Papers

Artificial intelligence (AI) is increasingly integrated into medical decision-making, yet its liability implications remain complex, particularly when physicians differ in diagnostic skills and their quality is unobservable. This paper develops a principal-agent model in which a social planner designs medical liability to regulate a physician with private quality information who chooses between a standard treatment, a personalized judgment-based treatment, or following an imperfect AI recommendation. Our analysis yields several novel insights. First, we show that the optimal mechanism under asymmetric information is surprisingly simple: a uniform, one-size-fits-all liability level for all physician types who deviate from the standard of care. Despite physician heterogeneity, this simple policy often achieves the full-information first-best outcome, particularly when standard care is reliable or AI is highly accurate. Second, the relationship between AI accuracy and optimal liability is non-monotonic. Contrary to common intuition, better AI does not always imply more relaxed liability. As AI accuracy increases, the optimal liability either decreases monotonically or follows an inverted-U pattern, depending on the uncertainty of the standard treatment. Third, asymmetric information does not universally reduce social welfare. Welfare loss arises only when standard care is unreliable and AI accuracy is too low; even then, its magnitude follows an inverted U-shape, initially increasing as AI complicates the regulatory problem, but declining as more accurate AI helps mitigate it. Finally, we find that information asymmetry is a double-edged sword in the presence of AI, and greater transparency does not benefit all stakeholders equally.

We introduce a framework for preference-robust decision making when preferences over risk are modelled through generalised distortion risk measures. Unlike distributional robustness, our approach addresses ambiguity in the risk functional itself. We construct ambiguity sets on distortion (weight) functions using the Wasserstein distance and Bregman divergences, and derive closed-form expressions for the worst- and best-case distortion risk measures. We further extend the framework to rank-dependent utility, yielding preference-robust behavioural models. In particular, rank-dependent utility appears as a robustification of the expected utility model, yielding a novel way to address the Allais paradox.

We study prior-independent auction design when bidder values are independently and identically distributed and the seller knows only a scale-invariant shape restriction on their distribution, but neither the distribution nor the scale of values. We show that the maximin problem over a broad class of dominant-strategy incentive-compatible mechanisms reduces without loss to scale-free mechanisms. For any $n\ge 2$ monotone-hazard-rate bidders, the second-price auction without a reserve is maximin optimal over this class, including randomized mechanisms that may allocate to a lower bidder. We derive its exact guarantee for every $n$ and the sharp exponential rate at which its loss relative to the Bayesian optimum vanishes. Many familiar auctions are standard: they allocate only to a highest bidder, although incentive compatibility does not require this. For two regular bidders, we solve the standard problem exactly: its optimal mechanism mixes the second-price auction with a relative-markup auction and achieves a worst-case ratio of approximately $0.524413$. We construct a nonstandard mechanism that sometimes allocates to the lower bidder and achieves approximately $0.524829$, proving that standardness is strictly costly. The contrast is driven by tail restrictions: monotone hazard rate makes lower-rank allocation unhelpful, whereas regularity permits it to improve worst-case revenue.

Creator economy platforms face a strategic dilemma: allocating traffic to established stars for immediate ad revenue versus nurturing emerging creators to build a follower base for future monetization. We develop a continuous-time dynamic optimization model to characterize the optimal traffic allocation policy for a platform managing heterogeneous creators with dual revenue streams (advertising and direct follower contributions). We characterize the optimal policy analytically, revealing a “most-valuable-creator-first" rule driven by a forward-looking activation set. Under Bass diffusion dynamics, this policy exhibits a sophisticated “conditional reversal" strategy, where the platform temporarily prioritizes lagging creators to capitalize on word-of-mouth effects. Regarding the ecosystem structure, we find the optimal policy acts as a selective gatekeeper. Unlike myopic policies that lead to a harsh “winner-take-all" market, or naive fairness-driven heuristics that foster inefficient “indiscriminate growth," the optimal policy imposes a strict capability threshold that screens which creators receive platform traffic. Furthermore, it enforces disciplined growth for successful entrants, capping their follower bases at an optimal ceiling to prevent over-investment. Finally, we demonstrate that simple heuristics can lead to significant revenue losses (up to 25%) and propose a practical “follower-growth adjusted" heuristic that achieves near-optimal performance by leveraging observed growth momentum.

Monderer and Shapley (1996) showed that a game is a potential game precisely when the players' second-order cross-differences agree pair by pair. This paper asks what can be built from them when the agreement fails. The resulting MS-potential, assembled from their common-interest part, is unique up to separable payoff terms and exists precisely when a higher-order MS-condition holds; on exact potential games it recovers the potential up to the players' main effects. A least-squares construction extends the MS-potential to all finite games and induces the \MS-decomposition: every game splits into a common-interest MS-potential game and a residual absorbing every player's individualistic effects. Everything read off the second differences is invariant under the transformations that leave strategic content untouched, relabelling, non-strategic translation and action duplication, where the CMOP decomposition is not; only the least-squares extension fails, since it averages and centres. The central result is an identity: when all players have equally many actions, an augmentation of the MS-potential coincides, up to the additive constant, with the potential of Candogan et al. (2011). If action counts are unequal they diverge, and no bound on that divergence is established here. Both rest on the same uniform weighting of the players' actions.

Per-impression auctions have long served as the allocation mechanism in online advertising. We argue that in “hands-off-the-wheel” (HOTW) markets, where advertisers declare budgets and “return-on-investment” (ROI) targets and the exchange's ML models predict click values, auctions are no longer necessary: all information required for optimal pricing is already known to the exchange, which occupies the position of a monopolist pricing against a downward-sloping demand curve. A HOTW market is a Fisher market, whose competitive equilibrium can be computed via the convex program of Eisenberg and Gale, yielding market-clearing prices and allocations satisfying all budget and ROI constraints simultaneously. This competitive-equilibrium price is revenue-optimal for the exchange among all uniform-price mechanisms: avoiding the demand reduction problem in typical uniform-price multi-unit auctions. The resulting competitive equilibrium is moreover outcome-equivalent to sequential first-price auctions with pacing, with pacing multipliers computable ex-ante by the exchange. This one-shot approach replaces millions of individual auctions with one convex program, which is not only operationally simpler than dynamically evolving bidding strategies, but revenue-optimal for the exchange, while delivering the same equilibrium outcome.

We develop a unified modeling framework that connects two distinct types of bubbles defined in the literature: the rational bubbles (aka P-bubbles), and the local martingale bubbles (aka Q-bubbles). We show that the local martingale bubble model includes the classical rational bubble as a special case. We relate both types of bubbles to an equity's risk premium via a novel decomposition.