This text grew out of a historical introduction initially written for a study of interest rates in cryptocurrency markets. The difficulty of defining a term structure for a currency without a conventional bond market led naturally to a more fundamental question: under what historical conditions does a yield curve become observable at all? Credit existed long before modern money, and interest-bearing loans are documented as early as ancient Mesopotamia. For much of history, the surviving evidence lacks the institutional features that facilitate reliable comparisons of interest rates by maturity: standardised debt instruments, sufficiently homogeneous borrowers, regular issuance over a range of maturities, observable market prices, and liquid secondary markets. We trace the gradual emergence of these conditions from ancient Mesopotamia, Greece, and Rome, through medieval and early modern Europe, to the development of modern sovereign debt markets in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.

Decentralized finance (DeFi) lending has grown from nonexistent in 2017 to nearly 40 billion US Dollars in deposited funds in May 2022. Using cryptocurrency as collateral, the platforms match speculative margin trading with yield-seeking depositors lending coins pegged to the dollar (stable coins). Depositors receive claims guaranteed by a basket of collateral, akin to new stable coins. We develop a framework requiring only knowledge of aggregate deposits and borrowings to measure overall system risks to lenders and borrowers. Using evidence from major protocols, the measures identify an increase in system fragility beyond prudent levels around mid 2021, with a potential loss of peg for extreme variations in coin prices. Overall, the model offers an easily implementable aggregate risk metric capturing the perspectives of synthetic investors and offers early warning signals as the industry is moving from deposits guaranteed by collateral to fiat money.

We study voluntary disclosure when investors observe firm reports through noisy information intermediaries such as auditors, analysts, rating agencies, or data providers. Any processing noise overturns the standard prediction of a unique partial-disclosure equilibrium. With low disclosure costs, the model unravels to full disclosure despite positive costs. With higher costs, the game admits two threshold equilibria featuring different disclosure probabilities. We characterize how the cost threshold for unraveling and the equilibrium set respond to changes in noise and fundamental uncertainty. In settings with high disclosure, both uncertainty and processing noise reduce disclosure, while higher certification costs can counterintuitively increase it. Endogenizing disclosure costs as optimal fees shows how profit-maximizing intermediaries select among equilibria, potentially generating a high-fee, high-disclosure regime. Extensions with bounded support, uncertain information endowment, endogenous noise, and competing information sources apply the insights to general information environments. The results caution against interpreting greater frictions as necessarily reducing disclosure.

We propose a new model of expected stock returns that incorporates quantity information from market trading activities into the factor pricing framework. We posit that the expected return of a stock is determined by not only its factor risk exposures (beta) but also the factor's quantity fluctuations (q) induced by trading flows, and hence term the model beta times quantity (BTQ). The rationale is that sophisticated investors should demand a higher factor premium when they have absorbed noise trading flows of stocks with high loadings to that factor. The BTQ model provides a compelling risk-based explanation for stock returns, which is otherwise obscured without considering the quantity information. The cross-sectional risk-return association, which is nearly flat unconditionally, strongly depends on the quantity variable. The structured BTQ model reliably predicts monthly stock returns out of sample, and addresses the factor zoo problem by selecting a small number of factors.

The comparative analysis of banks' financial statements poses significant challenges for automated question answering systems due to their complexity, substantial length, technical language, and inhomogeneity of both textual and numerical content across different jurisdictions and institutions. We introduce FinRAG-QA, a novel benchmark dataset for financial question answering, which comprises 999 practitioner-curated questions on 10 standardised indicators, grounded in 209 annual and Pillar 3 reports from 24 major European and U.S. banks spanning 2019-2023. Unlike prior financial QA benchmarks, which centre on U.S. filings and single-institution analysis, FinRAG-QA targets cross-institutional retrieval over documents averaging 198k words, longer than any existing financial QA resource. On this benchmark we evaluate a multi-stage RAG pipeline and isolate the contribution of each component. Contextual chunk enrichment combined with a retrieval-optimised embedding model raises NDCG@10 from 0.322 to 0.710; conditional on the ground truth being retrieved, a reasoning-optimised generator raises answer accuracy from 44.6% to 79.0% (+34.4 percentage points), at roughly 20x the generation latency. We further show that cross-encoder reranking degrades retrieval when the first-stage ranking is already strong, and that a single top-ranked chunk outperforms larger contexts at generation time. Experiments were run in late 2024-early 2025 with the models available at that time.

Reputation is a fundamental mechanism through which markets sustain trust when service quality cannot be perfectly assessed ex ante, constituting a form of intertemporal economic capital by attracting future demand. Its effectiveness as a disciplinary mechanism depends not only on past interactions but also on the persistence of the identity to which reputation is attached. When identities can be abandoned and recreated cheaply, reputational capital may itself become an object of opportunistic exploitation. This paper develops a dynamic economic framework to study when reputation is sufficient to discipline autonomous agents. We model reputation as capital attracting future economic activity. At each point, an agent chooses between operating honestly, investing in quality to preserve future gains, or executing a one-shot deviation to extract its reputation's value and restart from a penalized identity. Our analysis relates the temptation to opportunistic behavior to identity-reset costs, reputation persistence, demand sensitivity, and enforcement design, deriving comparative statics on optimal quality provision. Autonomous AI-agent operating on the blockchain are a relevant application: infrastructures such as ERC-8004, ERC-8183, and x402 combine reputation, identity, and payments in permissionless markets. Nonetheless, our framework applies to any environment where reputation generates future business and identities are replaceable.

AI agents can select tools, counterparties, and transaction parameters, yet inference should not itself confer authority to execute a financial action. This study develops and evaluates Authority-Inference Separation (AIS), an intent-centered architecture for bounded agentic finance. AIS treats a financial action intent as the control object: a machine-generated proposal can receive temporary executable authority only after an independent deterministic control plane validates registered agent identity, accountable ownership, mandate and risk-appetite lineage, policy version, state, approvals, and exact economic semantics. Blockchain can then enforce the operational representation of granted authority and record portable settlement evidence, while institutional legitimacy, service delivery, accounting classification, and human accountability remain off-chain obligations. Evaluation combines four-domain instantiation, official BIS and MAS cases, a 48-fixture executable prototype, and a public-ledger observability test. Across 36 synthetic authorization attacks, a direct-agent baseline accepted 36 attack effects, a prompt-policy baseline accepted 20, and AIS accepted none; all three accepted 8/8 admissible fixtures. AIS also rejected 4/4 token replays and 8/8 recipient or rail substitutions, withheld completion in 4/4 service-delivery failures, and populated all 13 defined evidence fields. A test of 1,700 recent Base transactions associated with public x402 facilitator addresses shows that public ledgers can evidence settlement and selected authorization parameters but cannot establish institutional mandate, legal accountability, service delivery, or accounting treatment. AIS and blockchain are therefore complementary: AIS decides whether a specific intent may act, while blockchain can make granted authority bounded, executable, and independently observable.

Claims of the form "we find no evidence that X affects Y" appear throughout the applied finance literature, yet whether such a claim contains evidence of absence or absence of evidence depends entirely on its confidence interval. The term "statistically insignificant" is routinely read to mean zero economic effect. However, a more honest description is that zero could not be rejected along with a range of other coefficient effect sizes. The crucial question is whether effect sizes in that range are consequential. This note distinguishes two kinds of insignificant results that are indistinguishable in a standard regression table: bounded null claims where the intervals reject effect sizes of consequence and thus represent a genuine finding, and vacuous null claims where even consequential effects remain unrejected and therefore establish nothing. I propose a minimal reporting standard for regression results in applied finance, where the smallest consequential effect size is stated (in the units of the decision, per a named increment of the regressor) alongside the descriptive statistics and compared with the relevant edges of the confidence intervals of null claims. Using only the reported coefficient and standard error, authors can distinguish bounded (informative) null claims that reject consequential effect sizes from vacuous null claims that establish no information, perhaps due to deficiencies in data or the identification strategy. The symmetric phrase "no effect" conceals, in particular, the frequent split verdict: bounded in one direction, vacuous in the other. In ongoing work, I apply this framework to published null claims in leading finance journals, beginning with my own.