Econometrics · Cross-listed from cs.LG
Global tree forecasters collapse at the hierarchical aggregate: a five-panel failure characterization
Md Rezwanul Islam and Wael Mohammed
Global forecasting models pool many series and learn one shared function. Gradient-boosted trees are their most common form. We measure a failure of this design that has not, to our knowledge, been documented. Train a global tree on the individual series of a hierarchy, then ask it for the hierarchical aggregate. The aggregate sits far outside the model's training range, and the forecast collapses. The model under-predicts the total by 30-50x in our production deployment, and by up to 496x in a public M5 reconstruction. The mechanism is known: beyond its training range, a tree predicts a constant. It surfaces at the aggregate because the total dwarfs every training series. The cure is not new. Per-series scaling, the preprocessing step that Montero-Manso and Hyndman (2021) recommend, prevents the collapse. So do a weighted aggregate-level training row and seasonal differencing. Our contribution is the characterization. The collapse reproduces on five panels: a production business-to-business marketplace, a synthetic hierarchy, M5, Australian Tourism, and a public business-buyer panel. It holds on three tree libraries, is invariant across training seeds, and is statistically significant. Its onset is immediate and tracks a simple support bound: a scale gap of only 1.15x already costs a third of the total. No standard configuration change prevents it: pooling every hierarchy level into training fails at scale, and the one knob that fits linear models in the leaves softens it without curing it. Rolling the forecasts forward recursively separates the cures: the aggregate-row cure re-collapses, per-series scaling degrades but stays low, and only seasonal differencing keeps its one-step accuracy unchanged. We close with a three-step procedure for diagnosing and preventing the failure in deployed systems.
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General Economics
Contextual Visual Distinctiveness in Online Product Search
Felicia Nguyen
In online product search, returned alternatives often look alike. We investigate when a product's visual separation from its closest look-alike in a returned set increases its choice probability. We introduce two occasion-level constructs: contextual visual distinctiveness (image distance from the nearest similar alternative in the consideration set) and relative fit (compatibility with the search query). We hypothesize that distinctiveness favors selection and is highly contextual, yields a premium that rises with relative fit, and matters most when text descriptions fail to differentiate options. Analyzing over 800,000 e-commerce search events using dense representations, we apply search-event and product fixed effects to evaluate the exact same product alongside varying visual neighbors. Results show a product is significantly more likely to be clicked when it lacks a close look-alike. This distinctiveness premium increases with relative fit and roughly doubles when competing descriptions are highly similar. Consistent with a model where distinctiveness aids in standing out pre-evaluation rather than increasing inherent utility, the extra clicks distinctiveness recruits convert 5-7% less often downstream. Ultimately, the evidence characterizes visual differentiation as a local
attention allocation mechanism whose value depends on query fit and information from competing cues.
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Econometrics
Exact Rejection Sampling for Non-Gaussian State Space Models
Joshua C.C. Chan
Rejection sampling requires a proposal that dominates the target by a known constant, generally unavailable for non-Gaussian state space models. We construct such a proposal for the latent state path, yielding independent exact smoothing draws and an unbiased likelihood
estimator whose relative variance is at most $1/p-1$ per draw at acceptance probability $p$. The method covers scalar states with affine Gaussian dynamics and log-concave observation densities, including multivariate observations. Transition twisting makes the log target-to-proposal ratio separable, and tangent-line twists make each term nonpositive, producing an attained, sharp dominating constant. With a companding node placement, the accumulated envelope error is $O(T/G^2)$ for a sample of length $T$ with $G$ nodes per date, so $G\propto\sqrt{T}$ keeps acceptance bounded away from zero; for
stochastic volatility, the required conditions hold almost surely. A simpler mode-centered grid shows the same scaling empirically. At $T=2{,}000$, acceptance is $75\%$, versus roughly $10^{-16}$ for the Gaussian envelope.
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Econometrics · Cross-listed from cs.LG
Across-Design Uncertainty in Short Pricing Panels: Inference and Identification
Pedro Cadahia Delgado
Short observational pricing panels often contain many data points but very few actual price changes. This paper shows that this sparsity creates a hidden source of error that standard statistical methods miss. When estimating price effects, most of the uncertainty does not come from sample size within a panel, but from the specific history of price movements observed. Standard confidence intervals fail because they only measure variation within the panel, ignoring this broader design-level error. Using simulations, we find that this cross-design variation accounts for most of the estimation error, causing standard methods to significantly understate uncertainty. First, we show that cross-design error decreases predictably as the total volume of price variation increases. Second, adding more data from regions that share the same price trends does not fix the issue; true precision improves only when combining data across units with independent price trajectories. Third, applying a simple variance-component adjustment across independently priced units restores accurate statistical coverage. We confirm these findings in real-world store scanner data, showing that products and pricing zones behave as if they have far fewer independent price movements than their raw counts suggest. Ultimately, reliable inference in passive pricing data requires genuine, independent variation, which can be achieved through controlled regional price testing.
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General Economics
Recommendation Quality and the Concentration of Consumption: Experimental Evidence from Netflix
Guy Aridor, Winston Chou, Nathan Kallus et al. (+3 more)
We study an experiment with 8.5 million users on Netflix's recommender system to measure how improvements in recommendation technology affect the set of products that get consumed. Improvements increase total consumption and users' reliance on recommendations while diffusing recommendations and consumption away from the most popular titles (“superstars") toward a larger number of moderately popular titles (“middle-tail"), with minimal effects on the most niche titles (“long-tail"). Our results challenge the notion that recommender systems polarize consumption – raising the consumption shares of the head and tail at the expense of the middle – and suggest that the returns to investing in middle-tail products grow as
algorithms improve and platforms scale.
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All authors Guy Aridor, Winston Chou, Nathan Kallus, Antoine Scheid, Allen Tren, Kevin Zielincki
General Economics · Cross-listed from stat.AP
A Synthetic Benchmark Dataset with Endogenous Marketing Spend for Validating Marketing Mix Models
Niklas Heusch
Marketing Mix Models (MMMs) estimate the incremental sales effect of advertising from observational time series, yet they are rarely validated against ground truth, because ground truth is unobservable in real data. Synthetic data closes that gap in principle, but existing generators produce marketing spend exogenously - omitting the central difficulty of the estimation problem, since real budgets are planned around promotional calendars, seasons, and recent performance. This paper presents a parameterized generator, and a fixed reference instance, of a synthetic weekly retail
dataset (156 weeks, three media channels) in which spend arises from four documented coordination mechanisms - quarterly budget feedback, anticipatory spending ahead of a promotional calendar, scheduled TV bursts, and algorithmic performance chasing - on a demand baseline with seasonal, quality, price, and unobserved sentiment components. Spend translates into incremental sales through two transformations, carryover and diminishing returns, instantiated here as
geometric adstock and logistic saturation with known parameters; the true causal decomposition of every week's sales is recorded alongside the error-contaminated variables a practitioner would observe. Every mechanism is a parameter that can be varied or switched off, and a companion procedure simulates go-dark geo-experiments with exact treatment effects. The seeded generator and reference instance are publicly released with notebooks that reproduce every number in this paper.
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General Economics · Cross-listed from stat.AP
Structural Estimation of Marketing Mix Model Parameters from Geo-Experiments
Niklas Heusch
Marketing Mix Models (MMMs) are widely used for marketing measurement and budget allocation, but face fundamental identification challenges: due to endogenous marketing spend decisions, MMM estimation on observational time-series data cannot recover the true causal effects of marketing. On the other hand, geo-experiments provide causal identification through randomization, but it is not clear how to use them efficiently to calibrate marketing mix models. We propose a novel structural estimation approach that recovers the complete set of MMM parameters - adstock decay ($\alpha$), saturation ($\lambda$), and effectiveness ($\beta$) - directly from geo-experimental time-series. By differencing outcomes between treatment and control regions, our method eliminates observed and unobserved confounding factors while preserving the temporal variation that identifies each parameter. We demonstrate on synthetic data that this approach recovers the true ROAS and the response curve over the range of spending covered by the experiments, together with credible estimates of the underlying parameters. Our framework enables efficient pooling across multiple experiments and provides a principled foundation for MMM calibration that fully utilizes the information experiments contain.
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Theoretical Economics
Surrender runs
Andreas Löffler and Stefan Steins
Rising interest rates can expose life insurers to surrender risk by reducing the
market value of their assets and raising policyholders' outside returns. This paper develops a minimal model of an insurance-specific run mechanism in which strategic interaction arises because early surrenders can deplete the asset pool backing continuation values. We analyze a strategic surrender game in which a run is an
equilibrium outcome determined jointly by asset values, contractual surrender claims, and payoff-dependent continuation benefits. The model yields closed-form interest-rate thresholds for fundamentals-driven and self-fulfilling runs. Thinner capitalization weakly lowers the joint-surrender cutoff. Continuation benefits raise surrender thresholds but can also create strategic complementarity.
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Econometrics
Candidate Set Size and Voting Behavior: A Front-Door Approach to Causal Moderation
Masayuki Haruhara
We study causal moderation when treatment assignment is randomized but the moderator is not. We combine the parallel estimation framework with front-door adjustment to identify an average mediated treatment moderation effect. We apply this approach to 165 municipal assembly elections in Tokyo (1987-2023), where pamphlet positions are assigned by lottery and total pamphlet pages are mechanically determined by candidate set size and fixed municipal rules. One additional candidate increases the front-page effect on winning probability by 0.322 percentage points through the page-count channel, 8.0% of its baseline magnitude, while the back-page effect does not increase significantly.
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Theoretical Economics · Cross-listed from cs.GT
Certified Learning and Equilibrium Implementation under Opaque Partial Commitment
Shuyang Zhang and Xiangtian Li
As an extension of existing
Bayesian persuasion framework with inadequate message mechanism, we study direct recommendation when a sender is bound by an installed information policy only with probability $\rho$, the realization of binding is hidden, and the receiver does not observe the persistent structural environment. The receiver first sees a payoff-neutral, nonmanipulable calibration sample and then faces a fresh, non-certified deployment interaction. In common, the calibration law identifies only the receiver-facing reduced form, not the latent binding and discretionary kernels. We characterize type-wise $\rho$-implementability, construct the receiver's posterior over the full deployment node, and prove a static direct-following implementation
theorem. After every calibration history that passes a posterior-predictive obedience test, the deployment assessment is an exact perfect
Bayesian equilibrium: Bayes consistency, receiver sequential rationality, sender sequential rationality, and off-path completion are all verified. Under finite-type separation, common recommendation support, and a positive obedience margin, the test activates such an
equilibrium with high probability. Our results keep statistical failure probability distinct from
equilibrium approximation. Finally, we embed the original robust value frontier, support-wise linear-programming
algorithm, and binary-action fractional-knapsack specialization into this implementation framework
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General Economics
Priority Transparency, Admission Chances, and Information Acquisition in School Choice
Georgy Artemov and Siqi Pan
We study, theoretically and experimentally, how transparency about students' priorities and admission chances shapes their incentives to acquire information about their own preferences in school choice and college admissions. In the model, uninformed students choose schools based on a common prior. When they learn their own preferences, their choices become more heterogeneous, which frees up seats at popular schools. Students who know they have high priority have stronger incentives to learn because they can more readily act on what they learn, whereas students who know they have low priority are discouraged. Full priority disclosure concentrates learning among high-priority students. By pooling priorities, partial disclosure spreads learning incentives to pooled students and yields higher welfare. In the laboratory, however, full disclosure yields the highest welfare instead, followed by partial disclosure, and then no disclosure, because greater transparency improves subjects' understanding of the strategic environment, leading to fewer mistakes. These findings support full disclosure of priorities or admission chances to guide information acquisition. However, deviations in learning remain even under greater priority transparency, partly because subjects respond suboptimally to admission chances when these are provided directly rather than inferred. Students' ability to interpret and use them is therefore itself a policy concern.
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