Papers

Merit-based scholarships are widely used to attract high-achieving students, but do they guarantee an improvement in the merit of a university's student pool? We study this question in centralized college admissions using a matching with contracts framework. We first introduce the scholarship choice rule, which processes scholarship levels from highest to lowest and selects the highest-merit students at each level. We show that scholarship feasibility, scholarship maximality, and no justified envy uniquely characterize this rule. We further characterize the student-proposing deferred-acceptance mechanism based on this rule as the unique mechanism, up to outcome equivalence, satisfying the extensions of the three axioms, together with individual rationality, and strategy-proofness. We then study the welfare effects of scholarship provision. In general matching markets, a university may be matched with lower-merit students after introducing a scholarship. Finally, when all schools use the scholarship choice rule and every student is eligible for every scholarship level a school offers, we show that a common merit ranking is necessary and sufficient for scholarship provision to guarantee, for every student-preference profile satisfying within-school monotonicity, a weak improvement in the scholarship-providing school's student pool.

In staggered difference-in-differences (DiD) designs, units enter treatment at different calendar times, so the treatment effect is not a single number but a set of Cohort-Average Treatment effects on the Treated (CATTs), one per cohort-time cell. Estimating every CATT as its own parameter, as the standard fully flexible estimator does, is unbiased but inefficient when some of these effects are in fact equal, whereas pooling them all into a single two-way fixed effects (TWFE) coefficient is efficient but, whenever the heterogeneity is genuine, biased for the individual effects. We frame the choice between these extremes as a partition-selection problem on the cohort-time cells and address it with a Dirichlet Process (DP) mixture prior on the CATTs. The model favors parsimonious groupings without fixing their number, and a collapsed Gibbs sampler delivers point estimates, credible intervals that marginalize the unknown partition, and co-clustering probabilities for every pair of CATTs. With the error variance held fixed and a pairwise penalty placed on the partition, a maximum a posteriori (MAP) partition reduces to an $\ell_0$-penalized regression, connecting the Bayesian formulation to the homogeneity-pursuit literature. In a calibrated simulation, the model cuts the sampling variance of the cohort-time effects by 26–52% relative to the fully flexible estimator, without the pooled estimator's bias, provided the distinct effects are separated enough to be recovered, and the posterior delivers near-nominal confidence-interval coverage by averaging over the unknown partition. In two applications the method recovers a precision-improving partial-homogeneity structure in one, where the cohort-time effects are genuinely heterogeneous, and reports that full pooling is adequate in the other, where they are not.

In this note, we show that equilibrium profit is zero in Bertrand competition with a finite number of firms and consumers whose willingness to pay are bounded, under any market segmentation profile.

The paper places the Samuelson–Merton “util-prob” construction and preference-based state-price interpretation inside a continuous-time equivalent-martingale-measure framework. The contribution is not the existence of a marginal-utility pricing kernel, but a compensated stochastic-exponential representation of the “util-prob” density. Behavioral weighting by marginal utility becomes an equivalent martingale measure only after the drift generated by risk aversion and prudence is compensated. Under positivity, integrability, normalization, and martingale conditions, the behavioral density is generated by the Brownian kernel $-A_t\sigma_t$, where $A_t$ is Arrow–Pratt risk attitude and $\sigma_t$ is state volatility. The required compensator identifies the finite-variation term that must be removed before marginal-utility weighting defines a true martingale density. The framework preserves put–call parity under a common admissible kernel and yields a Cox–Ross risk-premium identity linking option and underlying premia through volatility exposures. Empirically, the paper maps option-implied and physical densities into a signed Arrow–Pratt decomposition, with positive curvature interpreted as risk aversion and negative curvature as risk-seeking or speculative tilt. In a panel of liquid index ETF and single-name options, arbitrage-penalized EBMM has lower pooled holdout squared-error loss than arbitrage-penalized SVI when both models receive the same total-variance positivity and butterfly-density penalties, although slice-level results remain mixed. The exercise is best read as a density-ratio admissibility test rather than a replacement for production volatility-surface estimation.

We introduce StableEval Arena, a cost-aware benchmark framework for evaluating agentic AI systems on stablecoin peg-risk prediction. StableEval Arena evaluates LLM-backed agentic systems on diagnosing peg stress and forecasting deviations from the one-dollar peg over a hidden seven-day horizon, using leakage-safe historical replay with exchange price-volume data and market-context features. We report two complementary experiment blocks: a 120-case stress-enriched validation block and a 507-case natural-distribution full-arena evaluation block. Across six LLM-backed agent configurations and baselines, StableEval Arena measures prediction quality, calibrated-label behavior, structured-output reliability, latency, token consumption, and estimated inference cost. Rather than ranking agents by accuracy alone, the framework treats trustworthiness as a joint property of forecast quality, operational reliability, and computational cost. The results show a gap between protocol-following reliability and financial-risk reliability: agents reliably produce valid structured outputs at modest measured cost, but still miss most rare severe-stress and sustained-depeg cases. To support auditing and replication, we release the benchmark dataset on Hugging Face and the source code on GitHub.

We provide a first causal analysis of the behavioral consequences of the friendship paradox-the fact that people's friends in a network have more connections than average. We find that people's behavior is biased by their network position: they do not best respond to what they should infer the average behavior of the population to be, but instead simply to the average behavior of their friends. Moreover, we find that they fail to learn to overcome such a bias when relocated within the network, varying their observational environment. In these games of complements, the friendship paradox generates a systematic upward distortion in actions, increases behavioral dispersion, and persists despite learning opportunities.

Financial question answering is typically evaluated by answer correctness, yet in SEC filings a plausible and even numerically correct answer can be grounded in the wrong evidence. Similar facts and disclosures recur across sections of a filing, across reporting periods of the same firm, and across comparable firms. FinRank targets this provenance-sensitive retrieval problem by requiring systems to identify evidence for the intended entity, reporting period, and disclosure context. The benchmark contains 1185 manually authored question-answer records over the 10-K and 10-Q filings of 22 companies. Each record includes a reference answer, gold supporting passages, and hand-curated hard negatives drawn from confusable passages within filings, across reporting periods, and across comparable firms. FinRank evaluates passage retrieval, reranking, and hard-negative discrimination as separately measured tasks. Baseline results demonstrate the difficulty of this setting: among the evaluated systems, even a 7B instruction-tuned embedder reaches only 44.8% Recall@10 on the pooled evidence corpus; sub-billion-parameter encoders gain at most 3.5 points over BM25, a finance-adapted embedder trails BM25 by 9.7 points, and pairwise accuracy falls by 13.0-20.5 percentage points when random negatives are replaced with the curated hard negatives. FinRank provides an evidence-first benchmark for developing financial question answering systems that are not only accurate but also grounded in the correct disclosure.

Empirical and experimental studies suggest that a decision maker can remain with their default option even when preferred alternatives are available, yet standard choice data may not record which option is the default. Existing default-based models often assume that the default option is observed. In contrast, I study a decision maker subject to status quo bias and choice overload and illustrate how one can identify both the decision maker's default and preference from the observed behavior. This paper shows that anomalous choice behavior may arise from a latent default, a possibility largely overlooked in studies of standard choice data.

This paper documents an applied natural-language-processing framework for measuring the tone of Brazilian Monetary Policy Committee (Copom) statements. The project is explicitly inspired by iSent, Itaú's Central Bank sentiment classifier, particularly its sentence-level division of official communication into hawkish, dovish, neutral, and out-of-context classes. The implementation extends that idea in three directions. First, an LLM identifies short hawkish and dovish expressions and assigns each a 0-to-1 intensity weight. Second, the document index combines sentence counts with document-specific average signal intensities, producing a bounded score from -1 to 1. Third, a separate full-document layer measures forward-guidance direction, guidance explicitness, uncertainty level, and change in uncertainty. The empirical sample is restricted to communications dated August 2016 or later and contains 80 statements and 1,498 classified sentences from August 31, 2016 through August 5, 2026. Across this sample, 33.3% of sentences are hawkish, 18.0% dovish, 42.1% neutral, and 6.5% out of context. The average document score is +0.107, while the most hawkish reading is +0.570 in August 2021. The latest statement, dated August 5, 2026, scores +0.232, with eight hawkish, two dovish, and nine neutral sentences. Its structural overlay is more nuanced: guidance is directionally ambiguous but partly explicit, while uncertainty is classified as central and higher than at the prior meeting. Tone and the guidance-direction score have a contemporaneous Pearson correlation of 0.719. These are descriptive outputs, not a validated forecast of Selic decisions or DI returns. The main contribution is therefore methodological: a transparent, incremental, auditable system that separates rhetorical tone from policy guidance and uncertainty.

Recent work shows that Large Language Models (LLMs) encode more information in their activations than they show in their responses. We ask whether the information contained in activations could be used as a source of measurement for the presence of concepts. We compare two algorithms for extraction of concepts, i.e., Recursive Feature Machine (RFM) algorithm and linear probing against an embedding baseline, surface baselines, and the model's own response using a human-annotated Environmental, Social and Governance (ESG) dataset of financial texts. The best linear probe ranges from 0.6 to 3.3 percentage points below fine-tuned domain classifiers. The probes also outscore the model's own response in all comparisons. Furthermore, the probes outperform the RFM concept vectors in all accuracy comparisons. In a synthetic mixture test, their mean-pooled score tracks the number of concept sentences in a paragraph better than the concept-vector score. Put together, a linear probe on a frozen LLM is a cost-effective and generalizable alternative to fine-tuning a domain classifier.

Many economic and financial relationships may change gradually rather than abruptly. We study panel data models in which the coefficient vector is continuous and piecewise linear in calendar time, with a finite number of unknown kink dates at which its slope changes. We propose a penalised least squares estimator that applies adaptive weighted group penalties to the second differences of the coefficient path, and develop asymptotic theory showing that it recovers both the number and the locations of the kinks with probability approaching one. To our knowledge, this is the first panel framework to estimate an unknown number of common kink dates in a time-varying coefficient path under fixed effects. We establish that endpoint slopes converge at the usual cubic regime-length rate and interior slopes at rates determined by their own and adjacent regime lengths. We also develop a coefficient-by-coefficient extension allowing individual regressors to kink at different dates. Monte Carlo evidence supports the good finite sample properties, and we illustrate the method through an application in macro-finance, specifically the relationship between debt and growth.

Detecting algorithmic collusion is challenging because regulators often have limited access to firms' algorithms, training data, and market information. We study an intermediate-information regime in which an auditor can query firms' frozen pricing policies and construct the induced strategy graph. Using a complete characterization of Nash equilibria in a repeated pricing game, we identify graph-theoretic features of strategy graphs that are associated with collusive reward-and-punishment schemes, including maximum betweenness, attractor in-degree, and average path length. We then test these metrics on policies learned by decentralized Q-learning and the Q-learning algorithm of Calvano et al. (2020). We find that especially the maximum betweenness and attractor in-degree are strongly correlated with the standard profit-based Collusion Index. Importantly, the proposed metrics rely only on the unlabeled topology of strategy graphs and require neither price histories, demand estimates, nor competitive and monopoly benchmarks. Our results suggest that the structure of frozen pricing policies contains robust signals of collusion among reinforcement learning algorithms and provides a promising basis for auditing algorithmic pricing systems under limited information.

A choice rule is $q$-acceptant if it chooses $\min\{q,|X|\}$ alternatives from each set $X$. We show that a path-independent rule of maximum cardinality at most $q$ need not have a $q$-acceptant path-independent expansion, refuting Chambers and Yenmez (2017, Theorem 4). We construct a one-school matching market whose unique stable matching leaves a seat vacant that no path-independent expansion of the school's rule fills. Every path-independent rule satisfying the law of aggregate demand has such an expansion. We characterize the choice rules admitting an acceptant expansion by monotone selections of rejected alternatives.

This paper extends prior work on linguistic pattern based facility layout optimization by enhancing the LP Alinks framework with an explicit spatial uniformity criterion. While earlier studies demonstrated that linguistic patterns can effectively encode expert knowledge and guide agent based layout emergence, their optimization scope remained limited to cost oriented objectives. To address this gap, we introduce the Normalized Coverage Score (NCS), a scale adjusted measure of spatial evenness that complements the classical flow distance economic objective and enables systematic exploration of cost uniformity trade offs. A full factorial experiment comprising 324 conditions evaluates the combined effects of problem size, link density, virtual force scaling, and two families of membership functions on both objectives. Five way and nested three way ANOVAs reveal that structural factors (number of objects and link density) exert a dominant baseline influence on both economic performance and spatial uniformity. However, while economic cost is overwhelmingly governed by these structural characteristics, uniformity is substantially more sensitive to the linguistic pattern parameters, which control the dispersion compaction dynamics of the emerging layouts within the structural constraints. Based on these interactions, we derive a parameter-selection matrix that prescribes settings for cost minimization, uniformity maximization, or balanced compromise. Comparative analyses with Drezner's method, MDS, and non metric MDS demonstrate that the extended LP Alinks framework consistently attains superior uniformity while maintaining competitive economic performance, making it a robust and interpretable decision support tool for early stage facility layout design.

Economics uses different behavioural models for risk, time, losses, valuation, and social choice. I study a unified choice experiment in which the same decision makers face all these domains. I hide a decision maker's choices in one domain and ask a frozen tabular foundation model to recover them from that decision maker's choices elsewhere and labelled choices by other participants. The foundation model improves on the training-sample median, and the gain disappears when visible choices are shuffled across decision makers. I then estimate one random-utility model over the foundation model's learned representation. This structural model applies the same utility function in every domain, retains most of the foundation model's reduction in prediction error, predicts domains excluded from utility estimation, and reproduces how behavioural measures co-move across people. The resulting model separates three objects: a learned common choice domain, one systematic utility function on that domain, and one random component that generates stochastic choice on observed menus.

Introduction: We present a framework to assess the economic value of healthcare interventions by disaggregating value and examining heterogeneity. We applied it to an early health-economic model of population screening in England with a multi-cancer early detection (MCED) test. Value for such technologies often includes benefits, such as those associated with earlier detection, alongside potential harms from, for example, false positives or overdiagnosis. Value also varies between individuals, including across cancer types and stages. Understanding these components and heterogeneity is crucial for assessing overall value and prioritising future research. Methods: We adapted an existing decision-analytic model to simulate annual Galleri screening in an asymptomatic population, measuring outcomes in Quality Adjusted Life Years (QALYs) from an English NHS perspective (year of 2024). We disaggregate headroom value (assuming no cost to the test) into key components: cancer identification (pre- and post-diagnosis), false positives, overdiagnosis, and misclassification. Post diagnosis value was further disaggregated by cancer type to explore heterogeneity. Results: Our analysis predicts an overall estimated headroom value of 0.135 QALYs per individual. Early cancer identification was a major contributor, driven by health gains rather than cost savings. Cancers of the colon/rectum, lung and ovary were the largest contributors, accounting for 50% of overall value. These results remained robust across scenario analyses. Conclusion: The value disaggregation can guide decision making by clarifying value drivers, assessing plausibility of overall estimates, exploring heterogeneity, and prioritising future model and evidence development activities.

Consider a revenue-maximizing seller who can access a binary signal about two bidders` joint values. We explore what kind of information is most valuable to the seller by studying three classes of signals, each capturing a distinct dimension of bidders` values: their overall level (demand), their relative strength (ranking), and their dispersion while preserving bidder anonymity (competitiveness). We characterize the optimal signal and corresponding auction mechanism within each class, and find that competitiveness signals are particularly effective. Under certain regularity conditions, the optimal competitiveness signal yields at least as much revenue as any ranking signal or demand signal. Moreover, for signals that induce a monotone allocation, the optimal competitiveness signal yields at least as much revenue as any other binary signal.

I measure whether the rise of services is ultimately supported by household consumption or by non-household demand through production networks, investment, exports, and government. Using harmonized input-output tables for 76 economies over 1995-2022, I attribute service value added to its ultimate domestic final-demand category and measure the household orientation of each service economy in both levels and growth. The conventional service share does not reveal the type: it is negatively correlated with household orientation, and only about four in ten tertiarization episodes are majority-household. Among the 65 economies whose service share rose over 1995-2018, 77 percent became less household-oriented; the share is 75 percent under a two-percentage-point material-change threshold. Yet household-supported production becomes more service-intensive with income because households' aggregate position falls faster. A one-type benchmark has no purchaser margin; a two-type extension gives the condition for this reversal. An exact Leontief accounting and Shapley decomposition allocate a median 73 percent of service-share growth to production-system channels, which are the largest contribution in 80 percent of economies with materially rising shares. The decline in household orientation is instead allocated mainly to aggregate final-demand structure. The service share records how much service activity exists, not which economic transformation produced it.

Motivated by the rapid growth of data centers, we develop a model to evaluate bringyour-own-capacity (BYOC) mandates and flexibility accreditation in capacity markets for new large loads with shared supply-chain constraints. With efficient pricing, BYOC mainly reallocates procurement between grid-built and self-built capacity and therefore has little welfare effect, while flexibility delivers a modest gain by reducing the effective capacity requirement. Under administrative price caps, mandates can improve static welfare by forcing data centers to internalize the full cost of capacity. The welfare ranking of the two instruments depends on supply-chain stress. At low or moderate stress, only the flexibility instrument raises welfare. Under severe stress with capped prices, the welfare gain from the BYOC obligation can exceed the gross flexibility benefit. The two instruments differ in their effects on a neighboring market: a unilateral BYOC mandate can crowd out its capacity investment, while flexibility produces essentially no spillover at our calibrated benchmark. Finally, applying current capacity non-performance penalties to flexible loads may lead to financial incentives that are too weak to induce truthful flexibility reporting.

I argue that there is a sense in which universal equilibrium (defined loosely) existence in games is incompatible with eschewing strictly dominated strategies and a sense in which it isn't.

We develop a continuous-time stochastic choice theory with endogenous preference evolution. Unlike dynamic random utility, observed behavior affects future preferences through the conditional distribution of latent preference states, generating endogenous distributional feedback. We show that this feedback has observable behavioral implications and characterize stochastic choice by a behavioral representation consisting of contemporaneous choice and continuation behavior. This representation is identified from stochastic choice, yields a rigidity result linking structural preference dynamics to observable behavior, and characterizes exactly when distribution dependent utility is behaviorally reducible to dynamic random utility. We further prove a behavioral impossibility theorem: stochastic choice arrays exhibiting behavioral distributional feedback admit no dynamic random utility representation. On the probabilistic side, we establish existence and weak uniqueness for the underlying conditional McKean-Vlasov system with conditional law feedback. The structure unifies endogenous information, latent preference dynamics, behavioral identification, and stochastic choice within a single continuous-time model.

We study double auctions for markets in which goods are valuable in bundles, such as data, model weights, and fine-tuned AI assets. A key friction in such markets is No Assembly: a platform may be unable, for legal or technical reasons, to combine components supplied by different sellers into a single bundle. We formulate a combinatorial buyer's-bid double auction under this constraint. Under explicit stability and price-influence conditions (maintained in general, and for two goods derived from local price-taking and a feedback bound), each bundle submarket inherits the large-market discipline of single-good double auctions: bid shading vanishes, and clearing prices concentrate on competitive levels and track the common value (price discovery). The key incentive step, that bidding on a bundle creates no first-order strategic distortion beyond the single-good logic, is proved for two goods; for larger item sets it remains a maintained condition. Multi-agent reinforcement-learning simulations decompose the welfare loss and indicate that No Assembly, not strategic shading, is the binding finite-market friction, with both losses small in moderately thick markets and declining with complementarity amongst goods.

The extended-onion and C-vine constructions of Lewandowski, Kurowicka and Joe (2009) are standard methods for sampling from the LKJ_n(eta) distribution on correlation matrices. We show that both arise from the simpler row-normalized Bartlett construction associated with the restricted-Wishart representation of Wang, Wu and Chu (2018), which exposes redundancies hidden in standard gamma-based implementations of the classical constructions. Two exact row-wise couplings establish this: the squared norm of the Gaussian vector supplying the onion's direction has exactly the Gamma law required for one component of the Beta radius, and the same vector, with one chi-squared variate, generates the entire row of mutually independent C-vine partial correlations with their required symmetric-Beta laws. We also show that, relative to flat off-diagonal measure, the LKJ family maximizes entropy at fixed expected log-determinant; the dual natural parameter is eta-1. Under gamma-ratio accounting, normalized Bartlett, the onion, and the conventional symmetric-Beta C-vine require n-1, 2(n-1), and n(n-1) Gamma-equivalent calls. Controlled benchmarks confirm a low-dimensional advantage over the onion implementation and a persistent advantage over the C-vine implementations examined; direct Bartlett normalization also avoids subtractive complements, moving the small-eta zero-diagonal threshold from machine-epsilon scale toward the subnormal range. The sampler is valid for every real eta > 0 and requires only standard normal and chi-squared variates.

This paper investigates the strategic and welfare properties of endogenous population partitioning (secession) within large-population anonymous games featuring strategic heterogeneity. We consider a continuum-player framework with a binary action space where players are categorized either as fol- lowers, who experience positive network externalities from conformity, or as contrarians, who seek distinctiveness via anti-conformism. We fully characterize the set of Nash equilibria and establish con- ditions under which costless secession yields structural Pareto improvements. We demonstrate that in any strategically mixed society, every mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium admits a Pareto-improving se- cession. With finitely many types, secession systematically mitigates coordination frictions, enhancing both individual payoffs and aggregate utility. Furthermore, we characterize social planner configura- tions optimizing weighted aggregate utility, establishing a formal mathematical isomorphism between optimal jurisdictional design and the theory of Bayesian persuasion solved via concavification. Finally, we derive the structural conditions governing migration stability when subgroups can unilaterally re- locate across distinct societies.

Fixed-effect saturation does not itself distort conventional inference, but classical measurement error does. Under a local noise drift $\sigma_\nu^2=c^2/n$, the FE-OLS $t$-statistic converges to a non-central normal; saturation contributes a common $\sqrt{1-\rho}$ scaling rather than preferentially destroying signal or noise. Inverting the size distortion gives a Stock–Yogo-style critical value. Self-consistency of the within-reliability-corrected pilot yields a breakdown reliability $\lambda^{\dagger}=|t|/(|t|+\eta^{\dagger})$ — the minimum within reliability at which conventional inference retains nominal size within the chosen tolerance — computable from the reported $t$-statistic alone and algebraically $\rho$-free conditional on it; $\eta^{\dagger}\approx0.65$ at $5\%$ size and a 5-point tolerance. Replacing $|t|$ by $|t|+z_{1-\gamma_\beta}$ gives a certified breakdown reliability; with a lower-reliability bound whose coverage error is $\gamma_\lambda$, false certification is at most $\gamma_\beta+\gamma_\lambda$. Under a checkable projection-compatibility condition, a cluster-level score CLT and consistency of the Arellano variance estimator in the many-fixed-effect regime justify applying the same map to the reported cluster-robust $t$-statistic; clustering can reverse a verdict. In a saturated democracy–growth panel, aggregate V-Dem polyarchy is certified at $\gamma_\beta=0.05$, conditional on the supplied measurement model, while its judicial-constraints sub-index is flagged under i.i.d.\ and clustered standard errors. In a twin-pair wage design, the specification is flagged under both independent and correlated reporting-error models, although implied coverage of the nominal-$95\%$ interval ranges from $8\%$ to $68\%$. The diagnostic covers classical error in a continuous regressor, not binary-treatment misclassification.

Generative AI makes expert output uninformative about the human fallback capability its provider keeps in reserve. A liability commitment can signal that capability: a provider whose staff rescue more of the cases the AI fails pays damages less often, so the commitment certifies an asset built by keeping people on cases and lost by taking them off. This paper asks where contract law leaves room for such a signal. Four legal primitives map a posted cap into retained exposure and close the message space from both sides: litigation viability, the penalty doctrine, displacement of liability to the state or an indemnity pool, and mandatory control of standard terms. Where the law leaves an option of zero exposure, low types pool at zero, intermediate types separate on a schedule anchored at the mandatory floor, and high types pool at the ceiling; where it does not, separation starts at the bottom type. A statutory floor removes the lower pool but pushes the schedule toward the ceiling, so its net effect is not monotone. The penalty doctrine decides whether recovery adequate for deterrence can be restored by contract or only by investing in verifiability. Holding fallback skill constant demands more human engagement the less often the AI fails. A calibration to five occupations and twelve legal configurations in Germany, Austria, Switzerland, the United Kingdom and the United States locates the binding margin of each cell and supports no ranking by legal family or contracting channel.

We characterize asymmetric tail risk across over one hundred U.S. macroeconomic and financial variables using a dynamic factor model with stochastic volatility. A single mechanism unifies growth-at-risk, inflation-at-risk, and sectoral risk heterogeneity: common factors and their volatilities move together, while heterogeneous loadings transmit the resulting asymmetry unevenly across variables. We find that asymmetric tail risk is pervasive but heterogeneous. The heterogeneity is systematic: factor exposures, especially to financial conditions and inflation, explain over half of the cross-sectional variation in tail asymmetry across variables. These exposures determine where in the economy vulnerabilities concentrate and how the balance of tail risks shifts over time.

This study provides a method to quantify the benefits of shifting passenger traffic from air to high-speed rail from the perspective of flight-delay cost reduction. We first estimate the number of flight reductions for airport origin-destination pairs based on the high-speed rail ridership forecasts provided in the California High-Speed Rail 2020 Business Plan, and then distribute these flight reductions to quarter-hour intervals. Lasso models are applied to estimate the impact of reduced queuing delays at SFO, LAX, and SAN on arrival delays at the national Core 29 airports. These delay reductions are then monetized using aircraft operating costs and the value of passenger time. We evaluate alternative airport-capacity and flight-schedule scenarios, as well as multiple percentiles of probabilistic high-speed rail ridership forecasts. The resulting estimates indicate flight-delay cost savings of $51-88 million in 2018 dollars in 2029 and $235-392 million in 2018 dollars in 2033.

We study the expected average rank achieved by the Efficiency-Adjusted Deferred Acceptance (EADA) mechanism in i.i.d.\ matching markets. While student-proposing Deferred Acceptance gives students an expected average rank of logarithmic order, we prove that EADA's expected average rank is at most $4\log\log n+O(1)$. Therefore, EADA improves the asymptotic order of students' assignments. At the cost of a weaker bound, $O((\log\log n)^2)$, we extend this conclusion to a much larger class of mechanisms. Namely, every Pareto-efficient mechanism that weakly Pareto-dominates DA breaks DA's logarithmic barrier. These are the first asymptotic guarantees for the expected average rank of EADA and of the broader class of Pareto-efficient improvements of DA. The conclusions extend to many-to-one markets with bounded quotas and random markets with correlated preferences.

Remote work has fundamentally reshaped urban economic life, and the spatial organisation of activity across cities. However, access to flexible work is distributed unevenly across industries, income groups, and genders, creating disparities in health risks, social mixing, and economic opportunity. Understanding where workplace dependence (WPD) is concentrated is therefore important, yet its distribution across urban areas remains poorly understood. Here we pair fine-grained hourly population data with detailed company records in a large European city to examine how location, industry composition, and socio-economic characteristics shape physical workplace attendance. By comparing workplace activity during periods of low versus high COVID-19 restrictions, we identify the determinants of WPD. We find that while industry and firm productivity are key drivers, the relationship between WPD, income, and gender is highly contingent on distance from the city center. Near the centre, female-majority and income-diverse locations show the highest WPD, consistent with a residual, place-bound service workforce. These findings reveal a spatially contingent 'service trap' at the urban core, extending remote-work inequalities beyond individuals to the urban ecosystem as a whole.